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Abstract	  
This thesis presents one possible way to develop a computational cognitive 
architecture, dubbed CernoCAMAL, that can be used to govern artificial minds 
probabilistically. The primary aim of the CernoCAMAL research project is to 
investigate how its predecessor architecture CAMAL can be extended to reason 
probabilistically about domain model objects through perception, and how the 
probability formalism can be integrated into its BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) model 
to coalesce a number of mechanisms and processes. 
The motivation and impetus for extending CAMAL and developing CernoCAMAL 
is the considerable evidence that probabilistic thinking and reasoning is linked to 
cognitive development and plays a role in cognitive functions, such as decision 
making and learning. This leads us to believe that a probabilistic reasoning capability 
is an essential part of human intelligence. Thus, it should be a vital part of any 
system that attempts to emulate human intelligence computationally. 
The extensions and augmentations to CAMAL, which are the main contributions of 
the CernoCAMAL research project, are as follows: 
Ø The integration of the EBS (Extended Belief Structure) that associates a 
probability value with every belief statement, in order to represent the degrees of 
belief numerically. 
Ø The inclusion of the CPR (CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner) that reasons 
probabilistically over the goal- and task-oriented perceptual feedback generated 
by reactive sub-systems. 
Ø The compatibility of the probabilistic BDI model with the affect and motivational 
models and affective and motivational valences used throughout CernoCAMAL. 
A succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds is carried out to 
demonstrate improvements and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall 
cognitive performance. A discussion and critical appraisal of the experimental 
results, together with a summary, a number of potential future research directions, 
and some closing remarks conclude the thesis. 
  
4 
Table	  of	  Contents	  
1	   Introduction ........................................................................................ 9	  
1.1	   Problem Statement ........................................................................................... 9	  
1.2	   Proposed Solution .......................................................................................... 10	  
1.3	   Research Questions ....................................................................................... 11	  
1.4	   Thesis Structure ............................................................................................. 12	  
2	   Essential Background ...................................................................... 13	  
2.1	   Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence ................................................ 13	  
2.2	   Symbolism and Connectionism ..................................................................... 15	  
2.3	   Cognitive Modelling and Cognitive Architectures ........................................ 17	  
2.3.1	   Reactive Architectures ............................................................................ 20	  
2.3.2	   Deliberative Architectures ...................................................................... 20	  
2.3.3	   Hybrid Architectures .............................................................................. 21	  
2.4	   Theory of Mind, Emotions, and Motivation .................................................. 22	  
2.5	   Autonomous Cognitive Agents and Mobile Robots ...................................... 25	  
2.6	   Physical Grounding Hypothesis .................................................................... 27	  
2.7	   Perceptual Symbol System ............................................................................ 28	  
2.8	   Control System Approach ............................................................................. 29	  
2.8.1	   Control State Theory .............................................................................. 31	  
2.8.2	   Affective and Motivational Control States ............................................. 33	  
2.9	   Summary ........................................................................................................ 35	  
3	   Literature Review ............................................................................ 36	  
3.1	   Introduction to CAMAL ................................................................................ 36	  
3.2	   Layers and Organization ................................................................................ 42	  
3.3	   BDI Model ..................................................................................................... 43	  
3.3.1	   CRIBB Model ......................................................................................... 45	  
3.4	   Affect Model ................................................................................................. 47	  
3.4.1	   a-CRIBB Model ...................................................................................... 49	  
3.5	   Associations ................................................................................................... 51	  
3.6	   Motivational Blackboard and Motivators ...................................................... 53	  
3.7	   Domain Model ............................................................................................... 55	  
3.8	   Operational Overview ................................................................................... 57	  
3.9	   Representative Cognitive Architectures ........................................................ 58	  
5 
3.9.1	   RoboCAMAL ......................................................................................... 58	  
3.9.2	   ACT-R .................................................................................................... 63	  
3.9.3	   SOAR ..................................................................................................... 63	  
3.9.4	   CLARION .............................................................................................. 64	  
3.9.5	   GLAIR .................................................................................................... 64	  
3.9.6	   ICARUS ................................................................................................. 64	  
3.9.7	   PolyScheme ............................................................................................ 65	  
3.10	   Summary ...................................................................................................... 65	  
4	   CernoCAMAL Architecture ........................................................... 66	  
4.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................... 66	  
4.2	   Probability Theory ......................................................................................... 68	  
4.3	   Basics of Probability Calculus ....................................................................... 70	  
4.4	   Extended Belief Structure (EBS) ................................................................... 73	  
4.5	   CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner (CPR) ............................................... 75	  
4.5.1	   Memory Facility ..................................................................................... 77	  
4.5.2	   Norm Facility .......................................................................................... 79	  
4.6	   Operational Overview ................................................................................... 80	  
4.7	   Summary ........................................................................................................ 85	  
5	   Experimentation Testbeds .............................................................. 86	  
5.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................... 86	  
5.2	   Experimental Methodology ........................................................................... 87	  
5.3	   Predator-Prey Tile World .............................................................................. 88	  
5.4	   ARIA MobileSim World ............................................................................... 92	  
5.5	   CPR Functionality in Testbeds ...................................................................... 96	  
5.6	   Testbeds Evaluation ..................................................................................... 101	  
5.7	   Summary ...................................................................................................... 104	  
6	   Experiments and Results ............................................................... 105	  
6.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................. 105	  
6.2	   Predator-Prey Experiments .......................................................................... 106	  
6.2.1	   Validation of CPR in Predator-Prey Testbed ....................................... 106	  
6.2.2	   Goal Achievement  Success and Failure .............................................. 114	  
6.2.3	   Population Adaptation Experiments ..................................................... 116	  
6.2.4	   Probabilistic Motivator Norm Experiments ......................................... 119	  
6 
6.3	   MobileSim Experiments .............................................................................. 120	  
6.3.1	   Validation of CPR in ARIA MobileSim Testbed ................................. 120	  
6.3.2	   Goal Achievement  Success and Failure .............................................. 125	  
6.3.3	   Population Adaptation Experiments ..................................................... 127	  
6.3.4	   Probabilistic Motivator Norm Experiments ......................................... 130	  
6.4	   CernoCAMAL  vs.  RoboCAMAL ............................................................. 131	  
6.4.1	   Challenge for CernoCAMAL ............................................................... 132	  
6.4.2	   Cerno-on-Robo Challenge .................................................................... 135	  
6.5	   Summary ...................................................................................................... 136	  
7	   Critical Analysis and Discussion .................................................. 137	  
7.1	   Experimental Results Appraisal .................................................................. 137	  
7.2	   Evaluation and Assessment Criteria ............................................................ 139	  
7.2.1	   Knowledge and Information Accessibility ........................................... 140	  
7.2.2	   Generality and Integration .................................................................... 140	  
7.2.3	   Belief and Degree-of-Belief Reasoning and Updating ......................... 141	  
7.2.4	   Desire and Goal Reasoning and Updating ............................................ 141	  
7.2.5	   Intention, Action, and Behaviour ......................................................... 142	  
7.2.6	   Object Recognition and Classification ................................................. 142	  
7.2.7	   Decision Making, Learning, and Adaptation ....................................... 143	  
7.2.8	   Perception and Perceptual Processing .................................................. 144	  
7.3	   Open Research Issues and Some Recent Developments ............................. 145	  
7.4	   Summary ...................................................................................................... 147	  
8	   Summary and Conclusion ............................................................. 148	  
8.1	   Thesis  Summary ......................................................................................... 148	  
8.2	   Conclusions and Outcomes ......................................................................... 149	  
8.3	   Research Questions Re-visited .................................................................... 150	  
8.4	   Thesis Contributions and Claims Re-visited ............................................... 151	  
8.5	   Potential Future Directions .......................................................................... 152	  
9	   References, Bibliography, and Further Reading ........................ 155	  
10	   Appendix I – Blackboard and Domain Model ........................... 182	  
11	   Appendix II – Software Development Engineering .................. 185	  
12	   Appendix III – Copy Rights and Permissions ........................... 186	  
7 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3-1: Three Tower Model (Nilsson 1998) ........................................................ 39	  
Figure 3-2: Three Layer Model (Nilsson 1998) ......................................................... 40	  
Figure 3-3: The CogAff Architecture (Sloman 2001) ................................................ 41	  
Figure 3-4: The four-layer five-column CAMAL Model (Davis 2010) ..................... 42	  
Figure 3-5: Belief-Desire Reasoning Model (Bartsch, Wellman 1989) ..................... 46	  
Figure 3-6: High-Level View of CRIBB Architecture (Wahl, Spada 2000) .............. 47	  
Figure 3-7: High-Level View of a-CRIBB Architecture (Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004) 51	  
Figure 3-8: ActiveMedia AmigoBot Mobile Robot (ActiveMedia 2007) .................. 59	  
Figure 3-9: RoboCAMAL’s Enclosure (Robotics Lab, Hull University) .................. 59	  
Figure 3-10: RoboCAMAL’s Omni-Directional Vision (Gwatkin and Davis 2007) . 61	  
Figure 4-1: Overview of Architectural Operation ...................................................... 84	  
Figure 5-1: The Predator-Prey Simulation World (originally by Davis 2008) .......... 88	  
Figure 5-2: The Possible Entities of the Predator-Prey Simulation World ................ 89	  
Figure 5-3: The ARIA MobileSim Simulation World (ActiveMedia 2010) .............. 93	  
Figure 5-4: The Possible Entities of the ARIA MobileSim World ............................ 94	  
Figure 5-5: The Angular Positions of the Sonar Sensors (Whitbrook 2010) ............. 96	  
Figure 6-1: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes ....................................... 114	  
Figure 6-2: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures ....................................... 115	  
Figure 6-3: First Adaptability Experiment ............................................................... 117	  
Figure 6-4: Second Adaptability Experiment ........................................................... 118	  
Figure 6-5: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes ....................................... 119	  
Figure 6-6: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures ....................................... 120	  
Figure 6-7: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes ....................................... 126	  
Figure 6-8: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures ....................................... 127	  
Figure 6-9: First Adaptability Experiment ............................................................... 128	  
Figure 6-10: Second Adaptability Experiment ......................................................... 129	  
Figure 6-11: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes ..................................... 130	  
Figure 6-12: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures ..................................... 131	  
Figure 6-13: Negligible number of wrong associations ........................................... 135	  
Figure 6-14: Negligible number of wrong associations ........................................... 136	  
 
8 
List of Equations and Tables 
Equation 4-1: Axiom One .......................................................................................... 70	  
Equation 4-2: Axiom Two .......................................................................................... 70	  
Equation 4-3: Axiom Three ........................................................................................ 71	  
Equation 4-4: Theorem One ....................................................................................... 71	  
Equation 4-5: Bayes’ Rule .......................................................................................... 71	  
Equation 4-6: Probabilistic Inference Theorem ......................................................... 71	  
Table 4-7: CernoCAMAL’s CPR Actions ................................................................. 76	  
Table 5-1: Evaluation of CAMAL’s Spin-Off Projects ........................................... 103	  
Table 6-1: Cerno’s Reasoning over Reactive Feedback Lists .................................. 109	  
Table 6-2: Cerno’s Possible Environment Combinations ........................................ 133	  
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
a-CRIBB affective CRIBB  (see CRIBB below) 
ACT-R Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
ANN  Artificial Neural Network 
API  Application Programming Interface 
ARIA  Advanced Robotic Interface for Applications 
BBAI  Behaviour Based Artificial Intelligence 
BDI  Belief Desire Intention 
CAMAL Computational Architecture for Motivation, Affect, and Learning 
CogAff Cognition Affect  (project) 
CPR  CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner 
CRIBB Children’s Reasoning about Intentions, Beliefs, and Behaviour 
DegBel Degree of Belief 
EBS  Extended Belief Structure 
GC5  Grand Challenge 5 
P3DX  Pioneer 3DX  (robot) 
SOAR  State, Operator, And Result 
TOK  Theory of Knowledge 
UTC  Unified Theory of Cognition 
 	  
9 
1 Introduction	  
This chapter begins with a brief description of the problem tackled in this thesis. 
After setting the scene and defining the context, a description of a potential solution 
proposed to overcome this problem is presented. The research issues concerning the 
current cognitive architecture under investigation – CernoCAMAL – are then 
highlighted, followed by the objectives of the research described here. It is also 
pointed out how the proposed solution and its consequent augmentation have led to 
the development of a probabilistic reasoner for CernoCAMAL that can deliberate 
probabilistically over the generated perceptual feedback.  The chapter concludes with 
an outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Problem	  Statement	  
There is considerable evidence that probabilistic thinking and reasoning is linked to 
cognitive development and plays a role in cognitive functions, such as decision 
making and learning (e.g. Piaget 1928; Piaget, Inhelder 1951; Fischbein 1975; Shaughnessy 1981; 
Green 1983; Peard 1995; J.Truran 1996; K.Truran 1996; Fischbein, Schnarch 1997; Way 2003; 
Oaksford, Chater 2007, 2009). This leads us to believe that a probabilistic reasoning 
capability is an essential part of human intelligence.  Thus, it should be a vital part of 
any system that attempts to emulate human intelligence computationally. In other 
words, probabilistic reasoning is an essential aspect of the process of cognition and 
therefore must be considered in any adequate description of it, such as a 
computational  cognitive  architecture. 
The problem is that CAMAL has never addressed or included any probabilistic 
reasoning capability. As a multi-tier cognitive architecture, however, it must 
incorporate this fundamental cognitive capability.  CAMAL uses a variant of the a-
CRIBB reasoning model (Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004) i.e. a BDI model and an affect 
model, plus a motivational blackboard.  At the deliberative level, affective values and 
affordances can be associated with processes and predicates, and then relayed as 
control signals to instantiate and modify aspects of motivators and their associated 
representations and behaviours (Davis 2010). 
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One of the limitations of the BDI model, however, is the lack of any explicit 
mechanism to express degrees of belief. The belief statements used by CAMAL’s 
BDI model are represented by clauses of the form: 
belief	  (	  Descriptor,	  Source,	  Time	  ).	  
This particular syntax represents beliefs as categorical states.  Therefore, they cannot 
be adequately valenced via affective values and affordances, in line with the affect 
and motivational models. Given that the current CAMAL research presents an affect- 
and affordance-based core for mind, it seems reasonable to conjecture that beliefs, 
too, should be grounded in the use of affect with the aim to be consistent across 
different domains, tasks, and levels of processing. The belief structures are vital to 
this work – hence the early introduction of the belief predicate above – but they are 
merely an artefact of the implementation that demonstrate the principles argued for 
in the thesis. 
1.2 Proposed	  Solution	  
It is proposed to represent CernoCAMAL’s belief statements as graded states, using 
probability formalism. Put differently, it is proposed to use an Extended Belief 
Structure (EBS) to represent the degrees of beliefs numerically and then manipulate 
them.  The belief statements used by CernoCAMAL’s BDI model are represented by 
clauses of the form: 
belief	  (	  Descriptor,	  Source,	  Time,	  DegBel	  ).	  
A probabilistic reasoning capability will be incorporated in CernoCAMAL using the 
proposed belief predicate. The EBS associates a probability value	   DegBel with 
every belief statement in CernoCAMAL which defines the degree to which the belief 
statement is believed to be true. This will enable the computation of changing 
degrees of belief given apriori, and subsequently using the BDI, affect, and 
motivational models to determine the agent’s intentions, actions, or behaviours.       
In other words, it will allow the entire BDI model to run using numeric affective 
values and affordances to prioritize choices over the current belief set. 
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The proposed EBS and consequently the BDI model will be compatible with the way 
in which the affect and motivational models operate throughout CernoCAMAL: 
having an associated affective magnitude that can fluctuate according to success or 
failure associated with that element. Put differently, affect will serve as a decision 
metric and affective values as a currency across the entire architecture, including 
beliefs and the BDI model. This way, belief structures, too, will be grounded in the 
use of affect with the aim to be consistent across different domains, tasks, and levels 
of processing. 
The proposal to incorporate the EBS has also led to the development of the 
CernoCAMAL Probabilistic Reasoner (CPR) that can deliberate probabilistically 
over the generated perceptual feedback: feedback generated by reactive sub-systems. 
The CPR consistently reasons about the domain model objects and their instances, 
and keeps CernoCAMAL’s model of its surroundings up to date. 
1.3 Research	  Questions	  
In general, this project builds on research into computational models of cognition 
(Davis  1996…2010) and how affect and motivation can be used to improve reasoning 
about perceptions and belief formations (Davis 1996…2010). It also applies a 
development of these models, used in simulated and real environments (i.e. virtual 
and physical testbeds) to the control of a recently-built cognitive mobile robot –
RoboCAMAL (Gwatkin   2009). 
There clearly exists a need to address and incorporate probabilistic reasoning and 
inference in CAMAL. The primary aim of the CernoCAMAL research project is      
exactly to tackle this need with the formal probability theory. This research therefore 
attempts to address the following specific research questions in the current cognitive 
architecture under investigation – CernoCAMAL: 
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Ø Can CernoCAMAL reason probabilistically by exploiting the proposed EBS? 
Can the integration of the proposed EBS facilitate probabilistic reasoning and 
inference in CernoCAMAL? 
Ø Can the BDI model run compatibly with the affect and motivational models, and 
affective and motivational valences used throughout the whole architecture?   
Can this ensure a consistent and systematic metric across all aspects of affect, 
reasoning, and domain model management? 
Ø Can the probabilistic deliberation results of the CPR be used for computing 
changing degrees of belief given apriori, and subsequently using the BDI, affect, 
and motivational models to determine the agent’s intentions, actions, and 
behaviours? 
Ø Can the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture be applied to virtual and physical 
cognitive agents using synthetic testbeds and mobile robots? 
1.4 Thesis	  Structure	  
The remainder of this thesis is divided as follows: Chapter 2 presents some necessary 
background knowledge pertaining to this work. Chapter 3 reviews the original 
overarching CAMAL architecture as an important pivotal axis for the development 
of CernoCAMAL. Chapter 4 lays out the motivation and impetus for the 
development of CernoCAMAL followed by an introduction to its framework and 
main components, namely EBS and CPR. Chapter 5 introduces the testbeds, 
followed by an overview to the different types of controlled experimentation carried 
out in these environments.  Chapter 6 presents a succession of experiments in the 
simulation and robotic testbeds, followed by the experiments’ outcomes.  Chapter 7 
analyses the obtained experimental results, followed by a discussion over them. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary, a number of potential future research 
directions,  and some closing remarks.	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2 Essential	  Background	  
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the fields of Cognitive Science and 
Artificial Intelligence. Two major approaches to the study of these two inseparable 
areas of science are pointed out: Symbolism and Connectionism. The concepts of 
Cognitive Modelling and Cognitive Architectures are explained, and commonly used 
types of cognitive architectures are highlighted: Reactive, Deliberative, and Hybrid. 
The notion of Theory of Mind is introduced, and a flavour of the familiar phenomena 
of Emotion and Motivation is presented. This is followed by some background 
knowledge in Autonomous Cognitive Agents and Mobile Robots research. Three 
major approaches to the study of this area of research, and the possibility of 
achieving synthetic intelligence in autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots 
are presented: Physical Grounding hypothesis; Perceptual Symbol System theory; 
and Control System approach. The latter – as the cornerstone of this work – is 
discussed in detail, followed by an introduction to the Control State theory. The 
chapter concludes with presenting the notion of Affective and Motivational Control 
States and how they are used in developing cognitive architectures. 
2.1 Cognitive	  Science	  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  
Cognitive Science is the study of cognition and intelligence, and their computational 
processes in humans, animals, computers, and in the abstract (Kaplan, Simon 1989) with 
contributors from various fields, including Neuroscience, Psychology, Philosophy, 
and Computer Science.  It is a broad field that covers a wide array of topics related to 
cognition. It is, essentially, the study of cognitive processes and how they are 
integrated to form a mind (Franklin 1995). 
One of the main topics that Cognitive Science is concerned with is Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). AI involves the study of cognition, cognitive phenomena, and 
intelligence in machines, with an ultimate goal of producing working models with 
human-like or animal-like mental properties and capabilities, whether in order to 
provide detailed scientific explanations for aspects of human or animal cognition,    
or in order to solve real-world problems (Franklin 1995). 
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Nearly thirty years ago, Donald Norman (1980) set an agenda of important topics for 
Cognitive Science. He argued that there are at least twelve issues that should 
comprise this agenda: consciousness; perception; memory; language; thought; belief; 
emotion; interaction; performance; learning; skill; and development. This long, 
though non-exhaustive, list has played an important role in determining where 
researchers have focused their work in AI. 
But there exists a number of concerns: whether there is only one correct and unique 
way of integrating cognitive processes to build an artificial mind; whether there are 
any common principles with which an artificial mind can be built; whether there is 
any need for a set of general assumptions for constructing a cognitive model of mind. 
The eminent Unified Theories of Cognition (Newell 1990) attempts to address these 
concerns. It defines a Unified Theory of Cognition (UTC) as a single set of 
mechanisms and processes for all cognitive behaviour1. It argues that we need a set 
of general assumptions for building an artificial mind. It also asserts that any UTC 
must explain several key issues, such as how to represent knowledge, how to define 
goals, etc. 
This view of integrating various cognitive components and building an artificial 
mind is a prevalent view in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence.  It implies 
that mind can be decomposed into separate modules, as in distinct processing units, 
such as a unit for handling memory, a module for handling visual data, a centre for 
emotion processing, etc. This view is often referred to as the modularity of mind 
(Fodor 1983). This view is strongly opposed by the multimodality of mind view that 
denies the existence of such separate modules (Barsalou 1999). As a matter of fact, 
multimodal integration has been found in many different locations in the brain (e.g. 
Gallese, Lakoff 2005). Sensory modalities like touch, vision, hearing, and so on are 
actually integrated with each other and with motor control and planning. All this 
appears to suggest that there are no distinct regions whose only job is to link 
supposedly separate brain areas for distinct sensory modalities (Gallese, Lakoff 2005). 
  
                                                
1 Behaviours are directed to the achievement of goals, whether explicit or implicit (Toates1998).  
They are actions performed on an environment. The most primitive type is a reflex. More 
sophisticated type on an environment may be sub-systems built to achieve specific tasks, e.g. reactive 
sub-architectures. 
15 
2.2 Symbolism	  and	  Connectionism	  
In mid 1950s when access to digital computers had just become possible, AI research 
began to explore the possibility that human intelligence could be reduced to symbol 
manipulation. Essentially, symbolic AI systems manipulate symbols instead of 
numbers.  Furthermore, these systems operate under a set of rules, and their actions 
are determined by these rules. So, their general form is a symbol-processing program 
consisting of rules of some kind, stored in some sort of memory, along with some 
appropriate data structures.  The rules, then, operate on the data structures producing 
some impression of intelligence. John Haugeland coined the term good old fashioned 
AI for these symbolic approaches (Haugeland 1985). 
Much of the work done in symbolism (symbolic AI) is based on the Physical Symbol 
System hypothesis. The hypothesis states that a physical symbol system, such as a 
digital computer, has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action 
(Newell, Simon 1976). The hypothesis identifies a class of systems as embodying the 
essential nature of symbols, and as being the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
generally intelligent agent (Newell 1982). The hypothesis implies that computers, when 
we provide them with the appropriate symbol-processing programs, will be capable 
of intelligent action. It also implies, as Newell and Simon wrote, that the symbolic 
behaviour of man arises because he has the ‘characteristics’ of a physical symbol 
system. 
A physical symbol system consists of a set of entities, called symbols, which are 
physical patterns that can occur as components of another type of entity, called an 
expression or symbol structure (Newell, Simon 1972). Thus, an expression or symbol 
structure is composed of a number of symbols, related to each other in some way. 
This symbolic structure can be realized in a physical system, such as a digital 
computer. The adjective physical denotes an important feature that such a system can 
be realized by engineering together physical components. The ‘characteristics’ 
Newell and Simon referred to – highlighted in the previous paragraph – should be 
clear now. 
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A good example of a physical symbol system is a production system (Newell, Simon 
1976). A production system consists of a collection of rules (production rules), a set of 
conditions and facts that reside in a working memory, and a series of search 
mechanisms. These search mechanisms comprise a control system that infers new 
facts from the existing stored facts. A production system usually takes the simple 
form of if(condition),	  then(action) which means that if the conditions or 
facts in the working memory are true, then the actions or behaviours are carried out 
and, possibly, new facts are generated. 
There is another popular approach known as connectionism (connectionist AI). 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are well-known and widely-used example of 
connectionist models. Connectionist models are usually networks of large numbers 
of simple, but highly interconnected units, running in parallel. They are simplified 
models of the brain, and their constituent units (artificial neurons) are the analogues of 
biological neurons, together with weights that measure the strength of connections 
between the units. The behaviour of the network as a whole is a function of the initial 
state(s) of activation of the units and of the weights on its connections (Haykin 1994). 
The connectionist approach takes the idea that intelligence arises from the 
interactions of such highly-interconnected neurons (Clark 1989). Information from one 
neuron flows to another neuron across a synapse. Electrical signals carry information 
from one end of a neuron to the other, while a chemical reaction is responsible for 
passing signals from one neuron to another through their interconnected dendrites. 
ANNs are not programmed specifically to solve problems – they are trained.  In other 
words, they are not programmed as such, but learn how to perform a task.  Learning 
in biological systems involves adjustments to the synaptic connections that exist 
between the neurons.  This is true for ANNs as well. 
To summarize 2 symbolic AI people are advocating a computer model of mind and 
connectionist AI people are arguing for a brain model of mind. To paraphrase 
Franklin (1995): 
  
                                                
2 There are a number of common approaches to modelling the human mind and cognition, such as 
Symbolic, Connectionist, and Probabilistic. The latter is the cornerstone approach adopted by this 
work. See 4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
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Ø Symbolism constructs its model of mind using computation as metaphor – mind 
is like a digital computer, processing a symbolic language; so mental activity is 
like the execution of a stored symbolic program. 
Ø Connectionism bases its model of mind on a nervous system metaphor – mental 
activity is like the settling of a neuronal network into a stable configuration. 
The notion that intelligence requires the use and manipulation of symbols has been 
extremely influential in AI. Several leading minds in AI research maintain this 
computational approach, asserting that the kind of computing that is relevant to 
understanding cognition involves various operations on symbols (e.g. Newell 1980, 
1982, 1990; Fodor 1976, 1987; Pylyshyn 1987, 1989; Simon 1967, 1996, 1999). In contrast, 
connectionism proposes to design systems that can exhibit intelligent behaviour 
without storing, retrieving, and operating on structured symbolic expressions (e.g. 
Clark 1989). This method has grown very popular, particularly among those who 
believe that cognition can only be understood if we study it as Neuroscience (e.g. 
Arbib 1975). As described by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), almost everyone who was 
discontent with the information processing models of mind and symbolism, rushed to 
embrace the connectionist alternative! 
2.3 Cognitive	  Modelling	  and	  Cognitive	  Architectures	  
There are two widely-used, though ill-defined, terms throughout AI literature:   
model and architecture. A model is an abstract representation of a system from a 
particular point of view. It is an artificial system (or a design for one or a theory of one) 
that behaves in almost the same way as a natural system. We build models to 
simulate a natural phenomenon in a useful manner, in order to perform experiments 
with them. A cognitive model is an abstract representation of human or animal 
cognition (predominantly human).  It is an approximation to cognitive processes and is 
intended to be an explanation of how some aspect of cognition is accomplished by a 
set of primitive biological and computational processes. 
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Architecture means structure. A computational architecture shows various 
components and the control flow through them.  It is some level of abstraction of 
some functional system that provides functional differentiation into interacting 
components (Sloman 1993). A cognitive architecture refers to the design and 
organization of the mind and cognition.  It shows various components and the control 
flow through those components. It also specifies the underlying mechanisms and 
processes of a cognitive system.  Essentially, it provides a working model of some 
set of cognitive phenomena. 
A cognitive architecture could also be defined as an embodiment of a scientific 
hypothesis about those aspects of human cognition that are relatively constant over 
time and relatively independent of task (Ritter, Young 2001). Put simply, a cognitive 
architecture is a theory for simulating and understanding some aspect of cognition. 
Some well-known examples of cognitive architectures are ACT-R, SOAR, and 
CogAff (see 7.2). Cognitive architectures are designed and implemented to be capable 
of performing certain behaviours and functions based on our understanding of human 
(and sometimes animal) minds. A model of a task constructed in a cognitive 
architecture can be run to produce a sequence of actions or behaviours. These 
sequences can then be compared with the sequences produced by human users, to 
assess the quality of a particular model. 
Cognitive modelling refers to the investigation of mind and cognition through 
developing cognitive architectures, in order to simulate cognitive processes (Anderson 
1990). It must be noted that all modelling is context-dependent; i.e. a model has a 
scope defined as the set of circumstances under which the model works.  This scope 
is related to the concepts within which the model was developed and validated 
(Edmunds 2003). Attempts to construct cognitive models have been considerably 
assisted by the availability of appropriate languages for specifying and implementing 
them, such as Prolog. This thesis deals almost entirely with symbolic AI which, 
consequently, necessitates the need for explicit representation of beliefs, goals, 
actions, etc. One of the three software programming languages adopted for the 
purposes of this work is indeed Prolog that facilitates the convenient expression of 
symbols and symbolic structures (see appendix II). 
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In 1993 Professor Aaron Sloman put this conjecture forward: “In order to account 
for the main characteristics of the human mind, it is more important to get the 
architecture right than to get the mechanisms right. Architecture dominates 
mechanism.” (Mind as a Control System, Sloman 1993, p.1). He also suggested that we 
should try to characterize suitable classes of mechanisms and processes at the highest 
level of generality, and then expand with as much detail as is needed for our 
purposes.  This is referring to broad and shallow architectures (Reilly, Bates 1993) that 
we should aim to start with. That is, the architectures should accommodate and 
integrate a wide range of general functions, such as vision, motivation, emotion, 
various kinds of action, various kinds of problem-solving, etc. This contrasts with 
deep and narrow systems, e.g. systems to analyse images, or understand sentences, 
etc. It may be necessary for a while to tolerate relatively shallow and simplified 
components as we explore the problems of putting lots of different components 
together. Later, we can gradually add depth and realism to the systems we build 
(Sloman 1993; Reilly, Bates 1993). 
As mentioned earlier, Norman set an agenda of important topics for Cognitive 
Science. An important aspect of Norman’s agenda is actually the use of an 
architectural perspective (Norman 1980). One such example architecture based on his 
view could identify five interactive processes: the reception of incoming signals 
(perception), the generation of output (action or intention or behaviour), a reactive or 
regulatory system, a deliberative or cognitive system, and an emotional or affective 
system. He suggested that this is the type of architecture needed to address the twelve 
issues included in his agenda. 
A brief overview of the main types of architectures used in designing and developing 
autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots is presented next. 
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2.3.1 Reactive	  Architectures	  
Reactive architectures are a relatively simple way of generating behaviours that 
allow an agent to interact with a virtual or physical environment in real time. 
Reactive architectures rely on quick responses. They can, therefore, be fast which 
makes them efficient and suitable to dynamic (changing) environments. Reactive 
architectures are based on the assumption that intelligent behaviour can be generated 
without explicit symbolic representation or explicit symbolic reasoning. By linking 
responses in an agent’s perceptual systems directly to its actuators (also termed 
effectors or motors), the need to create an internal representation of the environment is 
eliminated (Brooks 1991). 
The classic or traditional approach to AI (symbolism) decomposes intelligence into 
functional information-processing modules, e.g. memory, vision, planning, learning, 
etc. Each individual module does not actually produce any behaviour – only when all 
the various modules are combined, will an agent produce behaviour.  In contrast, the 
reactive approach decomposes intelligence into behaviour-generating modules; i.e. 
each module produces a distinct behaviour, independent of other modules. Thus, the 
overall behaviour is determined by the combined effects of individual units acting 
independently. This makes reactive systems more robust than those built based on 
the symbolic approach, since the modules are placed in parallel, with information 
from the sensors passed to all units. Therefore, if a module breaks down or is 
removed, information is still passed to all the other modules and they can still 
operate.  This is the well-known subsumption architecture (Brooks 1986). 
2.3.2 Deliberative	  Architectures	  
Deliberative architectures are those that reason about actions and events, take into 
consideration the outcomes of their intentions, and deliberate to build a set of 
purposeful behaviours in order to achieve a specific goal. Most deliberative 
architectures make use of symbols to represent their current state and the 
environment they are situated in, in order to reason about their actions and events and 
determine their output. 
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Deliberative architectures have some major problems though. A first problem is the 
Frame problem which is essentially the problem of how to keep an agent’s model of 
its environment consistent and up to date (McCarthy, Hayes 1969; Pylyshyn 1987).            
A second problem is the Symbol Grounding problem, which is basically the problem 
of how symbols are created that represent objects and events in an agent’s 
environment (Harnard 1990). These issues can be simply put as: how to translate the 
environment into an appropriate symbolic description and how to symbolically 
represent information about dynamic and complex environments, and all that in time 
for an agent to act properly (Davis 2000). These two problems are issues that most such 
architectures need to address (Coradeschi, Saffiotti 1999, 2003; Shanahan 2005). This type of 
architecture on its own usually lacks reactivity in real-time contexts. 
2.3.3 Hybrid	  Architectures	  
As the name suggests, this approach combines reactive and deliberative processes,  
to gain the advantages of both types. The processes are used asynchronously which 
allows both quick responses and planned behaviours based on reasoning. Hybrid 
architectures usually use a reactive component to interact with the environment, and 
a deliberative component to reason about the environment, events, objects, and 
actions. Behaviours such as obstacle-avoidance that are difficult to achieve using 
symbolic methods, consequently become trivial by using a reactive layer, as there is 
no need for the agent to create an internal model or internal representation of its 
environment. 
Also, since the use of reactive components to interact with the environment filters 
out unnecessary information, only relevant information is passed to the deliberative 
component. This allows the deliberative processes to reason and plan in a more 
efficient way.  In addition to the above two advantages, in some cases a deliberative 
architecture could suspend processing, to allow full reactive use (e.g. RoboCAMAL: 
Gwatkin 2009). These major reasons make hybrid architectures a sensible approach for 
developing autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots. 
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2.4 Theory	  of	  Mind,	  Emotions,	  and	  Motivation	  
Franklin and Sloman have maintained for years, and still do, that the most useful way 
to look at a mind is as a control system for a cognitive agent. The continuing task of a 
mind, according to both thinkers, is to produce the agent’s next action; i.e. to answer 
the only really significant question there is: what shall I do next (Franklin 1995). Any 
theory specifying how to go about answering this question is a Theory of Mind. A 
Theory of Mind is computationally plausible if it can be implemented or modelled on 
a computer. Put differently, an acceptable Theory of Mind is one that maps onto a 
computational design, and onto at least one implementation. If a Theory of Mind is 
to be implemented or modelled on a computer or agent, we must have in hand a 
computationally plausible cognitive architecture. If we have succeeded in 
implementing our cognitive architecture on a computer or agent (or better still a mobile 
robot with real sensing and acting capabilities and embedded in the real world!) so that it 
supports our Theory of Mind, we have produced an instantiation of an artificial mind 
or synthetic intelligence, based on that particular cognitive architecture. 
Some researchers in the fields of Psychology and Cognitive Psychology hold a 
slightly different opinion of what a Theory of Mind actually is. It is common to see 
Theory of Mind referring to the ability to represent, conceptualize, infer, and reason 
about one’s own or others’ mental states from their experiences or their behaviours 
(Bartsch, Wellman 1989). This particular interpretation recognizes that the mind has the 
ability to attribute mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions) to oneself and others. 
Thus, a Theory of Mind in these fields refers to a process of generating inferences 
about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others. 
A specific area that has been intensively studied in Developmental Psychology under 
the heading Theory of Mind is the development of children’s understanding of 
beliefs and intentions as representational entities. In this context, the Theory of Mind 
studies the development of children’s competency in reasoning about mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. This is a specific cognitive ability to 
understand others as intentional agents (Gopnik 1993). 
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The nature of emotions has been studied for a considerable time, with many 
contrasting theories and views having been formed (e.g. Darwin 1872; Duffy 1941; Camras 
1992; Elliott 1992, 1994; Damasio 1994; Bates 1994; Bower 1994; Clore 1994; Ekman 1992…1999; 
Ekman et al. 1977…1994; Simon 1967…1999; Picard 1997…2010; Sloman 1993…2003; Clocksin 
2004; Aube 2005; Davis 1996…2010; Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004). The majority of the theories 
developed can be largely examined in terms of two components: 
Ø Emotions are cognitive, emphasizing their mental component. 
Ø Emotions are physical, emphasizing their bodily component. 
Research on the cognitive component focuses on understanding the situations that 
give rise to emotions, whereas research on the physical component emphasizes the 
physiological responses that co-occur with emotions, or rapidly follow them (Picard 
1997). The distinction is not crucial to this particular research work. What is 
fundamental is the accumulating evidence that implicates the significant role of 
emotions in a variety of cognitive functions, such as reasoning, learning, perception, 
memory, and decision making (Duffy 1941; Camras 1992; Elliott 1992, 1994; Damasio 1994; 
Bates 1994; Bower 1994; Clore 1994; Ekman 1992…1999; Ekman et al. 1977…1994; Simon 
1967…1999; Picard 1997…2010; Sloman 1993…2003; Aube 2005; Davis 1996…2010; Davis, Lewis 
2003, 2004). This leads us to believe that emotions are an essential part of human 
intelligence. Thus, they should be a vital part of any system that attempts to emulate 
human intelligence computationally. 
Further research proposes that motivation, too, plays a fundamental role in a variety 
of cognitive functions (e.g. Duffy 1941; Beck 2000; Westen 1996; Simon 1967, Davis 
1996…2010; Sloman 1993…2003; Sloman, Logan 1999; Arkin 1998). In psychology, 
motivation is the driving force behind all actions of an organism.  If it is taken that 
actions are performed to achieve a positive internal state or avoid a negative internal 
state, then motivation is the search for positive internal states and avoidance of 
negative internal states. According to leading researchers (e.g. Simon 1967; Izard 1991, 
1993; Davis 1996, 2001, 2008, 2010; Sloman 2001, 2003) emotions and motivations serve as 
filters that guide perception and action, determine the input into the evaluation 
processes, and manipulate the evaluation of perceptual information. 
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In summary, emotional and motivational experiences are essential aspects of the 
process of cognition, and therefore must be considered in any adequate description of 
it. In common language, emotional and motivational states are feelings, moods, 
sentiments, attitudes, etc. Of course, each of these terms has a somewhat different 
usage. In the work ahead, however, the term ‘affect’ which is less semantically-
overloaded is used instead of the term ‘emotions’ (Davis 2004). Affect can be 
considered a broader concept, and can be experienced as positive, negative, and 
neutral valences.  Research on computational and robotic models of affect has been 
very active over the last decade.  In her seminal book – Affective Computing – MIT 
Professor Rosalind Picard characterizes this new field that is forming in Computer 
Science and the scope of its research as: Computing that relates to, arises from, or 
deliberately influences emotions or other affective phenomena. She explains that this 
area is effectively the study of emotions in human-computer interactions, artificial 
intelligence, and cognitive architectures. 
Affective Computing includes modelling and implementing emotions or other 
affective phenomena, and therefore can aid the development and testing of new and 
old emotion theories.  Affective Computing also includes many other things, such as 
giving a computer the ability to recognize and express emotions, and developing its 
ability to respond intelligently to human emotions. An affective computer should 
have the skills of emotional intelligence, including an ability to manage its own 
affective mechanisms and processes, and to use them for improving its cognitive and 
rational functioning (Picard 1997). A fascinating example of a cognitive-affective 
machine is ShyBot, developed at the MIT Media Lab (Lee, Kim, Breazeal, Picard 2008).  
ShyBot is a personal mobile robot designed to both embody and elicit reflection on 
shyness behaviours of children living with autism. ShyBot can detect human 
presence and familiarity from face detection and proximity sensing, in order to 
characterize people as friends or strangers to interact with. It can also reflect 
elements of the anxious states of its human companion. The ShyBot project opened 
up an alternative way of considering human-machine interaction: deploying the use 
of cognitive-affective intelligence that machines can bring about.  This led to a wide 
variety of cognitive models for Affective Computing to be proposed, including a-
CRIBB (Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004). 
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The premises of Affective Computing still have not been universally accepted within 
the AI research community though. Despite its advantages, it is no surprise to see 
affect marginalized or sometimes even neglected in models of cognition constructed 
by computer scientists, since the developers of computers are largely biased towards 
the notion of ‘thinking’ rather than ‘feeling’ (Picard 1997). Another way to say this is 
that because intelligence can be seen as based on logical reasoning or abstract 
problem-solving, emotions are undesirable and can only lead to distraction or error! 
This view point, however, should be rectified. Affective experience appears to arise 
from elementary reactions of the central cognitive processes in the course of their 
construction.  In this way, affect constitutes a primitive core in cognitive operations:  
It directs attentional processes; It influences the retrieval of memories; It modifies 
the structuring of thoughts; It influences the formation of perceptions; It may depress 
certain types of experience and it may heighten others (Blumenthal 1977).  In a nutshell, 
emotions and affect constitute an ever-present substrate or foundation to everyday 
intelligent behaviours (Clocksin 2004). 
2.5 Autonomous	  Cognitive	  Agents	  and	  Mobile	  Robots	  
The design of autonomous cognitive agents is a branch of Artificial Intelligence and, 
more latterly, Software Engineering. What constitutes an autonomous cognitive 
agent is a controversial topic though. In this text, autonomous cognitive agents are 
defined as follows: an autonomous cognitive agent senses its environment and acts 
upon it in the service of its agenda, e.g. humans, animals, mobile robots, software 
agents, etc. Thus, an autonomous cognitive agent is situated within some 
environment (e.g. our world) or an artificial environment within a computer (simulation 
world) or within an operating system or a database or even a network. The 
autonomous cognitive agent actively senses its environment and acts upon it, so as to 
further its goals and agenda. Therefore, the control of behaviour is vital to an 
autonomous agent (Franklin, Graesser 1996). Cognitive architectures are the backbone of 
autonomous cognitive agents. 
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Autonomous cognitive agents are capable of independent, purposeful, real-world 
actions, and respond to external stimuli in a timely fashion. They sense their 
environment through some sensors and act upon that environment through some 
motors (also referred to as actuators or effectors). An agent’s perceptual input at a given 
instant is called a percept and the entire history of its perception is called percept 
sequence. Agents with human-like or animal-like cognitive capabilities have a single 
concern: what to do next? This concern needs to be addressed by producing an 
appropriate action or behaviour in response to the nature of the environment, the 
agent’s agenda, and what are currently feasible and desired actions. 
In humans, mind as a control system and main seat of natural intelligence balances 
all the mechanisms and processes, so that appropriate actions and behaviours are 
continually generated in a timely fashion. In cognitive agents, a similar control 
system is obviously needed, so that they can operate without the direct intervention 
of humans or other agents, and have some kind of control and autonomy over their 
actions and internal states (Franklin 1995). 
In order for such an agent to have such control and autonomy over its actions and 
internal states, knowledge and information need to be stored and retrieved in an 
efficient way. Knowledge can be embedded in an agent either structurally or 
symbolically. ANNs are an example of structurally-embedded knowledge. The 
stimulus is related causally to the action it produces. So, the action depends both on 
the stimulus and on the internal state of the autonomous agent. With symbolically-
embedded knowledge, in contrast, stimuli are first transformed into symbols, and 
then symbol manipulation leads to the action. Work on ANNs and symbolic systems 
has shown that structural embedding is often faster and more reactive, whereas 
symbolic embedding is often more flexible (Haykin 1994). 
Numerous research groups across the globe are undertaking research using 
autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots. There are several research issues 
that are being actively investigated. They pose important challenges to the fields of 
Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, which effectively outline some major 
research activities, including: 
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Ø How to describe enough of the properties of an autonomous cognitive agent or 
mobile robot, its abilities, and its environment, to allow it to make high-level 
decisions on how to act or what to do next. 
Ø How to store, manipulate, express, and retrieve the knowledge and information 
about the environment and the agent itself into its cognitive architecture. 
Ø How to include concepts such as common-sense, free-will, and the like. 
Below, are concepts that are areas of study in their own rights, but here they follow 
our discussion on the study of autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots as 
three major approaches to investigating the possibility of achieving synthetic 
intelligence and artificial cognition. 
2.6 Physical	  Grounding	  Hypothesis	  
In his controversial paper published in 1990, Professor Rodney Brooks of MIT 
criticized the Physical Symbol System hypothesis (symbolism). He claimed that this 
traditional approach to AI (symbolic AI) has emphasized the abstract symbol 
manipulation whose grounding in physical reality has rarely been achieved. He also 
argued that this classic approach of symbol manipulation is fundamentally flawed, 
and as such imposes severe limitations on the fitness of its progeny (Brooks 1990). 
The core of Brooks’ argument was that when intelligence is approached with strict 
reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on 
symbolic representation disappears. In his later papers Intelligence without 
Representation and Intelligence without Reason published in 1991, he outlined a 
method to incrementally building complete intelligent creatures. It is noteworthy that 
by ‘incrementally’ he described the fact that each new module of an intelligent 
system, each new layer of its architecture, is built independently upon the previous 
module. Whereas the traditional methodology bases its decomposition of intelligence 
into functional information-processing modules whose combinations provide overall 
system behaviour, this methodology bases its decomposition of intelligence into 
individual behaviour-generating modules whose co-existence and co-operation let 
more complex behaviour emerge (Brooks 1991). 
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This approach, which was dubbed the Physical Grounding hypothesis, provided a 
different methodology for building intelligent systems than that pursued for the last 
few decades (back in 1990). Essentially, it states that to build a system that is 
intelligent, it is necessary to have its representations grounded in the physical world. 
Once this commitment is made, the need for traditional symbolic representations 
fades. The key observation to be made here, described eloquently by Brooks himself, 
is the fact that the world is its own best model – it is always exactly up to date and it 
always contains every detail there is to be known. The trick is to sense it 
appropriately and enough (Brooks 1990). Therefore, to build a system based on the 
Physical Grounding hypothesis, it is necessary to connect it to the world (ground it in 
the world) via a set of sensors and motors. 
Physical Grounding hypothesis works well for reactive agents, as demonstrated in 
experiments carried out in the MIT AI Lab (1990, 1991). This is simply because 
reactive systems react directly to the world as it is sensed, avoiding the need for a 
representational knowledge. Also, the use of environment as its own model allows 
reactive control to use perceived states of the environment to avoid explicit symbolic 
representation and reasoning. The approach, therefore, allows fast, robust, and 
flexible robotic control systems to be built, and is often referred to as Reactive 
Planning or more generally as Behaviour-Based AI or BBAI (Brooks 1986, 1989,1991, 
1999; Agre, Chapman 1987; Kaebling 1989; Kaebling, Rosenschein 1994). If, however, the 
reactive agent wishes to make use of symbolic representation, reasoning, planning, 
etc, problems arise. For example, how is knowledge about the agent’s environment 
and its physical form instantiated into the agent’s cognitive architecture. 
2.7 Perceptual	  Symbol	  System	  
A common philosophical position is that perception and cognition reflect 
independent or modular systems in the brain – perceptual symbols pick up 
information from the environment and pass it on to separate systems that support the 
various cognitive functions, such as language, memory, and thought. This position 
assumes that cognition is inherently non-perceptual. 
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One recent theory that relates cognition strongly to perception is that of Lawrence 
Barsalou, Professor of Psychology, who argued that this view is fundamentally 
wrong (Barsalou 1999). He suggested that instead, cognition is inherently perceptual, 
sharing systems with perception at both the cognitive and neural levels, and therefore 
knowledge has a strong perceptual character. The basic assumption underlying 
Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol System hypothesis is that sub-sets of perceptual states 
in sensory-motor systems of the brain are extracted and stored in long-term memory 
to function as symbols. As a result, the internal structure of these symbols is modal, 
and they are analogically-related to the perceptual states that produced them. He also 
forwarded the conjecture that the schematic nature of perceptual symbols falls out 
from two assumptions about attention: selective attention (1) isolates information in 
perception and (2) stores the isolated information in long-term memory (Barsalou 1999). 
Perceptual symbols do not exist independently of one another in long-term memory, 
Barsalou clarifies. Instead, related symbols become organized into a ‘simulator’ that 
allows the cognitive system to construct specific simulations of an entity or event in 
its absence. Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system 
that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. 
These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, 
thereby implementing a fully-functional conceptual system (Barsalou 1999). The 
formulation of the Perceptual Symbol System theory can be viewed as a high-level 
functional account of how the brain could implement a conceptual system using 
sensory-motor mechanisms, Barsalou believes. Once the possibility of such an 
account has been established, later work can develop computational implementations 
and ground them more precisely in neural systems. 
2.8 Control	  System	  Approach	  
Although BBAI works well for reactive agents, it seems inappropriate for cognitive 
agents which need not only be able to operate reactively in response to events and 
tasks, but also deliberate in a purposive manner and demonstrate cognitive qualities, 
such as planning, reasoning, learning, etc. When trying to find an alternative starting 
point for a theory about the nature of mind and cognition, and then investigate the 
possibility of achieving synthetic intelligence and artificial cognition in (as opposed to 
adopting BBAI for that purpose) there are many options. 
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Some philosophers start from the notion of rationality or from a small number of 
familiar aspects of human mentality, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Sloman 
suggests that it would be more useful to step back to the general notion of a control 
mechanism that interacts with a dynamic environment, including parts of itself, in a 
way that is determined by the changeable internal state of the mechanism, the state of 
the environment, and the history of previous interactions (Sloman 1993). Sloman 
maintains that this is a deeply causal concept – the concept of a control system. 
However, as he further explains, this is still too general, because the notion of such a 
control system covers many physical objects, both naturally occurring and 
manufactured, that clearly lack minds. By adding extra constraints to this general 
concept, he believes, we may be able to home in on a set of interesting special cases, 
more or less like human beings or other animals. 
Common philosophical questions about this alternative approach to the study of mind 
and cognition, and the possibility of achieving synthetic intelligence and artificial 
cognition usually include whether all mental events and cognitive phenomena can be 
reduced to some sub-set, e.g. whether all mental states can be defined in terms of 
collections of beliefs, desires, and intentions. But the variety found in children, brain-
damaged people, or even some animals suggests that there are no absolutely 
necessary conditions for the existence of mental capabilities – only a collection of 
different designs with different properties (Sloman 1993). 
In particular, this approach leads to a new analysis of the concept of representation. 
As representation is obviously part of a control system, different kinds of 
representations play different roles in control mechanisms and processes. The 
Control System approach allows the mind and cognition (or a cognitive agent with a 
mind) to be considered as a set of control mechanisms and processes capable of 
supporting a number of control states (Simon 1967; Sloman 1993). This approach is 
based on developing architectures and theory of mind arising from the works of 
Sloman, Davis, and some others (Sloman, Croucher 1987; Sloman 1993; Sloman, Beaudoin, 
Wright 1995;  Sloman 1996;  Sloman, Logan 1999;  Davis 1996…2011). 
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2.8.1 Control	  State	  Theory	  
Sloman has maintained for years that it is more fruitful to construe the mind or an 
agent with a mind as a control system than as a computational system, although 
computation can play a role in control mechanisms and processes (Sloman 1993).      
He explains that the view that a mind is a control system is not provable or refutable 
– it merely defines an approach to the study of mind. Sloman also holds that the 
Control System approach to mind builds on an assumption that mind is a collection 
of many different control processes and mechanisms passing data between them 
asynchronously, as opposed to a single computation that can be reduced to a single 
state at any given time (Sloman 1987, 1993). Davis (2001) holds a similar view on this.  
He considers mind as a dynamic structure of asynchronous data, information and 
knowledge-processing mechanisms, and the information-rich control states they 
support. 
A control state is a behaviour internal to an agent.  Control states can exhibit external 
behaviours, such as obstacle-avoidance, or reflect and control internal states, such as 
beliefs.  In essence, control states can be a number of things, such as beliefs, desires, 
intentions, motivators, reflexes, etc. They can be considered as general behaviours 
within an agent, and therefore can be modified or updated at any time by some other 
processes. This view, which is also shared by Minsky (1985) is effectively built on the 
seminal work of Simon and Newell (Newell, Simon 1972, 1976; Simon 1967, 1996, 1999). 
Control states do not need to exhibit external behaviours though – they can be used 
to control the agent’s internal states. What is required is a specification on how the 
control states interact with one another (Davis 2008). This includes how a control state 
modifies other control states or is modified by them, the type and amount of 
information passed to other control states or received from them, whether the 
information passed and received is direct or filtered by some other control state, and 
finally if a control state produces behaviours directly or modifies other control states 
to achieve its ends (Sloman 1993, 1999). 
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Specific control states can exist at several levels, requiring different types of 
processing (Davis 1998). For example, reflexes that are reactions to unexpected stimuli 
may involve body actions and deflection of cognitive processing from current tasks, 
and may also influence future high-level processes. Also, it must be noted that 
control states need not be symbolic in nature, e.g. a reflex that may be known at the 
deliberative level, which is symbolic, but is actually reactive. 
The view point that mind is a control system provides an important perspective to the 
design of autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots. It builds on the 
assumption that cognition is an epistemic process that can be modelled using 
information processing architectures (Sloman 1993; Beaudoin 1994; Davis 2001…2010). 
Such information processing architectures can be in any number of control states, 
and the processing of information can give rise to changes in the current set of 
control states. Since the nature of information processing is dependent upon the 
control states, the same information may be processed differently in different control 
states (Davis 2010). This type of approach also requires us to specify our theories from 
the standpoint of how things work – how perception works, how motives are 
generated, how decisions are taken, how learning occurs, and so on (Davis 2008).   
Here are a few of these control states of particular relevance to this research work: 
Ø Beliefs: Beliefs are internal models, possibly assumed or inferred from 
perceptions and perceptual acts, or from information arising as the result of 
internal processes or other control states. They are states in which an agent is 
confident about the truth of a proposition. 
Ø Goals: Goals are internal or external states that an agent wishes to achieve, 
prevent, or maintain. They are desirable end states that are either qualitative, 
quantitative, or a combination of both. 
Ø Desires: Desires are symbolic statements that define a specific preferred state. 
They underpin goals and other purposeful behaviours that are related to beliefs 
and other control states. 
Ø Intentions: Intentions are plans of actions – a set of intended tasks – that can be 
inferred from beliefs and desires of an agent, or explicitly provided, influenced 
by other control states such as affective and motivational states. 
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Ø Motivators: Motivators are dispositions and tendencies to assess situations and 
respond to those situations and assessments in a certain way. They can provide a 
context and impetus for reasoning about events, and also a basis for goal-directed 
behaviours. They are, therefore, often used as a generic framework that draw all 
these control states (beliefs, goals, etc) together. 
2.8.2 Affective	  and	  Motivational	  Control	  States	  
Scientific evidence highlights the fundamental role of affect in rational and 
intelligent behaviour (e.g. Darwin 1872; Duffy 1941; Camras 1992; Elliott 1992, 1994; Damasio 
1994; Bates 1994; Bower 1994; Clore 1994; Ekman 1992…1999; Ekman et al. 1977…1994; Simon 
1967…1999; Picard 1997…2010; Sloman 1993…2003; Clocksin 2004; Aube 2005; Davis 
1996…2010; Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004). Since there appears to be a requirement for 
something analogous to affect in artificial cognitive systems, it has been conjectured 
to use affective control states which makes affect the basis of a consistent and 
systematic control language across a cognitive architecture (Sloman 1993…2003; Davis 
2001…2004). This control language is grounded in the use of affect with the aim to be 
consistent across different domains, tasks, and levels of processing (Davis 2010). 
Further research highlights that motivation too plays a fundamental role in a variety 
of cognitive functions (e.g. Duffy 1941; Beck 2000; Westen 1996; Simon 1967, Davis 
1996…2010; Sloman 1993…2003; Sloman, Logan 1999; Arkin 1998). Motivation cannot be 
observed directly, but can be inferred from the observable behaviour of an agent.  
From the viewpoint of mind as a control system, motivation can thus be thought of as 
a control state – facilitating the use of motivational control states. Motivations arise 
from the perception of the world and evaluation of events relevant to goals (Duffy 
1941). Each kind of evaluation gives rise to a distinct signal that reflects the priority 
of a goal to an individual, which then influences the resulting behaviour. Therefore, 
motivations drive behaviour or action selection (Arkin 1998). Motivations are 
essentially more encompassing than goals though. The reason is that motivations 
include not only the descriptions of goals, but also an affective context for those 
goals (Davis 2001). 
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Psychologists typically see motivation as the force that lies behind and gives sense to 
changes in behaviour.  Thus, motivation controls the changes in behaviour, as well as 
drive behaviour or action selection. Put simply, motivation is the driving force 
behind all actions of an organism.  On the other hand, affect exerts further control by 
triggering certain mechanisms and processes that may influence the intensity of the 
selected behaviour or action, or perhaps enable it or even prevent it (Arkin 1998). In 
general, some of these internal forces are more of a physiological kind, such as needs 
(hunger, thirst, etc), while others are more of a psychological kind, such as emotions 
(anger, fear, etc). These two types of motivational states are those most thoroughly-
studied so far, but probably do not exhaust all of the internal forces that determine 
behaviour (Aube 2005). 
According to leading researchers (e.g. Simon 1967; Izard 1991, 1993; Davis 1996, 2001, 2008, 
2010; Sloman 2001, 2003) affect and motivations serve as filters that guide perception 
and action, determine the input into the evaluation processes, and manipulate the 
evaluation of perceptual information.  Thus, emotional and motivational experiences 
are essential aspects of the process of cognition, and therefore must be considered in 
any adequate description of it. As motivators provide a context and impetus for 
reasoning about events and also a basis for goal-directed behaviours, they are often 
used as a generic framework that draw all the control states of a cognitive 
architecture together. A motivator often includes the following components (Sloman 
1994; David 2001; Davis 2010): 
Ø semantic content that represents a proposition denoting a possible state of affairs, 
which may be (categorically or partially) true or false. 
Ø motivator attitude to the semantic content that represents the motivator’s 
tendency for acting towards the semantic content (e.g. make true, keep true, make 
false). 
Ø belief status that is an indication of current belief about the status of the semantic 
content (e.g. true, false, partially true). 
Ø actors, agents, and objects referenced by the motivator. 
Ø behaviours associated with any intention or plan set or past similar motivators. 
Ø current commitment status of the motivator (e.g. rejected, undecided, complete). 
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Ø goal importance or urgency (in the range [0,	  1]) that is managed by the BDI-
affective processes in motivator-evaluation ad goal-revision. 
Ø association value or insistence (in the range [0,	   1]) that is managed by the 
BDI-affective processes, and is strengthened by goal-completion. 
Ø motivator value or intensity (in the range [0,	  1]) that is a value associated with 
the difference between the current and desired state of the motivator. 
It now seems reasonable to conclude that motivation and affect can be co-joined in 
perception and cognition. Given the fact that motivations are essentially more 
encompassing than goals (since they include not only the descriptions of goals but also an 
affective context for those goals) plus the fact that motivators are often used as a 
generic framework (since they can draw all the control states of a cognitive architecture 
together) the use of control states to develop cognitive architectures leads to the use of 
affective and motivational control states (Sloman 1993…1999; Davis 2001…2004; Davis 
2010). While this theory is in development, and arguably currently incomplete, the 
presented argumentation above provides sufficient support for the design of the 
current cognitive architecture under investigation – CernoCAMAL. 
2.9 Summary	  
This chapter began with a brief introduction to the fields of Cognitive Science and 
Artificial Intelligence. Two major approaches to the study of these two inseparable 
areas of science were pointed out. The concepts of Cognitive Modelling and 
Cognitive Architectures were explained, and commonly used types of cognitive 
architectures were highlighted. The notion of Theory of Mind was introduced, and a 
flavour of the familiar phenomena of Emotion and Motivation was presented. This 
was followed by some background knowledge in Autonomous Cognitive Agents and 
Mobile Robots research. Three major approaches to the study of this area of research, 
and the possibility of achieving synthetic intelligence in autonomous cognitive 
agents and mobile robots were presented. The latter – as the cornerstone of this work 
– was discussed in detail, followed by an introduction to the Control State theory. 
The chapter concluded with presenting the notion of Affective and Motivational 
Control States and how they were used in developing cognitive architectures. 
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3 Literature	  Review	  
This chapter begins with an introduction to a general class of computational 
cognitive architectures known as CAMAL. A review of the original overarching 
architecture is presented, as an important pivotal axis for the development of 
CernoCAMAL.  It is described what progress has been made since the start of the 
CAMAL research. Its priors (e.g. CogAff) and its spin-offs to date are introduced, 
and subsequently its components and organization are presented, including the BDI 
(Belief-Desire-Intention) and affect models. This is then followed by a brief discussion 
on the works of CRIBB and a-CRIBB reasoning models, and how their architectures 
make use of BDI and affect schemas. The chapter continues with introducing the 
association and motivator constructs. The concept of a motivational blackboard is 
presented, followed by explaining how CAMAL’s blackboard facilitates the 
operation of its motivational constructs. The role of a domain model is highlighted, 
and its components are then pointed out. A brief operational overview of CAMAL is 
given before proceeding to a broader literature review in the field of Cognitive 
Architectures. The chapter concludes with reviewing the most notable and significant 
examples of cognitive architectures, in particular the recent work of RoboCAMAL. 
3.1 Introduction	  to	  CAMAL	  
CAMAL is an acronym for Computational Architectures for Motivation, Affect, and 
Learning. The CAMAL cognitive architecture is an example of a general class of 
integrative cognitive architectures; drawing together a number of threads in 
Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, such as perception, action, decision 
making, motivation, affect, and learning. CAMAL has been in development for 
nearly eleven years. It was proposed by Davis (2001) and was developed from ideas 
incorporated in Guardian (Hayes-Roth 1995), ACT-R (Anderson, Lebiere 1998; Anderson, 
Matessa 1998; Anderson et al. 2004), CRIBB (Wahl, Spada 2000), CogAff (Sloman 2001), and 
the cognitive architectures of Singh and Minsky (Singh, Minsky 2002). It is, essentially, 
a UTC that tries to answer many of the questions that comprise Norman’s Cognitive 
Science agenda (1980). 
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However, due to the fact that a UTC, as a single set of mechanisms and processes for 
all cognitive behaviour, addresses a vast undertaking, the CAMAL spin-off projects 
have necessarily focused on a sub-set of issues, e.g. adding affect and affordances 
(Lewis 2004), its use in controlling autonomous mobile robots (Gwatkin 2009), etc. The 
main purpose of this computational cognitive architecture is to investigate synthetic 
intelligence and artificial cognition in autonomous cognitive agents and mobile 
robots, drawing on qualities found in natural minds. 
Previous work on CAMAL has mainly involved agents in simulated environments. 
Using agents and representation of mind as a collection of agents has a long history. 
Philosophical backgrounds of the multi-agent mind can be found in the 
Pandemonium theory of mind as a collection of demons (Selfridge 1959) and in Marvin 
Minsky’s ideas of mind as a society of agents (Minsky 1985). Note the similarity of 
these theories to Baars’ theatre metaphor and global workspace (Baars 1997) as 
hypothesized algorithms for the workings of the highest and most general levels of 
brain organization. Considerable research has been conducted in monitoring such a 
group of agents in cognitive robotic testbeds and then making changes, to study their 
behaviours and decision-making. 
Preliminary work (Davis 1996…2001) inspired and highly influenced by the CogAff 
project (Sloman 1993; Beaudoin 1994) centred on goals and motivators; how they came 
into being and how they were managed. Since then, various closely-aligned projects 
have focused on using affect and affordances to drive goal selection and behaviours 
(Nunes 2001; Bourgne 2003), how to relate the BDI model to affect and affordances 
(Lewis 2004), the role of metacognition in directing the focus of cognitive architectures 
(Venkatamuni 2008), and the use of the architecture in controlling mobile robots 
(Gwatkin 2009).  These five research projects have all concluded successfully. 
- Investigation of Motivation in Agents using the Simulation of 5-aside Football  (Nunes 2001) 
- Affect-Based Multi-Agent Architecture for a 5-aside Football Simulation  (Bourgne 2003). 
- a-CRIBB: Computational Models of Emotion and Affect  (Lewis 2004) 
- A Society of Mind Approach to Cognition and Metacognition in a Cognitive Architecture 
  (Venkatamuni 2008) 
- RoboCAMAL: Anchoring in a BDI Motivational Cognitive Robot  (Gwatkin 2009) 
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Nothing in these major works and similar ones by Davis and Sloman so far has really 
undermined the four-layer principle to a theory of mind and cognitive architectures; 
meaning a four-layer architecture provides an appropriate guiding model. 
Furthermore, the Control State approach is still valid, though it may not necessarily 
be an exhaustive description of what could be occurring within a mind. 
The most recent phase of this research (Gwatkin 2009) focused on translating the 
concepts of motivation, affect, and learning from a simulated agent to an embedded 
robot. Effectively, it moved from computer-simulated agents towards situated and 
embodied agents 3. The concept of ‘situated and embodied cognition’ is a research 
approach that relates the activities of a cognitive agent with the environment within 
which the agent’s activities take place (Clancy 1997; Clark 1998; Pfeifer, Scheier 1999). Put 
differently, situated and embodied cognition refers to the role the environment plays 
in the development of cognitive processes within an agent; meaning an agent’s 
behaviours and cognitive processes are context-dependent. 
‘Situated’ refers to the fact that the agent is ‘present’ within some environment – it is 
situated within some environment. ‘Embodied’ refers to the fact that the agent has a 
‘physical presence’ within some environment. Essentially, the situated and embodied 
cognition concept postulates that the mind should not be treated as a simple 
information processor, but that it is tied to the environment and the physical body of 
the cognitive agent. The distinct components of the domain model (see 3.7) – namely 
the environment domain model and the attributes domain model – reflect the situated 
and embodied nature of an agent. 
Also, it is noteworthy that the word ‘situated’ is not actually meant to imply that 
cognition is fixed to localized situations. Instead, situated cognition emphasizes that 
there is an inescapable environmental context for cognitive activity, and that 
cognition takes place within a totality of activity, including social activity (Clocksin 
2004). The situatedness of cognition is actually a consequence of embodiment. The 
embodied nature of cognition suggests that cognition is not a mental machine 
working on abstract problems, but it is an activity connected with a body that 
requires cognition to make it function (Wilson 2002) or as Sloman puts it (Sloman 1993) 
                                                
3 Note that an agent in a simulation world can also be considered situated. However, this statement is 
meant to emphasize the fact that a cognitive mobile robot has a physical presence within a physical 
environment. 
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mind is a control system.  Moving towards embodiment can be seen in the transition 
from the CRIBB and a-CRIBB projects to the recent work of RoboCAMAL (Gwatkin 
2009). Before outlining the components and organization of CAMAL, it would be 
instructive to briefly reflect on the cognitive architecture of CogAff that has inspired 
the development of CAMAL. Later on (see 7.2) the thesis refers to CogAff again as a 
well-known representative cognitive architecture. The name CogAff is used both for 
the project and as a label for a generic schema proposed by Sloman (2001) for a wide 
variety of architectures, both natural and artificial. CogAff itself was inspired by the 
Three Tower / Three Layer model proposed by Nilsson (1998) with vertical divisions, 
shown in Figure 3.1. There are different versions of this model, depending on the 
sophistication of the perceptual, central, and motor sub-systems. Arrows from left to 
right (thick arrows) indicate the flow of perceptual data. Arrows from right to left 
(thin arrows) indicate the flow of feedback. 
 
                                    Figure 3-1: Three Tower Model (Nilsson 1998) 
The Three Layer model, depicted in Figure 3.2, attempts to account for the existence 
of a variety of more or less sophisticated forms of information processing and 
control, which can operate concurrently. The version shown here postulates three 
concurrently-active layers which are found in different biological species. The three 
layers account for different sorts of processes, found in different kinds of animals 
and humans. 
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                               Figure 3-2: Three Layer Model (Nilsson 1998) 
The first layer contains reactive mechanisms which automatically take action as soon 
as appropriate conditions are satisfied. The deliberative layer provides high-level 
reasoning capabilities (e.g. what-if reasoning) required for planning, decision-making, 
etc. Relatively few organisms have this, and again the forms can vary widely. The 
reflective or metacognitive layer provides the ability to monitor, evaluate, and control 
internal processes and strategies. Within the reactive layer, when conditions are 
satisfied, actions are performed immediately (they may be external or internal actions). 
By contrast, the deliberative layer, instead of always acting immediately in response 
to conditions, can contemplate possible actions, compare them, evaluate them, reason 
about them, and select among them. At least in humans, chains of possible actions 
can be considered in advance, though there are individual differences in such 
capabilities. The human deliberative system can also consider hypothetical past or 
future situations not reachable by chains of actions from the current situation, and 
can reason about their implications (Sloman, Logan 1999).  The illustration of Figure 3.3 
shows the complete CogAff architecture. 
In a nutshell, CogAff is an architectural framework designed to support interaction 
between cognition and affect. It posits three distinct levels of processing: a reactive 
level uses condition-action associations that respond to immediate environmental 
situations; a deliberative layer operates over mental goals, states, and plans to reason 
about future scenarios; and a meta-management mechanism lets the agent think about 
its own thoughts and experiences. 
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Most of the three-layer architectures do differentiate between the three towers of 
perception, central processing (cognition), and action across all layers. This provides a 
useful starting point to consider the contexts for processing across a cognitive 
architecture. However, as Sloman points out, this can lead to an inherent bias to 
simplistic left-to-right processing models based on sense-think-act cycles (Sloman 
2001). Such cognitive models may suffice for simple agents with limited tasks, but 
can restrict the development of more sophisticated information processing that 
includes feedback, directed perception, and sophisticated behaviour-environment 
interactions (Davis 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: The CogAff Architecture (Sloman 2001) 
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3.2 Layers	  and	  Organization	  
In CAMAL, as depicted in Figure 3.4, there are two more columns in addition to the 
three towers of perception, central processing (cognition), and action present in 
architectures such as CogAff and Nilson’s. The affect column conceptualizes the 
affect model, which in actuality is distributed across the entire architecture. The 
motivation column contains the architecture’s motivational blackboard, itself 
containing motivational constructs. This is all coordinated by the cognition and 
deliberative layers that make use of various cognitive processes, such as the BDI and 
affect reasoning models. 
 
 
    Figure 3-4: The four-layer five-column CAMAL Model (Davis 2010) 
 
The lowest level is the reflexive level that uses a perception-action process to 
generate behaviours. The data from the agent’s perceptual systems are collected and, 
based on their values, simple actions are performed. These actions can be combined 
to produce simple, default behaviours. At this level, there is no explicit 
representation of the agent’s environment. 
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The next level is the reactive level that builds on reflexive mechanisms to generate 
more complex behaviours, such as goal-oriented behaviours. The goals at this level 
are usually reactions to the agent’s internal and external states. It may be recognized 
that the reflexive and reactive layers together comprise a ‘Brooks-style’ controller 
that provides flexible and robust low-level control. Again, at this level, there is no 
explicit representation of the agent’s environment. 
The deliberative level is more complex than reflexive and reactive layers. It provides 
deliberation, planning, decision-making, and problem-solving capabilities that can be 
used for carrying out different tasks, such as achieving goals, etc. Unlike the first two 
levels, the deliberative layer holds a representation of the agent’s environment. This 
representation should be constantly updated and maintained by examining the inputs 
from agent’s perceptual systems, and also the interactions of reflexive-reactive layers 
with the agent’s environment. 
The purpose of the reflective or metacognitive layer is to monitor and control the 
processes generated by the interaction of the reflexive, reactive, and deliberative 
levels. By monitoring these processes, the reflective layer looks to suppress 
unwanted behaviours and promote useful ones. Put simply, it serves to monitor the 
overall behaviour of the agent. 
3.3 BDI	  Model	  
With the rise of AI and widespread discussions about whether machines can think, 
understand, have emotions, etc, the idea that machines might have mental states that 
resemble our own has been pursued with some powerful tools, such as cognitive 
modelling and the development of cognitive architectures. The philosophical idea of 
cognitive agents that possess beliefs, desires, and intentions has been particularly 
studied in Cognitive Systems and Cognitive Robotics research. These are known as 
BDI agents, where beliefs, desires, and intentions represent mental states that are 
being given clear semantics (Bratman 1987; Georgeff, Rao 1995; Georgeff et al. 1999). 
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Such systems demand considerable cognitive flexibility, requiring the ability to 
reason over collections of beliefs and knowledge, deal with high levels of 
uncertainty, respond to unexpected circumstances, etc. In such systems, decision 
making and planning begin with some collection of beliefs. Under certain 
circumstances, a goal will be adopted. Where there are a number of options in a 
situation, a decision must be made. Arguments for and against different possible 
decisions can be developed and weighed. Depending upon the arguments, an 
intention or action or behaviour may be adopted and then carried out.  Actions may 
lead to new situations and, possibly, new beliefs. 
In effect, the BDI framework can be considered as a Logical Theory of Rational 
Agency (Georgeff, Rao 1991, 1995). The leading agent theories in this area more or less 
share similar logical properties, bringing together an informational component (in 
order to represent the agent’s beliefs and knowledge), a motivational component (in 
order to represent the agent’s desires and goals), and a dynamic component (in order 
to represent the agent’s activities). Thus, the BDI approach typically combines 
informational aspects, motivational aspects, and dynamic aspects of propositional 
logic (Fisher et al. 2007). Unfortunately, this framework lacks an explicit mechanism to 
express the plausibility of the agent’s beliefs. 
More recently, it has been proposed to integrate into the BDI approach of Bratman, 
Georgeff, and Rao psychological notions in order to develop more complete 
cognitive models of agents capable of sustaining more human-like interactions with 
people, especially ordinary people involved in conversational activities with assistant 
agents. For example, Gratch and Marsella (2004) have proposed a model of emotions 
based on SOAR, with a significant impact upon the SOAR cognitive architecture. 
Emotions have, also, been integrated into the BDI framework, for instance with eBDI 
(Jiang et al. 2007). Although there has been a lot of research works about the effects of 
personality on agents’ behaviours in the virtual agents community (one of the most 
recent one being the SEMAINE project: Bevacqua et al. 2010) they generally focus more on 
their impact on the animated agent (e.g. gaze or facial expressions) than on the rational 
decision processes (Sansonnet, Bouchet 2011). 
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Within the CAMAL architecture, the BDI model provides a method to control the 
flow of information through the deliberative component, determining the intentions, 
actions, or behaviours of the agent based on its beliefs and desires. Obviously, the 
confidence an agent can have in a belief can vary, and depends on the source of the 
belief. Beliefs are based on inputs from the agent’s perceptual systems and also its 
previously-held beliefs. They could also be assumptive (default) beliefs, or possibly 
deducted from reasoning and perceptual acts.  The same applies to desires and goals. 
By coupling the agent’s beliefs and desires, a set of intentions or actions or 
behaviours can be generated as to how to achieve the agent’s goals. But do we 
categorically need a BDI model within CAMAL as a cognitive architecture?         
The answer is yes. A simple example will elucidate why: One way of achieving an 
agent’s goal is to simply perform an action based on the current beliefs that the agent 
has. If the environment changes, the agent’s beliefs should be modified accordingly, 
thus the previous action may no longer be valid. As the action has no access to the 
new beliefs, it will still act and may fail to achieve the agent’s goal. It is for this 
reason that intentions are required. Intentions are akin to plans of actions or 
behaviours or possibly reactive sub-architectures that are based on the agent’s 
desires, and have access to the agent’s beliefs. If the environment changes and the 
agent’s beliefs are updated, then the agent’s intentions should be modified 
accordingly to prevent the agent from failing its goal. 
3.3.1 CRIBB	  Model	  
A number of scientists including Wimmer, Perner, Wahl, and Spada (Wimmer, Perner 
1983; Wahl, Spada 2000) set up a series of experimental tests to check whether children 
between three and five years of age were able to attribute a false belief to someone 
else. In one of these experiments, children watched a scene in which a character, 
called Maxi, put a bar of chocolate in a drawer and went away. While he was away, 
his mom took the chocolate and put it somewhere else. When Maxi came back, the 
clip was stopped and the children were asked by the experimenter: Where will Maxi 
look for his chocolate? The results showed that children over five did not have any 
problems in attributing to Maxi a false belief, whereas children below five predicted 
that Maxi would look for the chocolate where his mom put it! 
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Wahl and Spada later developed a computer model called CRIBB (Children’s 
Reasoning about Intentions, Beliefs, and Behaviour) to investigate reasoning in 
young children. The model is based upon Bartsch and Wellman’s general theory for 
Belief-Desire reasoning (Bartsch, Wellman 1989) and simulates knowledge and inference 
processes of a competent child solving problems and false-belief tasks. It was 
designed using a symbolic cognitive modelling approach and was implemented 
computationally to allow for the detailed examination of representational and 
operational demands in the Theory of Mind tasks in children. 
The CRIBB model represents propositions about physical states of a given situation 
and about another person’s intentions, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviour. Inferences 
are drawn from its knowledge base by inference schemata. This set of inference 
schemata simulates the knowledge that we assume to be a central part of a child’s 
Theory of Mind. The BDI model of CRIBB can be seen in Figure 3.5. The inputs 
into this model are perception, basic emotions, and physiology. The agent’s beliefs 
are determined by its perception of the environment and its previously-held beliefs. 
The agent’s desires are determined by its basic emotions, physiology, and its 
previously-held desires. The coupling of the agent’s beliefs and desires manifests 
itself as intentions or plans of actions or behaviours. These can lead to reactions that 
may consequently change the agent’s environment and possibly the agent’s 
emotional state and physiology. These changes, in turn, can alter what the agent 
perceives of its environment, and so on. 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Belief-Desire Reasoning Model (Bartsch, Wellman 1989) 
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A further element of CRIBB is a Consistency Mechanism as illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
It detects and resolves any contradictions in the system’s beliefs. It is invoked each 
time a new proposition is added, in order to ensure the consistency of the knowledge 
base. If a contradiction is found, then the more certain proposition is added to the 
knowledge base. The certainty of a proposition is determined by its source. For 
example, if a proposition is formed based on a situational knowledge, then it is 
considered more certain than a proposition that is formed based on an assumption. 
 
Figure 3-6: High-Level View of CRIBB Architecture (Wahl, Spada 2000) 
3.4 Affect	  Model	  
There was a growing consensus among AI thinkers (Minsky 1985; Sloman, Croucher 1987; 
Franklin 2000; Sloman 2001; Davis 2001) that artificial minds and cognitive agents, to be 
complete and believable, require a computational equivalent to emotion in order to 
complement their behavioural and cognitive capabilities. This requirement was 
originally highlighted in earlier prominent research (Simon 1967; Norman 1980). Later 
work by Davis (2001…2004) questioned this ‘requirement for emotion’ attitude in 
intelligent systems.  Davis’s thesis was that emotion per se is not really a requirement 
for the majority of synthetic intelligence theories or cognitive systems (Davis 2004). 
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As emphasized earlier, Davis also suggested that a direction given by the less 
semantically-overloaded term ‘affect’ would be more appropriate for synthetic 
intelligence and artificial cognition than the term ‘emotion’. Davis (2004) then 
conjectured the alternative Theory of Affect which draws on theories such as Control 
States (Simon 1967; Sloman 1987, 1993; Davis 2000, 2001) and Perceptual Affordances 
(Gibson 1979). His argumentation for affect as a control mechanism makes use of the 
Control States approach to mind, his experimental work with cognitive agents, and 
his on-going designs for synthetic intelligent systems. 
Affect is generally defined in terms of information processes and representational 
structures across a cognitive architecture. It is qualitatively defined as negative, 
neutral, or positive (i.e. it can be experienced as negative, neutral, or positive valences) 
and can be mapped numerically over the interval [-­‐1.0,	  +1.0]. The use of affect 
and affective control states makes affect the basis of a consistent and systematic 
control language across a cognitive architecture. It also allows external events and 
objects to take valenced affordances, and internal mechanisms to be prioritized via 
valenced processes (Davis 2010) 4. 
In many cognitive systems, an affective module is implemented as a separate 
independent part of the architecture that interacts with other sub-systems (e.g. TOK 
Architecture of Reilly and Bates 1993). However, as highlighted earlier, research into affect 
shows that affective states have wide-ranging permeating effects on numerous 
cognitive functions, such as reasoning, learning, perception, memory, and decision 
making. This leads to the conclusion that affect is not really a separate entity; it is a 
distributed mechanism across the entire cognitive architecture. Put simply, affect is 
distributed across all the sub-systems, hence the earlier statement on CAMAL layers 
and organization that the affect column conceptualizes the affect model, which in 
actuality is distributed across the entire architecture (see 3.2). 
  
                                                
4 Valence refers to the intrinsic attractiveness (positive-ness) or aversiveness (negative-ness) of an 
event, situation, or object. For example, negative emotions such as fear and anger have negative 
valence, whereas positive emotions such as joy and pleasure have positive valence. 
49 
Davis’s earlier work on cognitive agents and control states focused on goal 
processing and addressed how goals and related control states need to be valenced in 
a number of different ways.  Davis’s current model of affect allows various elements 
within the architecture to have an associated magnitude that can fluctuate according 
to success or failure associated with that element. The affective valencing of 
information processes and representational structures can be given (i.e. defined)      
or the agent can adapt or learn appropriate affordances according to its role and 
current environment (Davis 2010). 
3.4.1 a-­‐CRIBB	  Model	  
Based on our daily lives and lived experiences, there is no doubt that emotions can 
disrupt reasoning under certain circumstances, and that misdirected or uncontrolled 
emotions can lead to irrational behaviour. For many years, the dominant view was 
that emotions are quite distinct from the processes of rational thinking and decision 
making, and are often a major impediment to those processes. To paraphrase Davis, 
they were often considered to be “the Achilles’ heel of reason!” (Davis 2000, p.1). 
Damasio made a strong case that this traditional view (which he dubbed Descartes’ 
Error) is wrong, because emotions and affect actually play a fundamental role in 
rational thinking and decision making (Damasio 1994). Damasio maintained that when 
a system’s underlying affect do not function properly, rational decision making 
breaks down. 
Other researchers and theorists such as Sripada and Stich (2005) have also challenged 
this attitude. They have argued that if we view affect through the longer lens of 
evolutionary theory, we can see that much of what looked to be irrational is actually 
part of an effective strategy for achieving an agent’s goals and maximizing its 
success. Therefore, an affective element should be considered as an essential part of 
any cognitive system. Today, this is an accepted consensus among theorists and 
designers of cognitive systems that synthetic minds and cognitive agents, to be 
complete and believable, require a computational equivalent to affect, in order to 
complement their behavioural and cognitive capabilities (Simon 1967; Norman 1980; 
Minsky 1985; Sloman, Croucher 1987; Franklin 2000; Sloman 2001; Davis 2001; Robinson, El-
Kaliouby 2009; Vallverdu, Casacuberta 2009; Davis 2010). 
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Wahl and Spada’s computer model of CRIBB did not incorporate basic emotions that 
are present in the original schema of Bartsch and Wellman’s (1989) Belief-Desire 
reasoning model. To incorporate this important aspect of cognition and investigate its 
use, the CRIBB model was extended with an Affect and Affordance Model and was 
dubbed a-CRIBB (Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004).  Therefore, the a-CRIBB reasoning model 
is an extension of the BDI model used in CRIBB. Adding affect and affordances 
resulted in more effective cognitive processing and task management, based on 
extensive experiments carried out in various simulation terrains. 
The first major change compared to CRIBB is that the framework is implemented as 
a situated agent in a synthetic world of a fungus eater. The agent’s motivation is to 
collect minerals and fungus. Other extensions to the CRIBB model, which are 
effectively the main contributions of the a-CRIBB model, are as follows: 
Ø A distributed model of affect across all the sub-systems. 
Ø The inclusion of affective affordances applied to the perception of the system, 
which is an extension to Gibson’s (1979) Theory of Affordances. 
Ø A revision of the consistency mechanism used to resolve belief contradictions by 
incorporating affective correspondences. 
Ø A description of a goal base, including the goal-maintenance, goal-importance, 
and goal-achieved mechanisms. 
Ø A central monitoring system using Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s (1987) monitoring 
mechanism to overcome the problem of communication in the system. 
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     Figure 3-7: High-Level View of a-CRIBB Architecture (Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004) 
3.5 Associations	  
The a-CRIBB reasoning model was developed to investigate the incorporation and 
use of affect and affordances within the CRIBB reasoning model. Essentially, it 
added several new elements to the original CRIBB – the main two being the affect 
model and associations. CAMAL uses a variant of the a-CRIBB reasoning model 
(Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004) i.e. a BDI model and an affect model, plus a motivational 
blackboard that uses affective affordances to instantiate and modify motivators.      
At the deliberative level, affective values and affordances can be associated with 
processes and predicates, and then relayed as control signals to instantiate and 
modify motivators and their associated representations and behaviours. The affect 
model distributes affect values and affordances across the entire cognitive 
architecture, rather than have a centralized module. This is made possible by the use 
of associations. 
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An association is a construct that contains a belief-desire-intention combination, as 
well as an associated affect value, termed insistence (Davis 2004). This association 
value is one of the main factors in deciding, at the deliberative level, a cognitive 
agent’s next action. A cognitive agent maintains various beliefs about the 
environment it is operating in, and several possible goals that relate to that 
environment or the objects within it. It also has a number of different plans of actions 
or intentions or behaviours. Associations provide a method for a cognitive agent to 
keep track of all these possible belief-goal-action combinations, as well as containing 
a key value that indicates their relevance and significance to the agent at a given time 
– their insistence.  These combinations detail the correct action required to achieve a 
specific goal given a specific belief.  Associations take the following form: 
association	  (	  Belief,	  Desire,	  Intention,	  Insistence	  ).	  
The associations can be pre-defined (pre-programmed or coded) prior to runtime 
(typically a small number related to high priority tasks for specific environment 
configurations) or generated and formed when the architecture is initialised, or 
dynamically created by using all possible B-D-I combinations. 
When there is a list of associations, the agent will extract only those that have a 
belief-desire combination that correspond to the current stated belief and goal of the 
agent. Then, of the remaining associations, the one with the highest insistence is 
chosen, which will give the intention or action or behaviour to be taken. The 
association value is then modified and updated based on whether the corresponding 
action failed or succeeded to achieve the agent’s goal. If it failed, the value would be 
reduced; if it succeeded, the value would be increased. Therefore, association values 
fluctuate and are based on feedback from the agent’s previous actions (Gwatkin, Davis 
2007). Based on this principle, when CAMAL dynamically generates associations, it 
can then learn which combination makes more sense (meaning which association has a 
higher insistence and thus likelihood of success) for the current task set and environment. 
This process ensures that successful associations will develop higher association 
values, while unsuccessful associations will develop lower ones. 
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3.6 Motivational	  Blackboard	  and	  Motivators	  
The term blackboard is a metaphor for global context; meaning the blackboard is 
like a global workspace and communication structure that holds the relevant 
information about an agent’s environment, attributes, properties, beliefs, desires, 
current state, previous states, etc. (Corkill 1991). This metaphorical blackboard, 
analogous to Baars’ theatre metaphor and global workspace (Baars 1997) is potentially 
accessible by all the processes of an agent. 
Using blackboard systems is a well-established approach to solving problems of 
control, cooperation, and communication between different agents and problem 
solvers of a cognitive or expert system. During 1991, the blackboard system was 
considered an ‘emerging technology’. Gray et al. (1991) predicted a meta-level expert 
system, with the aid of a blackboard system, to share information between the 
individual expert systems. Blackboard architectures are even adopted in the context 
of genome annotation projects (e.g. Descorps-Declère et al. 2006) where they allow 
methodological and biological knowledge to be updated. 
A blackboard system consists of three components: the blackboard, the knowledge 
sources, and the control component (Corkill et al. 1986). The knowledge sources are 
independent modules that contain the knowledge and information needed to solve 
some problem. They can access the blackboard or specific areas on it, extract the 
relevant information, manipulate it, and then post their contributions back on the 
blackboard, so that the results are again accessible to all the processes. These posts 
could be anything, such as an updated belief, the addition or deletion of a goal, a 
preferred intention, etc 5. 
The knowledge and information held on the blackboard can be divided into several 
distinct areas: beliefs that the agent can have about its environment, desires that the 
agent can have about the objects in its environment, intentions that the agent can 
have to achieve its goals, associations that are used to manage the BDI and affect 
models, and a motivator that contains the result of the operation and execution of the 
various knowledge sources of the blackboard. 
                                                
5 Sometimes knowledge sources may be restricted to accessing and modifying only specific parts of 
the blackboard. 
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The motivator construct is such an important part of the deliberative processes that 
the blackboard is usually referred to as the motivational blackboard.                      
The motivational blackboard not only holds the relevant knowledge and allows the 
various cognitive processes access to the information they require to carry out their 
tasks, but also controls and coordinates the flow of information through the 
architecture. Put differently, the focus of a cognitive architecture is often on the 
motivator construct as a representational form that enables perception, affect, 
cognition, and behaviour to interact (Davis 2010). In other words, a motivator is a 
representational schema that is used as a generic framework to bring together many 
aspects of perceptual and cognitive processing, such as perception, affect, cognition, 
and behaviour. 
As stated before (see 2.8.2), the use of control states to develop cognitive architectures 
led to the use of affective and motivational control states. These control states are 
managed by the use of motivators. As a matter of fact, motivators not only manage 
and manipulate the affective and motivational control states present at the 
deliberative level, but may also trigger appropriate intentions or actions or 
behaviours at the reactive level, e.g. selecting a suitable reactive sub-architecture 6. 
Motivators take the following form: 
motivator	  (	  Goal,	  Association,	  Deterministic,	  Cycles,	  Intensity	  ).	  
The Intensity element is an affect value that gives the importance of the motivator 
to the agent (see 2.8.2). The schema also contains the agent’s chosen goal plus the 
appropriate association chosen to achieve that goal, which contains the intention of 
the agent as well. 
The Cycles element gives the number of cycles that the reactive component should 
run for. This value is dependent on the agent’s goal and is a component of the 
domain model; meaning it is pre-defined prior to runtime. The Deterministic 
element is set to either false or true. If set to true, the motivator would override 
any failure in achieving a goal until the end of the cycle or until the goal is met. 
                                                
6 Reactive sub-architectures are akin to actions, intentions, or behaviours. They are designed to 
achieve specific reactive tasks, e.g. obstacle avoidance. 
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Meaning, the motivator becomes strictly goal-oriented and determined, until it 
achieves the goal or runs out of cycles. If set to false, the motivator would return 
the first possible action that the deliberative-reactive interface selects, based on the 
appropriate goal-association combination; meaning the motivator tries to achieve the 
goal, but if failed would exit even if there are still cycles left. Once a goal and a 
relevant association are chosen, the motivator-update knowledge source of the 
motivational blackboard uses them to update the motivator. 
The control component of a motivational blackboard, generally, manages the course 
of problem-solving and makes run-time decisions about the expenditure of problem-
solving resources.  The control component of CAMAL is comprised of the reasoning 
and updating mechanisms that build a motivational construct. The motivational 
construct is, thus, a representation of the outcome from those reasoning and updating 
mechanisms. 
3.7 Domain	  Model	  
In addition to the BDI and affect and motivational models, CAMAL has a domain 
model. The domain model consists of all the elements that describe some part of the 
cognitive agent’s physical form or environment (real environment or simulation 
testbed).  It is vital that relevant information about the cognitive agent’s attributes 
and properties along with its surrounding environment be incorporated into its 
cognitive architecture. This incorporation, which is partly done through encoding 
(pre-programming) is achieved by the use of a domain model.  In addition to this 
method of instantiating the relevant information into the cognitive architecture, 
CAMAL also allows an extended domain model where learning occurs through 
dynamical association generation. 
The inclusion of a domain model makes the BDI and affect and motivational models 
generic, as they can be implemented on any agent in any environment – all that is 
needed would be the use of an appropriate (given or learnt) domain model to 
instantiate the relevant information about the agent and its enclosure or terrain into 
its cognitive architecture. 
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The domain model is distributed across the entire cognitive architecture, at both the 
reactive and deliberative levels. It provides information on the agent’s attributes and 
its surrounding environment; it defines the types of objects to be found within the 
agent’s environment (simulation or physical); it defines some of the possible beliefs 
that are most relevant to the agent; it defines the relationships between the stated 
beliefs; it defines the goals that the agent can have; it provides a list of all the 
possible actions the agent can undertake; it provides the objects’ perceptual profiles 
(i.e. the information required to recognize an object), etc. 
There are several components of the domain model that need to be introduced at this 
point, as they are vital to understanding how the architecture operates (for the rest, see 
appendix I). Statements about the agent’s environment at the deliberative level pertain 
to the possible beliefs the agent can have. These constitute the beliefs used in the 
BDI model. These statements, whether for simulated or embodied agents, are present 
on the motivational blackboard. These belief statements are represented by clauses of 
the form: 
belief	  (	  Descriptor,	  Source,	  Time	  ).	  
This particular syntax represents beliefs as categorical states.  They can be prioritized 
only by CAMAL preference model, using belief preference operators based on their 
source (see appendix I). However, they cannot be adequately valenced via affective 
values and affordances. 
Statements pertaining to the agent’s attributes are present at the deliberative level. 
These statements are on the motivational blackboard, and provide information on the 
goals that the agent can have and the actions that the agent can take. These constitute 
the desires and intentions used in the BDI model. Goals take the following form: 
goal	  (	  Descriptor,	  SuccessCondition,	  Importance	  ).	  
The Descriptor is a description of the agent’s goal. The SuccessCondition is 
the belief descriptor required for the goal to be achieved. The Importance is an 
affect value detailing the goal’s affordance. It controls how important the goal is to 
the agent. 
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Intentions are plans of actions – a set of intended tasks – that can be inferred from 
beliefs and desires of an agent, or explicitly provided (encoded / pre-programmed). 
They are akin to plans of actions or behaviours or reactive sub-architectures that are 
based on the agent’s desires, and have access to the agent’s beliefs. If the 
environment changes and the agent’s beliefs are updated, then the agent’s intentions 
should be modified accordingly to prevent the agent from failing its goal(s).          
The architecture at any one time makes use of only one of a number of alternative 
reactive sub-architectures. The BDI model is responsible for selecting the agent’s 
current goal (desire) and the intention (reactive sub-architectures used to establish that 
goal). For the majority of work in simulation and robotic worlds, variations of an 
initial domain model and motivational blackboard have been used (see appendix I). 
In summary, CAMAL is built around the concept of control states and, in particular, 
motivators. The primary conjecture is that the further development, design, and 
implementation of such cognitive architectures can proceed using a consistent and 
systematic control language across all aspects of reasoning and domain model 
management – something that the development of CernoCAMAL has taken 
advantage of. This control language can be grounded in the use of affect and 
affordances with the aim to be consistent across different domains, tasks, and levels 
of processing (Davis 2010). Together, they can be used to guide both internal and 
external decision-making and activities. 
3.8 Operational	  Overview	  
CAMAL uses a BDI model to drive a motivational blackboard. Perceptual updates 
lead to belief formations, and then belief revision in the BDI model, which then gives 
rise to goal revision. The association-update then uses the new belief set and goal set 
to determine the relevant action or intention or behaviour. The motivator-update 
enables goal revision and the selection of the next goal, based on goal importance 
(urgency) and goal success and current beliefs. This, in turn, drives motivator 
revision using the association construct, which in turn enables belief-desire-intention 
combinations to be ranked based on the likelihood of their success (association value 
or insistence). The goal urgency, association insistence, and motivator intensity are 
all underpinned by affordances; i.e. they are all consistently grounded in affect. 
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Therefore, affect and affordances are the means by which the agent can weigh its 
processes and also control the economics of its reasoning and processing. Together, 
they allow motivators to persist or be updated by new goals, associations, etc. 
A more extensive implementation of CAMAL allows for the use of metacontrol and 
metacognitive control processes (Venkatamuni 2008). Consulting Figure 3.4 again 
illustrates the column that conceptualizes the metacontrol and metacognitive control 
processes (reflective layer). It, also, illustrates how the BDI model is represented as 
the arcs from the perception processes across the motivational blackboard associated 
with the BDI hierarchies in the fourth column of the architecture schematic. 
The architecture, BDI model, and motivational model are configured at run-time 
using various domain models that allow the architecture to instantiate itself in a 
specific configuration. The processes interact through the use of affect and 
affordances. For any particular configuration of the architecture, there is a default 
behaviour, e.g. avoidance. This default behaviour (or possibly a set of default 
behaviours) is determined by the deliberative architecture – an example of many 
interactions taking place between the various layers of CAMAL. For a specific 
domain model, there are several behaviours associated with it; which represent 
intentions in the BDI model, prioritized and ranked by the affordances set by the 
affect model. 
3.9 Representative	  Cognitive	  Architectures	  
This chapter began with an introduction to CAMAL and a focused literature review 
on it, as the cornerstone and pivotal axis of this work (CernoCAMAL). It is now time 
to reflect on RoboCAMAL to complement this review. 
3.9.1 RoboCAMAL	  
RoboCAMAL was the most recent achievement of CAMAL research (Gwatkin 2009). 
The robot that runs RoboCAMAL is an ActiveMedia AmigoBot mobile robot, 
sketched in Figure 3.8 below. 
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     Figure 3-8: ActiveMedia AmigoBot Mobile Robot (ActiveMedia 2007) 
The robot’s environment is an enclosed area approximately two meters square. There 
is a one-meter partition wall roughly halfway along one side. There are various 
possible objects in this closure that RoboCAMAL’s vision system is designed to 
detect: blue ball, red robot, black robot. The black tape alongside the base of the 
walls is meant to aid the vision system by increasing the contrast between the walls 
and the floor. See Figure 3.9 below. 
 
 
Figure 3-9: RoboCAMAL’s Enclosure (Robotics Lab, Hull University) 
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RoboCAMAL has eight sonar sensors (4 facing forward, 2 rear-facing, and 1 on each side) 
and communicates with a Linux desktop via a pair of wireless radio modems 
(InfoWave modems). RoboCAMAL is controlled using the ARIA software suite (see 5.3). 
ARIA consists of a set of functions that access the information sent by the server 
platform (i.e. the robot). This enables the user to define a set of actions, called micro-
behaviours. These micro-behaviours can be added to the main robot connection loop, 
which will enable them to have access to the sensor buffers. 
Each micro-behaviour is fired once every processing cycle, and hence can access the 
relevant sensory data once every processing cycle. Each micro-behaviour uses the 
sensory information to produce an action. Each action consists of a desired heading 
and a desired speed that will be used by the robot’s specific functions to control the 
left and right motor speeds. The micro-behaviours are all reactive in nature. Once a 
micro-behaviour has been fired, it produces a set of actions that it wishes to carry 
out. These desired actions from each fired micro-behaviour are placed onto an action 
list. The next step is obviously to choose an appropriate action from the action list, 
and subsequently an attempt to carry it out. 
The module that determines the specific action to be sent to the robot via the wireless 
radio modem to be performed is the resolver module. The original resolver has been 
modified to include three extra arbitration methods in addition to ARIA’s indigenous 
arbitration method (ArPriorityResolver). What happens in reactive RoboCAMAL is that 
the robot’s sensors gather information and pass it to the sensor buffers, via the radio 
modem and the USB cable of the camera. The perception module uses the 
information in the sensor buffers to determine whether an event has occurred. If so, 
feedback messages are sent to the deliberative component. The deliberative 
component processes this information and returns appropriate control messages. 
The configuration module uses these control messages to configure the sensor 
buffers to the appropriate object profile, and also configure the resolver module to 
use an appropriate arbitration method. It, then, determines an appropriate reactive 
architecture, i.e. an appropriate combination of reactive micro-behaviours. Following 
this, active micro-behaviours fire and produce a list of desired actions. This list is 
used by the resolver module to determine the final action. The action command is, 
then, sent to the robot via the radio modem. Upon receiving the command, the robot 
performs that action. 
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In addition to the sonar array, RoboCAMAL has been fitted with an omni directional 
vision system – ODV device (Gwatkin & Davis 2007). Omni directional vision involves 
the capture and interpretation of images that depict full 360 degrees view of the 
surroundings. It offers the convenience of dealing with the rotation of the camera, or 
the robot equipped with the camera, as this will not make objects disappear from 
view, but only change their relative image positions. For reasons of simplicity and 
low cost, the ODV device in RoboCAMAL has been implemented using a single 
web-camera and a single spherical mirror bolted on top, depicted in Figure 3.11. 
Once an omni directional image has been captured by the camera and sent to the 
client (Linux machine) via the USB cable of the camera, it needs to be interpreted. 
An important tool used in image interpretation is image segmentation. The main goal 
of image segmentation is to define regions within an image that correlate with 
objects in the physical environment. There are various techniques used for image 
segmentation, such as thresholding algorithms, edge-based algorithms, region-based 
algorithms, etc. Since RoboCAMAL’s vision system must be fast, it adopts a Sobel 
edge-detection technique along with a simple thresholding method. 
 
Figure 3-10: RoboCAMAL’s Omni-Directional Vision (Gwatkin and Davis 2007) 
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Once a captured image is transformed into an edge image by running a Sobel 
operator over it, the formed edges need to be linked together to construct a 
continuous node chain. This chain will then be used to separate one area from the 
next. RoboCAMAL’s segmentation algorithm actually investigates an area of interest 
(AOI) within an image. The AOI is defined as an area around the robot. It is this area 
that is analysed to identify objects – objects that RoboCAMAL is designed to detect. 
In summary, RoboCAMAL observes its environment and forms beliefs 
(environmental beliefs). It, then, chooses an appropriate action based on those 
beliefs, its internal state, and its pre-set goal(s). It, finally, executes that action.  
Robo-CAMAL’s anchoring mechanism deals with the formation of beliefs; the BDI 
schema and the Affect model are responsible for choosing an appropriate action; and 
the reactive level is responsible for interpreting the control messages received from 
the deliberative layer and executing that action. The RoboCAMAL research project 
was successfully concluded in 2009. 
The research has now gone into the applications of complete and believable 
cognitive agents for simulated training environments (e.g. Tambe et al. 1995), computer 
tutoring systems (e.g. Koedinger, Anderson, Hadley, Mark 1997), and interactive computer 
games (e.g. Magerko, Laird, Assanie, Kerfoot, Stokes 2004). In particular, as Langley et al. 
(2009) point out in their review of research issues and challenges for cognitive 
architectures, over the past few decades at least three invited symposia have brought 
together researchers in this area (Laird 1991; VanLehn 1991; Shapiro, Langley 2004) and 
there have been at least two edited volumes (Sun 2005; VanLehn 1991). Many 
researchers have proposed and developed cognitive architectures over the past four 
decades. 
As it is impossible to survey the entire space of cognitive architectural theories, only 
the following six distinct frameworks are briefly reviewed in this thesis, due to two 
reasons: Firstly, because they have appeared in the literature with reasonable 
frequency. Secondly, because they have exhibited different degrees of concern with 
explaining human behaviour. There is a variety of other frameworks as well, but the 
representative sample reviewed here is an excerpt taken from the highlights of 
Langley et al. (2009) that gives some intuitions about the space of cognitive 
architectures. 
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No connectionist networks, exemplar-based models, or production systems 
approaches are included in this thesis though, since none has yet demonstrated the 
broad functionality associated with cognitive architectures in the sense discussed in 
this work. They have, on occasion, served as important components in larger-scale 
architectures, as in Sun et al. (2001) CLARION framework. But as must be clear by 
now, this work focuses on a symbolic account of cognition. The following describes 
some representative cognitive architectures that serve as concrete examples, reported 
in the literature with reasonable frequency. Note that CogAff was previously 
introduced and reviewed at the beginning of this chapter as an inspiration to the 
proposal and development of CAMAL. 
3.9.2 ACT-­‐R	  
(Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational) (Anderson 1976; Anderson, Lebiere 1998; Anderson, 
Matessa 1998; Anderson et al. 2004; Anderson 2007) is a cognitive architecture realized as a 
symbolic goal-oriented production system, written in Lisp. It is primarily concerned 
with modelling human behaviour and semantic memory. It has seen continuous 
development since the late 1970s and is, therefore, cited frequently as a well-known 
example of a cognitive architecture. The most recent instantiation of it includes a 
declarative memory for facts and a procedural memory consisting of production 
rules. The architecture operates by matching productions on perceptions and facts, 
mediated by the real-valued activation levels of objects, and executing them to affect 
the environment or alter declarative memory. Learning in ACT-R involves creating 
new facts and productions, as well as updating base activations and utilities 
associated with these structures. 
3.9.3 SOAR	  
(Newell 1986; Laird et al. 1987; Rosenbloom 1993; Lewis 2001) encodes procedural long-term 
memory as production rules, whereas working memory contains a set of elements 
with attributes and values. The performance system matches productions against 
elements in working memory, and generates sub-goals automatically when it cannot 
continue. When processing in the sub-goal lets the agent overcome this impasse, the 
architecture adds a new ‘chunk’ to long-term memory that summarizes the sub-goal 
processing. 
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In recent versions, episodic and semantic learning store working memory elements as 
structures in long-term memory, while reinforcement learning alters weights 
associated with rules that select operators. 
3.9.4 CLARION	  
(Sun et al. 2001; Sun 2007; Sun 2009) stores both action-centred and non-action knowledge 
in implicit form, using multi-layer neural networks, and in explicit form, using 
symbolic production rules. Corresponding short-term memories contain activations 
on nodes and symbolic elements that the architecture matches against long-term 
structures. Performance involves passing sensory information to the implicit layer, 
which generates alternative high-value actions, and to the explicit layer, which uses 
rules to propose actions. The architecture then selects the candidate with the highest 
expected value. Learning involves weight revision in the implicit system, using a 
combination of reinforcement learning and back-propagation to estimate value 
functions, and construction of production rules by extraction from the implicit layer, 
error-driven revision, and instantiation of rule templates. 
3.9.5 GLAIR	  
(Shapiro, Ismail 2003) stores content at a knowledge or cognitive level, a perceptual-
motor level, and a sensory actuator level. The highest layer includes generalized 
structures that define predicates in logical terms, ultimately grounding abstract 
concepts and procedures in perceptual features and behavioural routines at the 
middle layer. The system supports inference, belief revision, planning, execution, 
and natural language processing, inferring high-level beliefs from perceptions and 
deriving commands at the sensory actuator level from the agent’s goals and plans. 
3.9.6 ICARUS	  
(Langley, Choi 2006; Choi 2011) represents long-term knowledge in separate memories 
for hierarchical skills and concepts, with short-term beliefs, goals, and intentions cast 
as instances of these general structures. The performance element first infers all 
beliefs implied by its concepts and its perceptions of the environment, then selects an 
applicable path through the skill hierarchy to execute. 
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Means-ends problem solving occurs when no skills relevant to the current goal are 
applicable, whereas learning creates new skills based on traces of successful problem 
solving. 
3.9.7 PolyScheme	  
(Cassimatis, Trafton, Bugajska, Schultz 2004) is a cognitive architecture designed to achieve 
human-level intelligence by integrating multiple representations, reasoning methods, 
and problem-solving techniques. Each representation has an associated specialist 
module that supports forward inference, and other basic operations, which match 
against a shared dynamic memory with elements that are grounded in perception and 
action. PolyScheme makes a stronger semantic commitment than most architectures, 
encoding all structures with a basic set of relations about time, space, events, 
identity, causality, and belief. 
3.10 	  Summary	  
This chapter began with an introduction to a general class of computational cognitive 
architectures known as CAMAL. A review of the original overarching architecture 
was presented, as an important pivotal axis for the development of CernoCAMAL.   
It was described what progress had been made since the start of the CAMAL 
research. Its priors (e.g. CogAff) and its spin-offs to date were introduced, and 
subsequently its components and organization were presented, including the BDI 
(Belief-Desire-Intention) and affect models. This was, then, followed by a brief 
discussion on the works of CRIBB and a-CRIBB reasoning models, and how their 
architectures made use of BDI and affect schemas. The chapter continued with 
introducing the association and motivator constructs. The concept of a motivational 
blackboard was presented, followed by explaining how CAMAL’s blackboard 
facilitated the operation of its motivational constructs. The role of a domain model 
was highlighted, and its components were then pointed out. A brief operational 
overview of CAMAL was given before proceeding to a broader literature review in 
the field of Cognitive Architectures. The chapter concluded with reviewing the most 
notable and significant examples of cognitive architectures, in particular the recent 
work of RoboCAMAL. 
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4 CernoCAMAL	  Architecture	  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of relevant research conducted prior to 
CAMAL and CernoCAMAL, with regards to probabilistic thinking and reasoning. 
The fact that none of the CAMAL spin-off projects to date has addressed the 
cognitive capability of probabilistic reasoning is underlined, followed by 
emphasizing the main motivation of extending CAMAL to develop this fundamental 
cognitive ability. A brief introduction to the probability theory is given, followed by 
a review of the basics of the probability calculus and framework. The structure of 
CAMAL’s belief statements is explored, from which the CernoCAMAL’s Extended 
Belief Structure (EBS) is developed. The EBS is discussed and its advantages over 
CAMAL’s inadequate belief statements are pointed out. The chapter then goes on to 
introduce CernoCAMAL’s Probabilistic Reasoner (CPR) and explaining how it 
reasons probabilistically over the feedback generated by reactive sub-systems of 
CernoCAMAL. A comprehensive design criteria for the belief predicates constituting 
goal- and task-oriented feedback generated by reactive sub-systems is outlined. The 
memory facility used in the design of the CPR is addressed, followed by the norm 
facility incorporated in the structure of motivators. The chapter concludes with 
presenting an operational overview of CernoCAMAL. 
4.1 Introduction	  
Since the 1950s, Cognitivism (also known as Cognitive Psychology) has been the 
predominant perspective within which human learning research has been conducted 
and cognitive theories of human learning have evolved. The roots of human 
interaction and learning theories can be found in research dating back to the 1920s 
and 1930s. For example, Jean Piaget the famous Developmental Psychologist, 
portrayed children as active and motivated learners who, through numerous 
interactions with their physical and social environments, construct an increasingly 
complex understanding of the world around them (Piaget 1928). Piaget and Inhelder 
(1951) later linked the development of children’s probabilistic thinking and reasoning 
to Piaget’s general theory of cognitive development  (Way 2003). 
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In more recent years, a number of researchers (e.g. Fischbein 1975; Shaughnessy 1981; 
Green 1983; Peard 1995; J.Truran 1996; K.Truran 1996; Fischbein, Schnarch 1997) have 
contributed to the growing body of knowledge in regards to probabilistic thinking 
and reasoning. There is now considerable evidence that probabilistic thinking and 
reasoning is linked to cognitive development and plays a role in cognitive functions, 
such as decision making and learning. 
It is also noteworthy that similar to child’s development, the architecture of an 
intelligent system is not static – it develops over time. Put differently, the behaviour 
of an intelligent agent depends on the challenges that arise from being situated and 
embodied, and being in interactions. It is a product of the on-going development of 
the agent in interactions with its environment. New learning and reasoning bring 
about new capabilities which, in turn, modify the capabilities for further learning and 
reasoning. 
All this evidence leads us to believe that a probabilistic reasoning capability is an 
essential part of human intelligence. Thus, it should be a vital part of any system that 
attempts to emulate human intelligence computationally. In other words, probabilistic 
reasoning is an essential aspect of the process of cognition and, therefore, must be 
considered in any adequate description of it. This is the core motivation for the 
design, development, and implementation of CernoCAMAL, as this cognitive 
capability has never been implemented or included in CAMAL before. CAMAL has 
pursued a perspective informed by affective and motivational control states, 
rationalized by cognitive models of reasoning and learning. There clearly exists a 
need to incorporate probabilistic reasoning. 
The development of the current cognitive architecture under investigation – 
CernoCAMAL  –  is mainly based on projects and experiments in the theory, design, 
and implementation of affect- and motivation-based architectures of Davis (Davis 
1996...2010) (see 3.1). It builds on the work of Simon’s Control State theory (1967, 1996, 
1999) and is conducted within a conceptual framework. The viewpoint of ‘mind as a 
control system’ is a major constituent of this conceptual framework (Sloman 1993). 
Another comprising part of the CernoCAMAL’s conceptual framework is the 
viewpoint that ‘architecture dominates mechanism’. It sums up the view that 
architecture has a greater influence on the capacities of an intelligent system than the 
mechanisms it consists of  (Sloman 1993).  
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4.2 Probability	  Theory	  
How best to reason about uncertain situations has always been of concern to humans. 
Rationality and rational reasoning and decision making, however, have always 
seemed to concern reasoning according to the rules of logic. Piaget viewed logical 
reasoning as defining the end-point of cognitive development. Even contemporary 
psychology of reasoning has focused on comparing human reasoning against logical 
standards. An example would be contradictory statements about uncertain situations 
and degrees of belief or doubt (such as negations existing simultaneously: P	  &	  ¬P 
which is false) which normally cause logic-based models of cognition to fail, 
whereas in probability calculus,   P(x)	  =	  0.9	  	  &	  	  P(¬x)	  =	  0.1   is  acceptable. 
Formal logic has its foundations in the studies of human rationality which is an 
evident characteristic of the human cognition. Cognition means many things to many 
people though. It is, however, taken necessarily to include the higher-level 
information processing stages that are carried out by the human and animal brains, 
such as thinking, reasoning, learning, planning, looking ahead, and even 
consciousness (Blumenthal 1977).  Reasoning and learning are fundamental and crucial 
components of cognition (Taylor 2005).  There are a number of common approaches to 
modelling the human mind and cognition, such as: 
Ø Symbolic:  performing logical inferences on symbols, e.g. language structures. 
Ø Connectionist:  obtaining inferences from ANNs at a sub-symbolic level. 
Ø Probabilistic: performing probabilistic inferences and using the results for 
reasoning and, possibly, learning and adaptability. 
The probabilistic approach is key here. Probabilistic thinking and reasoning is shown 
to be linked to cognitive development, based on a substantial body of research (e.g. 
Piaget 1928; Piaget, Inhelder 1951; Fischbein 1975; Shaughnessy 1981; Green 1983; Peard 1995; 
J.Truran 1996; K.Truran 1996; Fischbein, Schnarch 1997; Way 2003; Oaksford, Chater 2007).        
In addition, the probabilistic approach to human cognition has become established. 
Oaksford and Chater argue that cognition is better understood in terms of probability 
theory – the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic – the 
calculus of certain reasoning (Oaksford, Chater 1999, 2007, 2009). 
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In Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford, Chater 2009) the case is made that cognition in 
general and human everyday reasoning in particular are better viewed as solving 
probabilistic, rather than logical, inference problems. It is also argued that rather than 
viewing people as flawed logicians, the focus should be instead on the spectacular 
success of human reasoning under uncertainty. The basic formalism of probability 
calculus has been available from the 17th century, and provides a promising 
framework for coping with uncertainty. As a matter of fact, the probability calculus 
was specifically invented in the 17th century by Fermat and Pascal in order to deal 
with the problems of physical uncertainty introduced by gambling. 
But it did not take long before it was noticed that the concept of probability could 
also be used as an approach to scientific reasoning about uncertainty. It, then, quickly 
took on a larger and deeper significance as a formal framework for how rational 
cognitive agents should reason in situations of uncertainty. A cognitive agent running 
the CAMAL architecture, however, assumes that propositions are either true or false 
or unknown, unless it is equipped with some process of assigning degree or extent or 
strength of beliefs and then handling the probability computations, as this cognitive 
capability has never been implemented or included in CAMAL before ( addressing     
the main motivation for the design, development, and implementation of CernoCAMAL ). 
An appropriate set of questions at this point would be whether we should bother with 
uncertainty at all; whether we need to take into consideration the uncertainty inherent 
to a cognitive agent’s environment; and whether, specifically, the CAMAL belief 
propositions mechanism ( true, false, or unknown ) is really inadequate for a cognitive 
architecture. It must be noted that reasoning about any realistic domain always 
requires that some simplifications be made. The very act of preparing knowledge to 
support reasoning ( such as reasoning over a set of beliefs ) requires that we leave many 
facts unknown, unsaid, or crudely summarized. For example, using a domain model 
to instantiate into CAMAL’s cognitive architecture knowledge about its 
environment, beliefs, goals, and tasks will have many details and exceptions which 
we simply cannot afford to enumerate – not to mention the conditions under which 
these rules apply! An alternative to the extremes of ‘ignoring’ or ‘enumerating’ all 
details and exceptions is to use reasoning under uncertainty. 
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Also, it must be noted that when humans reason rationally, they are actually using a 
BDI model and an affect model, along with an underlying motivational schema; all 
together and asynchronously. This, however, is not the complete picture of reasoning 
rationally. Performing probabilistic reasoning and inference, and allowing degrees of 
belief or doubt to outcomes of events are also employed in reasoning and learning 
processes. This is evident in our daily lives as well. 
4.3 Basics	  of	  Probability	  Calculus	  
The probabilistic inference framework can provide a formal, general approach to 
computing posterior probabilities given some apriori. This section briefly introduces 
the basics of probability calculus. First, a few notations: 
€ 
P(x)  denotes probability of 
€ 
x . 
€ 
P(x |θ)  denotes probability of 
€ 
x  given 
€ 
θ . 
€ 
P(x,θ) denotes joint probability of 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
θ . 
Probability is the measure of how likely an event is. An event is one or more 
outcomes of an experiment. An outcome is the result of a single trial of an 
experiment.  An experiment is a situation involving chance or probability that leads 
to outcomes and results. Let 
€ 
U  be the universe of possible events. Then, the 
maximum probability must apply to the 
€ 
true event lying within 
€ 
U . By convention, 
this maximum probability is set to 
€ 
1 resulting in the first axiom for probability: 
€ 
P(U) =1       
         Equation 4-1: Axiom One 
This probability mass always sums or integrates to 
€ 
1.  For simplicity, it is assumed 
that this probability mass is evenly distributed or spread over 
€ 
U , so that the 
probability of any region is proportional to its area.  Obviously, for any region such 
as 
€ 
x  its area cannot be negative (even if 
€ 
x  is empty) resulting in the second axiom 
for probability: 
€ 
∀x ⊆U,P(x) ≥ 0       
        Equation 4-2: Axiom Two 
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The third axiom 7 results from the need to compute the probability of combined 
events 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
y : 
€ 
∀x,y ⊆U,P(x∪ y) = P(x)+ P(y)− P(x∩ y)  
      Equation 4-3: Axiom Three 
In summary, a probability is a measure over a set of events that satisfies the above 
three axioms. The Bayesian probability assumes belief measures obey these three 
basic axioms (Pearl 1988, 2003). The basic expressions in the Bayesian probability are 
statements about conditional probabilities. Thomas Bayes ( 1702 - 1761 ) was an 18th 
century minister who made his main contribution to the science of probability by 
associating the phrase “ ...	  given	  that	  I	  know	  Y	  ” with the now-famous ratio 
formula, which has become the definition of conditional probabilities. He introduced 
a key theorem which serves as the mathematical basis of probabilistic inference: 
€ 
∀x,y ⊆U,P(x | y) = P(x,y)P(y) =
P(x∩ y)
P(y)       
    Equation 4-4: Theorem One
 
The heart of Bayesian techniques lies in the inversion formula: 
€ 
P(h |e) = P(e | h)*P(h)P(e)         
        Equation 4-5: Bayes’ Rule
 
The Bayes’ rule states that the belief we accord a hypothesis 
€ 
h  upon obtaining 
evidence 
€ 
e  can be computed by multiplying our previous belief 
€ 
P(h)  by the 
likelihood 
€ 
P(e | h)  that 
€ 
e  will materialize if 
€ 
h  is true (Pearl 1988). 
€ 
P(e) is just a 
normalizing factor. 
€ 
P(h |e)  is called the posterior probability of 
€ 
h  given 
€ 
e , and 
€ 
P(h)  is called the prior probability of 
€ 
h . 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 =    !"#$!"!!!"∗!"#$"!"#$!%&!            
         Equation 4-6: Probabilistic Inference Theorem 
  
                                                
7 It is noteworthy that in some text books, a simplified version of this ( where 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
y  are mutually 
exclusive ) is introduced as the Third Axiom, and then the complete version is presented as a  
Theorem or Consequence.  Another consequence that is commonly used is:  
€ 
P(¬x) =1− P(x)  
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The posterior probability
€ 
P(h |e)  could also be interpreted as the degree of belief in 
€ 
h  conditioned on the observation of 
€ 
e . Probability calculus provides a powerful 
tool for expressing uncertainty in a cognitive model or domain. In the context of 
Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence however, probability refers not to 
‘objective’ facts about gambling devices or anything else, but rather it describes a 
reasoner’s degrees of belief. Probability theory is, thus, a calculus not for solving 
mathematical problems about objects in the world, but for expressing degrees of 
belief and subsequently updating beliefs accordingly. This perspective is the 
‘subjective’ or Bayesian view of probability. 
From its origins, probability theory was viewed as both mathematics and psychology. 
Reconciliation is, thus, long overdue between the mathematics of probability as a 
vital tool in building theories of cognition and the psychology of probabilistic 
reasoning and inference (Chater et al. 2006). Probabilistic models of cognition such as 
CernoCAMAL provide a framework for reasoning and updating beliefs realistically. 
Moreover, they can be applied in various ways to the problems that a cognitive 
system faces, such as the problem of incorporating degrees of belief in their BDI 
model. 
In summary, many – if not all – aspects of human cognition depend fundamentally 
on inductive inference: evaluating degrees of belief in hypotheses given weak 
constraints imposed by observed data (Tenenbaum, Mozer 2000).  In logic-based models 
of cognition, the currency of belief is a binary truth value.  In connectionist models 
of cognition, the currency of belief is an activation level. In probabilistic models of 
cognition such as CernoCAMAL, the currency of belief is a probability value. 
Generally, in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence applications, probabilities 
refer to degrees of belief or belief affordances. Thus, a cognitive agent’s degree of 
belief that a particular entity is a specific object (say might be P1) might well 
increase to a greater number (say P2) as new perceptual evidence or reactive 
feedback comes in. At the same moment, the experimenter knows the exact number 
of that specific object in the testbed. Thus, the two cognitive beings are viewing the 
very same event, but their belief states and hence their subjective probabilities might 
differ. This particular approach of combining prior information (apriori) and 
evidence is the subjective or Bayesian view of probability. As evidence accumulates, 
the degree of belief in a hypothesis ought to change accordingly. 
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It is noteworthy that this inference method may be biased due to initial beliefs 
(default assumptive beliefs, such as environment(sparse)) that the cognitive agent 
holds before any evidence or perception or reactive feedback is ever collected. This 
form of inductive bias, though valid, does not detract from the calculated degrees of 
belief over time, as these belief affordances are after all numerical ‘estimates’ that a 
cognitive agent works out and are always subject to modification. 
4.4 Extended	  Belief	  Structure	  (EBS)	  
In CAMAL beliefs are core.  They are represented by clauses of the form: 
belief	  (	  Descriptor,	  Source,	  Time	  ).	  
It is, then, the BDI and affect models that determine the intentions, actions, or 
behaviours of the agent based on its beliefs and goals. One of the limitations of the 
BDI model, however, is the lack of any explicit mechanism to express the degree to 
which the belief statement Descriptor is believed to be true. Since affect is used 
across the cognitive architecture as a decision metric, affective values can be thought 
of as a currency. Meaning, since affect serves as a decision metric, affective values 
can serve as a currency. Put differently, the BDI model lacks an affective decision 
metric consistent with the affordances used in the affect and motivational models. 
Given that the current CAMAL research presents an affect- and affordance-based 
core for mind (Davis 2010) it seems reasonable to conjecture that beliefs, too, should 
be grounded in the use of affect, with the aim to be consistent across different 
domains, tasks, and levels of processing. This can be achieved by extending the 
belief structure to incorporate probabilities as degrees of belief associated with 
different information sources. The extended belief structure associates a probability 
value DegBel with every belief statement in CernoCAMAL which defines the degree 
to which the belief statement is believed to be true: 
belief	  (	  Descriptor,	  Source,	  Time,	  DegBel	  ).	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The DegBel element represents the degree of belief in the plausibility of 
Descriptor. Obviously, the following belief functions must satisfy the rules of 
probability theory: 
0  ≪	  DegBel	  ≪  1	  ,	   	   DegBel	  =	  0	  ,	   DegBel	  =	  1	  
DegBel	  =	  0 means definitely false and DegBel	  =	  1 means definitely true. Note that 
extent of beliefs are represented by real numbers, and there is a correspondence with 
common sense! 
CernoCAMAL uses this extended belief structure to represent the degree or extent or 
strength of beliefs numerically and then manipulate them. The idea behind equipping 
the original CAMAL with such an extended belief structure is based on the fact that 
the uncertainty and incompleteness of information (e.g. perceptual information) can 
induce some uncertainty in the validity of its conclusions; i.e. formed beliefs. 
Therefore, every belief clause must be associated with an assessment of its 
plausibility or reliability – belief affordance. This extension will allow the entire BDI 
model to run using numeric affective values to prioritize choices over the current 
belief set. The use of such an affective or BDI model will make affordances the basis 
of a consistent and systematic control language across the entire cognitive 
architecture. It will also allow external events and objects to take valenced 
affordances, and internal mechanisms to be prioritized via valenced processes. 
The resulting formalization of the BDI model enables CernoCAMAL to deal with 
dynamic environments, as demonstrated by experiments performed in simulation and 
real testbeds. It does so by facilitating the use of a consistent and systematic metric 
across all aspects of reasoning and domain model management. This way, the BDI 
model can run using numeric affect values similar to the affordance values employed 
in the affect and motivational models. The primary conjecture here is that the 
incorporation and implementation of the EBS can proceed using the same systematic 
control mechanism based on affordances. This control mechanism is, essentially, 
grounded in the use of affect. This has subsequently led to the development of a 
probabilistic belief reasoner for CernoCAMAL that can deliberate probabilistically 
over the feedback generated by the reactive layer. 
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In summary, by exploiting this new probabilistic belief-affordance structure in 
CernoCAMAL, the initial probabilities (apriori) can be specified as assumptive 
(default) degrees of belief; then as evidence about a situation is gathered by 
perceptual systems, that evidence can be propagated through the entire BDI model, 
revising and updating other beliefs and their affordances (degrees). This enables the 
architecture to select a focused belief set that mirrors its current activities, as 
highlighted by actions, objects, and agents referenced in a current motivator.          
By utilizing the EBS, the entire BDI model along with the affect and motivational 
models are ‘pulled  together’ operating in a formalized manner. 
4.5 CernoCAMAL	  Probabilistic	  Reasoner	  (CPR)	  
The development and implementation of the EBS in CernoCAMAL allows for the 
inclusion of degrees of belief for different information sources. The following is the 
initial domain model assumptions made over the apriori of various sources of belief: 
degree_of_belief	  (	  perception,	   0.9	   ).	  
degree_of_belief	  (	  deduction,	  	   0.7	   ).	  
degree_of_belief	  (	  assumption,	   0.5	   ).	  
It is also noteworthy that a belief descriptor could be the apriori probability of an 
object being present in the environment: 
apriori_prob	  (	  Object,	  DegBel	  ).	  
which is clearly in the form of assumed knowledge. CernoCAMAL’s CPR, given the 
list of domain model objects and assumed degree_of_belief for various sources of 
belief, can compute the posterior probabilities, assign them to the appropriate belief 
descriptors, and reason probabilistically about the number of objects and their 
instances that may be present in the environment 8. As an example, consider a 
possible initial configuration of having one sphere, one prey, one predator, and no 
unidentified objects in the DND Tile World simulation environment (see 5.2). This 
configuration can be represented by the following statements: 
  
                                                
8 Note what ‘uncertainty’ is referring to here, in the context of the CPR using the EBS. 
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belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  object,	  0.0	  ),	   assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  sphere,	  0.3	  ),	   assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  pred,	  	  	  0.3	  ),	   assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  prey,	  	  	  0.3	  ),	   assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
This initial configuration assumes that if there is one object, then it is equally likely 
to be a sphere, a prey, or a predator, hence the probability of every domain object 
being present is 1/3	   or 0.3 with a 0.5 degree of belief since the statements are 
assumptive. Known exemplars of the above object classes are identified via 
instances, e.g. prey2. The feedback messages received from the reactive layer take 
the following form:   [	  reactive_cycles	  (	  N	  )	  |	  Messages	  ]. 
The deliberative layer uses the reactive feedback messages to construct updated 
beliefs. It, then, updates the time and activates the deliberative component with the 
updated beliefs. Table 4.7 illustrates possible elements constituting the reactive 
feedback list, accompanied by their interpretations and actions to be taken by 
CernoCAMAL’s CPR. What follows afterward is a brief overview of the design 
criteria for the belief predicates constituting goal- and task-oriented feedback 
generated by reactive sub-systems. A detailed list of these predicates that are specific 
to the predator-prey testbed (see 5.2) can be found in the next chapter (see 5.4). 
Feedback Item Meaning CPR Action 
reactive_cycles Number of reactive cycles 9 Update reactive cycles. 
fail 
Current goal has not succeeded; 
i.e. architecture’s instantiated 
behaviour has failed to achieve 
the current goal. 
Display a message stating that 
the current goal-directed 
behaviour has failed. 
non-belief clause 
Invalid predicate; i.e. predicate 
does not belong to the belief 
predicate set. 
Display a message stating that a 
non-belief predicate is not of 
interest. 
Table 4-7: CernoCAMAL’s CPR Actions 
                                                
9 The deliberative component may trigger the reactive component to run for 10 cycles. This means 
that for every one deliberative cycle, the reactive component will run for 10 cycles. The reactive 
component will, therefore, run for 10 cycles before calling the deliberative level, unless a significant 
event occurs. 
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The power of CernoCAMAL’s CPR lies in its probabilistic interpretations of the 
predicates pertaining to various instances contained in reactive feedback lists. Note 
that the instances that were destroyed; i.e. eaten (see 5.2) and could not be re-
generated when stumbled upon and the instances that were lost, but could be re-
generated when stumbled upon. This intelligent probabilistic reasoning capability 
that keeps track of the instances is made possible by CernoCAMAL’s memory 
facility. 
4.5.1 Memory	  Facility	  
From a functional perspective, memory is seen as a capability for storage and 
retrieval of data. From an experiential perspective, memory is often thought of as 
episodes in which strong feelings of recall briefly dominate a person’s awareness 
(Middleton, Edwards 1990; Nader 2003; Neisser, Fivush 1994). It is, however, difficult to 
justify separating memory from emotions and affect. Based on our daily lives and 
lived experiences, there is no doubt that affect can disrupt reasoning under certain 
circumstances, and that misdirected or uncontrolled emotions can lead to irrational 
behaviour. These feelings of affect strongly influence the way we recall as well. 
They influence what we remember and how we remember what it is that we 
remember. Memory, in essence, consists of much more than some local 
measurements of recall though.  The experience of memory forms parts of on-going 
interactions that are emotionally-charged and are embedded in a broader context 
(Clocksin 2004). 
CernoCAMAL’s CPR memory facility is best understood by considering Cerno 10 in 
its dynamic and uncertain simulation environment. Now, suppose that Cerno starts 
moving around and stumbling across various objects in the testbed.  Cerno’s findings 
are represented as reactive feedback lists that are passed to the deliberative 
component for reasoning and deliberation. Having found a domain object or perhaps 
an unidentified one, Cerno reasons about the probabilities of various objects and their 
instances being present in the environment. Now, suppose that Cerno loses or eats 
(destroys) an item, e.g. a sphere or prey. That lost or eaten (destroyed) object or 
instance is withdrawn from the simulation world. 
                                                
10 Cerno refers to the implementation instance – the cognitive agent – whereas CernoCAMAL refers 
to the computational cognitive architecture.  Put differently, Cerno is an instance of CernoCAMAL. 
78 
The way Cerno limits the scope of the propositions it must re-consider and re-
evaluate in the light of its actions is by the loss’ or destruction’s memory trail that is 
formed by the CernoCAMAL’s CPR. The object and instance reasoning of 
CernoCAMAL’s CPR using memory trails is perhaps the most significant part of the 
probabilistic reasoning carried out in the deliberative layer of the architecture, as well 
as the most significant contribution of this work.  It is for this reason that the greatest 
emphasis is placed on the tests and experiments that validate the correct functionality 
of the CPR ( see  6.2.1 & 6.3.1 ).  In a nutshell, when an instance is found 11 : 
Ø If the instance list of that object is empty (i.e. if that object is definitely the first 
to be found), then a new unique instance is generated. 
Ø If there is a memory trail of a previously lost instance, then that previously 
generated lost instance is re-created, instead of re-generating a new incremental 
one. 
Ø If the found instance can refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than extending the instance list), then it 
refers to that previously found instance. 
Ø If the found instance has been found for a second time, then the first one refers to 
a previously found instance and the second one generates a new unique instance. 
Ø If an instance was eaten, then the trail for that instance will be marked as 
‘destroyed’ so that upon finding an instance, the identification is made based on 
the fact that it cannot possibly be that destroyed instance. Put crudely, an eaten 
object or instance cannot come back to life. 
 	  
                                                
11 Other predicates (such as near, hit, and touched) are also treated as found; meaning hitting 
something is akin to finding it. 
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4.5.2 Norm	  Facility	  
So far, a probabilistic reasoning capability has been incorporated in CernoCAMAL 
using the BDI model. This has enabled the inclusion of degrees of belief (belief 
affordances) and subsequently using the BDI and affect and motivational models to 
determine the agent’s intentions, actions, or behaviours. It has, effectively, allowed 
the entire BDI model to run using numeric affective values to prioritize choices over 
the current belief set. The proposal to incorporate the EBS has also led to the 
development of the CPR that can deliberate probabilistically over the generated 
reactive feedback, using the memory facility. 
Recall that a motivator contains the result of the operation and execution of the 
various knowledge sources of a blackboard. It is a representational form that enables 
perception, affect, cognition, and behaviour to interact. Put differently, it is a 
unifying schema that brings together many aspects of perceptual and cognitive 
processing,  such  as  perception,  affect,  cognition,  and  behaviour: 
(	  Extended	  Belief	  Predicate	  	  x	  	  Desire	  	  x	  	  Intention	  )	  	  +	  
Goal	  	  +	  	  Association	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  à	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Motivator	  
Also, recall that at the deliberative level of CernoCAMAL, affective values and 
affordances can be associated with processes and predicates, and then relayed as 
control signals to instantiate and modify motivators and their associated 
representations and behaviours. Probabilistic formalism can be integrated into the 
motivational construct as well, by means of a shallow metacognitive norm. 
Metacognition can be simply defined as thinking about thinking (Wilson, Keil 1999). 
Any knowledge or cognitive process that refers to monitoring and controlling some 
aspect of cognition can be considered metacognitive. 
This mechanism makes the motivator selection and updating a configurable 
probabilistic process. Therefore, the one motivator that is eventually chosen by 
deliberative processing not only reflects the result of the operation and execution of 
the various knowledge sources of the CernoCAMAL’s motivational blackboard, but 
also performs in line with the BDI model and takes into consideration the associated 
degree of belief: 
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(	  Extended	  Belief	  Predicate	  	  x	  	  Desire	  	  x	  	  Intention	  )	  	  +	  
Goal	  	  +	  	  Association	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  à	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Probabilistic	  Motivator	  
The described norm used in CernoCAMAL takes the form: 
norm	  (	  motivator,	  selection,	  DegBel_Time_Desire_Intention	  ).	  
Other Metacognitive norms that are used in CernoCAMAL include: 
norm	  (	  belief,	   belief_decay_threshold,	  15	  ).	  
norm	  (	  goal,	   failed_goal_interval,	   15	  ).	  
The first involves the age of a belief. If a belief is older than (in terms of the elapsed 
deliberative time) a pre-defined threshold, then it is removed (here it is 15). The 
second involves the consecutive number of times a goal has failed (here it is 15).  If 
so, then it is removed.  These norms are used in experimentation to confirm that a 
probabilistic motivator yields a higher overall performance, success count, task 
effectiveness, and goal achievement. They provide a powerful tool towards 
developing efficient computational cognitive models. 
4.6 Operational	  Overview	  
CernoCAMAL uses a BDI schema to drive a motivational blackboard. The 
blackboard, essentially, represents the whole deliberative component which has been 
written in Prolog. The inclusion of degree-of-belief (belief affordance) in the 
structure of CernoCAMAL’s belief predicates enables the architecture to select a 
focused belief set that reflects its current activities, as highlighted by actions, objects, 
and agents referenced in a current motivator.  The motivator enables goal revision 
and the selection of the next goal, based on goal importance and goal success and 
also current beliefs. The deliberative processing of these constructs allows the 
selection of an appropriate intention or action or behaviour related to specific objects 
and tasks. This, in turn, drives motivator revision using the association construct, 
which in turn enables belief-desire-intention combinations to be ranked based on the 
likelihood of their success or association values. 
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The belief degree (belief affordance), goal importance (urgency), association value 
(insistence), and motivator value (intensity) are all underpinned by affordances; i.e. 
they are all consistently grounded in affect. Therefore, affect and affordances become 
the means by which the agent can weigh its beliefs and processes, and also control 
the economics of its reasoning. Together, they allow motivators to persist or be 
updated by new goals, associations, etc. 
At the reactive level, perceptual data from the testbed’s sensors are passed to the 
deliberative layer. This perceptual message is posted to the motivational blackboard 
and reasoned about by the CernoCAMAL’s CPR (see 6.2.1 & 6.3.1). The re-
implemented belief-update module uses the new information to modify its belief set. 
The goal-update then uses the updated belief set to determine if the current goal has 
been achieved, and what the new goal is. The association-update then uses the new 
belief set and goal set to determine the relevant action or intention or behaviour. 
Whether in simulated or robotic testbeds, sensory information is mapped onto belief 
structures. Belief affordance or degree of belief defines the degree to which the belief 
statement is believed to be true. The insistence measure allows the control of external 
behaviour through the building of associations that link beliefs, goals, and intentions. 
In a nutshell, the rationality of the BDI model and its CPR is modulated with 
affective mechanisms and processes, allowing degree-of-belief updating to structured 
and controlled environments through the use of its extended belief predicates. 
This is finalized by the use of a shallow probabilistic metacognitive norm that takes 
into account the selected belief degree. The term ‘shallow’ underlines the fact that 
the probabilistic metacognitive norm is hand-coded. This limitation is addressed in 
the final chapter as one of the possible improvement areas for the CernoCAMAL 
future work. The motivation for the inclusion of the shallow probabilistic 
metacognitive norm was a previous CAMAL spin-off work (Venkatamuni 2008) that 
investigated the concept of metacognition in a society of agents as a powerful 
catalyst for control of affective-motivational-BDI architectures, with respect to 
reasoning, planning, decision-making, and learning. It was concluded, based on 
extensive experimental results, that using norms through a metacognitive (reflective) 
layer would improve the performance of the CAMAL architecture in general, as well 
as in terms of specific metrics, e.g. life expectancy and resource collection of the 
agents used in those experiments. 
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In this thesis, however, a slightly different methodology is employed to test the same 
concept, in that the reactive component of CernoCAMAL is pre-programmed with a 
probabilistic norm prior to runtime; meaning it is defined in the domain model. 
Experimental results confirm the performance improvement of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture (see  6.2.4 & 6.3.4). 
At a high level conceptual view, CernoCAMAL goes through a number of phases as 
it operates: 
Ø It observes the environment using its perceptual sensors. 
Ø It forms focused beliefs and initiates BDI-association using the affect model. 
Ø It performs the action based on the BDI-association combinations and degrees of 
belief and also domain model assumptions and restraints. 
Ø It observes the environment again, once the action has been carried out. 
Ø It feeds the consequences on the environment into the BDI-association and 
modifies the association values and degrees of belief based on this feedback 
message. 
Ø It reasons probabilistically about the possible number of objects and their 
instances based on the feedback messages received from the reactive layer. 
Obviously, if the observed state of Cerno’s enclosure after the action conforms to its 
required desire state (i.e. if architecture’s instantiated behaviour has succeeded to 
achieve the current goal), then the association mechanism increases the association 
value. If, however, the environmental state after the action does not conform to the 
required goal state, the association value is decreased. Put simply, the association 
value is constantly modified and updated based on whether the corresponding action 
or goal-directed behaviour failed or succeeded to achieve the agent’s current goal. 
Therefore, association values fluctuate and are based on feedback from previous 
actions. 
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During every deliberative cycle, perceptual updates lead to belief formations, and 
then belief revision in the probabilistic BDI model which, then, gives rise to goal 
revision. The association-update then uses the revised (new) belief and goal sets to 
determine the relevant action(s) based on the domain model rules. The motivator-
update enables goal revision and the selection of the next goal, based on goal 
importance and goal success and also current beliefs. This, in turn, drives motivator 
revision using the association construct, which in turn enables belief-desire-intention 
combinations to be ranked based on the likelihood of their success. 
Figure 4.1 shows a schematic view of the CernoCAMAL architecture, along with its 
major components. Also, illustrated are the motivator coupling of BDI and affect 
models, enabling the linking of reactive and deliberative processes through affect, 
and also the mapping of affordances onto objects and actors in an external 
environment. CernoCAMAL’s motivational construct as the core representational 
schema of the architecture links perception, beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions. 
The central idea here is the use of motivational constructs as a domain and task 
workspace with which a cognitive agent can organise its perceptions, beliefs, 
motivations, and intentions. Supporting these constructs is the affect model and 
various affordances that provide a consistent and systematic control language for 
ordering propositions, selecting goals from the desire set, constructing a plan of 
action from the intention set, forming a focused belief with an updated degree of 
belief, and prioritising processes – pulling together all these operations in a 
formalized manner. 
In this diagrammatic view of the CernoCAMAL architecture, the left column 
represents perception and associated activities, the right column actions and 
associated activities; the central column (cognition) comprises of mechanisms 
responsible for reasoning, planning, behaviours, deliberation, etc. The probabilistic 
BDI model underpins information flow at the deliberative layer which is based upon 
the experimentally justified cognitive model of CRIBB. Perceptions, extended 
beliefs, desires, and intentions are reflected in the semantic contents of the 
motivational constructs present within the architecture.  These map onto behaviours 
at the reactive level and actions via the robot’s motors (actuators or effectors) in the 
environment. The affect model associated with the motivational constructs allows 
adaptive behaviour preference which is based upon the a-CRIBB model. 
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Belief Set:  B  Goal Set:  D  Intention Set:  I 
Focused Belief: b ∈ B ( Descriptor,   Source,  Time,  DegBel ) 
Selected Goal:  g ∈ D ( Descriptor,   SuccessCondition, Importance ) 
Association:  a ( b,  g,  i ∈ I,   Insistence ) 
Motivator:  m ( g,  a, deterministic, reactive-cycles, Intensity ) 
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                          Figure 4-1: Overview of Architectural Operation 
Before proceeding to experimentation for validation purposes, it is worthwhile to 
recap the principles and arguments behind this thesis:  CAMAL is an example of a 
general class of integrative cognitive architectures for synthetic intelligence that is 
built around the concept of control states and, in particular, motivators.  The primary 
conjecture is that the further development, design, and implementation of such 
cognitive architectures can proceed using a consistent and systematic control 
language across all aspects of reasoning and domain model management –  
something that the development of CernoCAMAL has taken advantage of. This 
control language is grounded in the use of affect and affordances with the aim to be 
consistent across different domains, tasks, and levels of processing. Together, they 
can be used to guide both internal and external decision-making and activities, and 
enable the cognitive agent to weigh its beliefs and processes, and also control the 
economics of its reasoning and processing. 
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4.7 Summary	  
This chapter began with a brief overview of relevant research conducted prior to 
CAMAL and CernoCAMAL, with regards to probabilistic thinking and reasoning. 
The fact that none of the CAMAL spin-off projects to date had addressed the 
cognitive capability of probabilistic reasoning was underlined, followed by 
emphasizing the main motivation of extending CAMAL to develop this fundamental 
cognitive ability. A brief introduction to the probability theory was given, followed 
by a review of the basics of the probability calculus and framework. The structure of 
CAMAL’s belief statements was explored, from which the CernoCAMAL’s 
Extended Belief Structure (EBS) was developed. The EBS was discussed and its 
advantages over CAMAL’s inadequate belief statements were pointed out. The 
chapter then went on to introduce CernoCAMAL’s Probabilistic Reasoner (CPR) and 
explaining how it reasoned probabilistically over the feedback generated by reactive 
sub-systems of CernoCAMAL. A comprehensive design criteria for the belief 
predicates constituting goal- and task-oriented feedback generated by reactive sub-
systems was outlined. The memory facility used in the design of the CPR was 
addressed, followed by the norm facility incorporated in the structure of motivators. 
The chapter concluded with presenting an operational overview of CernoCAMAL.  
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5 Experimentation	  Testbeds	  
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the concepts of testbeds and 
controlled experimentation. The experimental methodology used to evaluate various 
aspects of CernoCAMAL’s cognitive performance is outlined, followed by a 
summary of the different types of experiments to be carried out in these two 
synthetic worlds. An ontological description of the two simulation testbeds that 
Cerno will be operating in for experimentation purposes is given.  The features and 
implementation details for these two virtual environments are presented. The 
predicates and elements constituting the reactive feedback list, accompanied by their 
interpretations and actions to be taken by the CPR, are listed. The chapter concludes 
with reflecting on the way in which previous CAMAL spin-off projects’ testbeds 
have been evaluated, and further point out the merits of the CernoCAMAL testbeds. 
5.1 Introduction	  
The appropriate use of the methodological underpinnings of AI, such as testbeds and 
controlled experimentation, is imperative in evaluating a cognitive system or 
designing and validating a cognitive agent (Hanks, Pollack, Cohen 1993). It is also 
necessary to have meaningful benchmarks and metrics, and thereby allow the testing, 
evaluation, and comparison of the various abilities of competing cognitive systems. 
In the realm of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Robotics research, these 
standard problems will be those able to be carried out by animals, adults, and 
children of various ages, so that the level of progress of a cognitive agent can be 
tested against alternative cognitive agents. 
A carefully-designed testbed is a challenging environment in which AI or Robotic 
programs can be studied. A testbed environment serves as a simplified version of a 
real-world environment in which the experimenter has access to particular aspects of 
the environment. Other aspects may be allowed to vary parametrically or even 
randomly. Controlled experimentation is performed on a testbed as a widely-used 
method of investigating cognitive systems and agents. The researcher systematically 
varies the features of a system or the environment in which the agent is embedded, 
and then measures the effects of those variations on some aspects of system 
performance. 
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All CAMAL spin-off projects including this CernoCAMAL research work have 
involved the use of testbeds and controlled experimentation. 
5.2 Experimental	  Methodology	  
As set out in the first chapter, the CernoCAMAL research attempts to address the 
following specific research questions in the current cognitive architecture under 
investigation: 
Ø Can CernoCAMAL reason probabilistically by exploiting the proposed EBS? 
Can the integration of the proposed EBS facilitate probabilistic reasoning and 
inference in CernoCAMAL? 
Ø Can the BDI model run compatibly with the affect and motivational models, and 
affective and motivational valences used throughout the whole architecture? Can 
this ensure a consistent and systematic metric across all aspects of affect, 
reasoning, and domain model management? 
Ø Can the probabilistic deliberation results of the CPR be used for computing 
changing degrees of belief given apriori, and subsequently using the BDI, affect, 
and motivational models to determine the agent’s intentions, actions, or 
behaviours? 
Ø Can the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture be applied to virtual and physical 
cognitive agents using synthetic testbeds and mobile robots? 
The key to designing and conducting suitable experiments for assessing the above 
criteria is to understand what needs to be measured and evaluated. It is then that the 
obtained results can be interpreted correctly as meaningful metrics and benchmarks 
to determine whether they validate the achievement of the research goals or perhaps 
otherwise. 
In order to enable experimentation, the blackboard monitor has been designed to 
contain an Experiment feature. This feature facilitates the running of the cognitive 
architecture for a pre-defined number of times (i.e. deliberative cycles) which in turn 
allows statistics collection.  A series of experiments, listed below, were set out to test 
the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture for validating the research criteria outlined.  
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The obtained results from carrying out these different types of experiments in two 
synthetic testbeds (described next) are presented in Chapter Six. 
Ø EBS and CPR  Experiments 
Ø Goal Achievement Success and Failure 
Ø Population Adaptation 
Ø Probabilistic Motivator Norms 
Ø Comparative Experiments 
5.3 Predator-­‐Prey	  Tile	  World	  
This application area uses a graphical world created using SWI-Prolog Version 5.8.0 
– an abstract tile world with operators that affect the world, incorporating a (white) 
Cerno agent, several edible spheres (blue objects), preys (red agents), and predators 
(green agents). A screenshot of this synthetic terrain along with its corresponding 
Prolog command window are shown in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5-1: The Predator-Prey Simulation World (originally by Davis 2008) 
Probability computation lends itself well to predator-prey scenario, since the 
computed probabilities could imply the extent or risk that a particular entity is a 
predator, etc. 
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Furthermore, probability provides a formalism to align danger risk, goal risk, task 
liability, etc, with the belief degrees and affect and motivational valences used 
throughout the architecture. Before fleshing out the specifics of the simulation 
domain though, it is crucial to present an ontological analysis of the domain model to 
clarify the structure of the knowledge, entities, and relationships among them. 
Essentially, an ontology of a particular domain describes the kinds of entity involved 
in that domain and the relationships that can hold among different entities (Church, 
Hanks 1990). Ontological analysis clarifies the structure of knowledge. Given a 
specific domain such as predator-prey world, its ontology forms the heart of any 
system of knowledge representation for that domain. Without ontologies, there 
cannot be a vocabulary for representing knowledge; meaning ontologies enable 
knowledge sharing in a conceptual framework (Gruber 1993). 
Figure 5.2 below illustrates the two possible entities that may exist in this domain: 
 
 
 
 
  
	  
	  	  	  predator	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  prey	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sphere	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  object	  
 Figure 5-2: The Possible Entities of the Predator-Prey Simulation World 
Here is an ontological description of the domain that Cerno will be operating in: 
Ontology	   	   :-­‐	   Domain	  Descriptor	  |	  Belief	  Clause	  |	  
Goal	  Clause	  |	  Intention	  Clause	  |	  
Association	  
Domain	  Descriptor	  :-­‐	   Object	  |	  Default	  Predicate	  Set	  |	  
Domain	  Predicate	  Set	  
Object	   	   :-­‐	   Default	  Object	  |	  Domain	  Object	  
Agent Object 
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Default	  Object	   :-­‐	   Self	  |	  Object	  |	  Identifier	  |	  Unknown	  
Domain	  Object	   :-­‐	   sphere	  |	  pred	  |	  prey	  
Identifier	   	   :-­‐	   ID	  ß	  gensym(Domain	  Object)	  
Default	  Predicate	  Set	   :-­‐	   environment(EnvDescript)|	  
fail(Intention)	  |	  
time(T)	  |	  reactive_cycles(N)	  |	  
instance_of(Identifier,	  Object)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(assumption,	  DegBel)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(deduction,	  DegBel)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(perception,	  DegBel)	  
Domain	  Predicate	  Set	   :-­‐	   Belief	  |	  Goal	  
Belief	   	   	   :-­‐	   hit(Object)	  |	  lost(Object)	  |	  
found(Object)	  |	  near(Object)	  |	  
know_of(Object)	  |	  instance_of(Object)	  
ate(Object)	  |	  herded(Object)	  
attacked(Object)	  |	  destroyed(Object)	  |	  
location(Object,	  Location)	  |	  
apriori_prob(Object,	  Affordance)	  
Goal	   	   	   	   :-­‐	   avoid(Collisions)	  |	  avoid(Object)	  |	  
find(Object)	  |	  eat(Object)	  |	  
herd(Object)	  |	  hit(Object)	  |	  
attack(Object)	  
Intention	   	   	   :-­‐	   methodavoid	  |	  methodfind	  
methodhit	  |	  methodattack	  |	  
methodherd	  |	  methodeat	  
Association	  	   	   :-­‐	   Belief	  |	  Goal	  |	  Intention	  |	  Affordance	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Descriptor	  Set	   	   :-­‐	   sparse	  |	  cluttered	  |	  dynamic	  |	  static	  
Object	  Set	   	   	   :-­‐	   object	  |	  agent	  |	  sphere	  |	  prey	  |	  pred	  
Domain	  Super	  Class	   :-­‐	   agent	  ß	  pred	  |	  prey	  
The testbed implementation of the predator-prey simulation world is organized 
around the theme that the agent is situated in a two-dimensional 500×500 grid.  It is 
designed to support controlled experiments with cognitive agents (e.g. Cerno) situated 
in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Dynamic describes the fact that the 
simulation environment is changing all the time, as the agents are moving around. 
Uncertain is defined as unpredictable and describes the fact that the agents have no 
way of finding out which agent is going to do what next. 
The world consists of the described grid on which can be placed a Cerno, several 
spheres, preys, predators, and obstacles (the experimenter can manipulate the numbers). 
The ability to modify and control these and other parameters and features of the grid 
world allows systematic exploration of the simulation world with various 
characteristics. The goal of such explorations is, essentially, to find relationships 
between world characteristics and corresponding characteristics of the embedded 
Cerno and its cognitive performance. 
Each object occupies one cell of the grid. The simulation interface allows Cerno, 
predators, and preys to take one of four primitive actions: move left, right, up, and 
down, unless doing so would cause them to run into the world’s boundaries or 
obstacles. The number of spheres, preys, and predators can be determined prior to the 
experiment, but obstacles appear randomly. The simulation world also has explicit 
sensing operators with configurable parameters, e.g. sonar and vision, with pre-
defined ranges: 
sense_limit(	  vision,	  300	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  sonar	  ,	  300	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  near	  ,	  50	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  herd	  ,	  45	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  hit	  ,	  40	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  attack,	  35	  ).	  
sense_limit(	  eat	  ,	  30	  ).	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There are five scenarios as to what Cerno could represent as a cognitive agent, in 
order to investigate probabilistic reasoning and behaviour selection: 
1. Scenario One: Cerno avoids everything. 
2. Scenario Two: Cerno finds and eats sphere. 
3. Scenario Three: Cerno finds and herds prey. 
4. Scenario Four: Cerno finds and attacks pred. 
5. Scenario Five: This is a more sophisticated scenario, building on the first 
four. Here, Cerno acts as a virtual sheepdog, herding prey, feeding off spheres, 
and protecting against predators. 
For each scenario, goals and associations are designed according to roles, such as 
being a herd dog, and what that may entail. Moreover, in each scenario ‘prey’ refers 
to a sheep that is both regarded as prey for a predator and to be herded by Cerno.  
Due to multiple various goals and goal preferences of scenario five, and also greater 
number of goals and associations, this scenario is selected for carrying out 
experiments. The first four scenarios are not of significant interest for 
experimentation, as they do not represent complex settings.  It is in the fifth scenario 
that goals start to fail, etc. 
5.4 ARIA	  MobileSim	  World	  
ARIA (ActiveMedia Robotics Interface for Applications) is an object-oriented API 
(Applications Programming Interface) written in C++. It is a client-side software for 
access to and management of ActiveMedia mobile robots and robotics applications. 
Its flexibility makes ARIA an excellent foundation for high-level control of robots 
that effectively act as the server in a client-server environment. ARIA can be used in 
many different ways, from simple command-control of the robot for direct-drive 
navigation, to development of high-level intelligent actions. 
MobileSim is a simulator developed by ActiveMedia Robotics Corporation (providers 
of the ARIA API) to simulate ActiveMedia mobile robots and their environments, 
which is useful for debugging and testing ARIA programs. It converts an 
ActiveMedia map file into an stage environment and then places simulated robots in 
that environment – in this case a P3DX. The MobileSim world consists of an stage 
environment, simulated robots, and some obstacles. 
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To operate the robots, the ARIA library is used. This is a C++ library that can be 
used with Microsoft Visual Studio on Windows operating system. Essentially, ARIA 
communicates with the robots over a COM1 port (RS-­‐232 serial port) or it can 
communicate with the MobileSim simulator over a local TCP socket. Figure 5.3 
shows a sample environment containing 3 (red) robots and 4 (green) objects. 
 
Figure 5-3: The ARIA MobileSim Simulation World (ActiveMedia 2010) 
The CernoCAMAL framework was initially implemented as a situated cognitive 
agent in a synthetic predator-prey Tile World. It is, subsequently, interfaced with 
ARIA’s MobileSim environment and applied to a virtual P3DX robot to implement a 
cognitive robotic agent.  Figure 5.4 illustrates the two possible entities that may exist 
in this simulation domain: 
94 
 
 
 
 
  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  agent	  prey	  sphere	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  object	  
         Figure 5-4: The Possible Entities of the ARIA MobileSim World 
Here is an ontological description of the domain that Cerno will be operating in: 
Ontology	   	   :-­‐	   Domain	  Descriptor	  |	  Belief	  Clause	  |	  
Goal	  Clause	  |	  Intention	  Clause	  |	  
Association	  
Domain	  Descriptor	  :-­‐	   Object	  |	  Default	  Predicate	  Set	  |	  
Domain	  Predicate	  Set	  
Object	   	   :-­‐	   Default	  Object	  |	  Domain	  Object	  
Default	  Object	   :-­‐	   Self	  |	  Object	  |	  Identifier	  |	  Unknown	  
Domain	  Object	   :-­‐	   object	  |	  agent	  
Identifier	   	   :-­‐	   ID	  ß	  gensym(Domain	  Object)	  
Default	  Predicate	  Set	   :-­‐	   environment(EnvDescript)|	  
fail(Intention)	  |	  
time(T)	  |	  reactive_cycles(N)	  |	  
instance_of(Identifier,	  Object)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(assumption,	  DegBel)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(deduction,	  DegBel)	  |	  
degree_of_belief(perception,	  DegBel)	  
 	  
Agent Object 
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Domain	  Predicate	  Set	   :-­‐	   Belief	  |	  Goal	  
Belief	   	   	   :-­‐	   hit(Object)	  |	  lost(Object)	  |	  
found(Object)	  |	  near(Object)	  |	  
know_of(Object)	  |	  instance_of(Object)	  
location(Object,	  Location)	  |	  
apriori_prob(Object,	  Affordance)	  
Goal	   	   	   	   :-­‐	   avoid(Collisions)	  |	  
avoid(Object)	  |	  find(Object)	  
Intention	   	   	   :-­‐	   methodavoid	  |	  methodfind	  
Association	  	   	   :-­‐	   Belief	  |	  Goal	  |	  Intention	  |	  Affordance	  
Descriptor	  Set	   	   :-­‐	   sparse	  |	  cluttered	  |	  dynamic	  |	  static	  
Object	  Set	   	   	   :-­‐	   object	  |	  agent	  
Domain	  Super	  Class	   :-­‐	   agent	  ß	  robot	  
The MobileSim interface allows the CernoCAMAL architecture to be mounted on a 
P3DX robot that moves around (unless doing so would cause it to run into the world’s 
boundaries or obstacles). Another robot – an Amigo – represents a predator in this 
terrain. There are also some obstacles as spheres and preys that appear randomly. 
The simulation world has explicit sensing operators with configurable parameters, 
e.g. sonar with pre-defined ranges.  Figure 5.5 shows the angular positions that ARIA 
assigns to each of the sonar sensors on the robots (of course virtual ones here). 
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Figure 5-5: The Angular Positions of the Sonar Sensors (Whitbrook 2010) 
It must be noted that presently sonar readings can only give a range to whatever one 
of the sonar sensors detects, from which the position coordinates can be calculated as 
ARIA does for range sensors. It is, however, not possible to detect the identity or 
colour of an object. This is one of the shortcomings of the MobileSim environment 
that consequently simplifies the experiments performed in this simulation 
environment. 
5.5 CPR	  Functionality	  in	  Testbeds	  
The following are a comprehensive set of possible elements constituting the reactive 
feedback list, accompanied by their interpretations and actions to be taken by 
CernoCAMAL’s CPR. These predicates are applicable to both simulation worlds, but 
mostly specific to the predator-prey terrain, e.g. ate(prey). Understanding these 
mechanisms is a prerequisite to making sense of the experiments. 
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LOST	  
1. Lost an object in its general form, e.g. lost(sphere) à all instances of that 
object are lost + all know_of and instance_of are retracted + memory of all 
the lost instances is formed + a suitable message is displayed. 
2. Lost an instance of an object that has never been found before, i.e. illegal 
argument for the predicate lost à a suitable message is displayed. 
3. Lost an instance of an object that has actually been found before à that 
particular instance is lost + know_of and instance_of for that particular 
instance are retracted + memory of the lost instance is formed + a suitable 
message is displayed. 
ATE	  
1. Ate an object in its general form, e.g. ate(sphere) à only one instance of that 
object is eaten (the most-recently found instance, i.e. Recency Conflict 
Resolution) + that particular instance is destroyed + know_of and instance_of 
for that particular instance are retracted + a suitable message is displayed. 
2. Ate an instance of an object that has never been found before à i.e. illegal 
argument for the predicate ate à a suitable message is displayed. 
3. Ate an instance of an object that has actually been found before à that particular 
instance is destroyed + know_of and instance_of for that particular instance 
are retracted + a suitable message is displayed. 
FOUND	  
1. Found an instance that has already been found before à a suitable message is 
displayed. 
2. Found an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in 
its general form, that there is a memory trail of a previously lost instance of it à 
that previously generated lost instance is re-created, instead of a new incremental 
one + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for that 
particular instance are asserted. 
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3. Found an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in 
its general form, while the instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that object is 
definitely the first to be found à a new unique instance is generated + a suitable 
message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for the new unique instance 
are asserted. 
4. Found an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in 
its general form for the second time (i.e. two founds in a single reactive 
feedback list) à the first found refers to a previously found instance + the 
second found generates a new unique instance + a suitable message is displayed 
+ know_of and instance_of for the new unique instance are asserted. 
5. Found an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in 
its general form, while it can refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than extending the instance list) à 
found refers to that previously found instance + a suitable message is displayed. 
6. Found an illegal instance (an instance that cannot possibly be recognized as that 
instance!) à a suitable message is displayed. 
NEAR	  
1. Near an instance that has already been found before à a suitable message is 
displayed. 
2. Near an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, that there is a memory trail of a previously lost instance of it à 
that previously generated lost instance is re-created, instead of a new incremental 
one + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for that 
particular instance are asserted. 
3. Near an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, while the instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that object is 
definitely the first to be near to (to be found) à a new unique instance is 
generated + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for 
the new unique instance are asserted. 
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4. Near an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form for the second time (two nears in a single reactive feedback list) à 
the first near refers to a previously found instance + the second near generates 
a new unique instance + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and 
instance_of for the new unique instance are asserted. 
5. Near an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, while it can refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than extending the instance list) à 
near refers to that previously near (found) instance + a suitable message is 
displayed. 
6. Near an illegal instance (an instance that cannot possibly be recognized as that 
instance) à a suitable message is displayed. 
HIT	  
1. Hit an instance that has already been found before à a suitable message is 
displayed. 
2. Hit an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, that there is a memory trail of a previously lost instance of it à 
that previously generated lost instance is re-created, instead of a new incremental 
one + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for that 
particular instance are asserted. 
3. Hit an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, while the instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that object is 
definitely the first to be hit (to be found) à a new unique instance is generated + 
a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for the new 
unique instance are asserted 
4. Hit an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form for the second time (two hits in a single reactive feedback list) à 
the first hit refers to a previously found instance + the second hit generates a 
new unique instance + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and 
instance_of for the new unique instance are asserted 
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5. Hit an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) in its 
general form, while it can refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than extending the instance list) à hit 
refers to that previously hit (found) instance + a suitable message is displayed 
6. Hit an illegal instance (an instance that cannot possibly be recognized as that 
instance) à a suitable message is displayed 
Attacked	  
1. Attacked an instance that has already been found before à a suitable message is 
displayed. 
2. Attacked an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) 
in its general form, that there is a memory trail of a previously lost instance of it 
à that previously generated lost instance is re-created, instead of a new 
incremental one + a suitable message is displayed + know_of and 
instance_of for that particular instance are asserted. 
3. Attacked an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) 
in its general form, while the instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that object 
is definitely the first to be hit (to be found) à a new unique instance is generated 
+ a suitable message is displayed + know_of and instance_of for the new 
unique instance are asserted 
4. Attacked an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) 
in its general form for the second time (two attackeds in a single reactive 
feedback list) à the first hit refers to a previously found instance + the second 
attacked generates a new unique instance + a suitable message is displayed + 
know_of and instance_of for the new unique instance are asserted 
5. Attacked an object (either known such as sphere or unknown such as object) 
in its general form, while it can refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than extending the instance list) à 
attacked refers to that previously hit (found) instance + a suitable message is 
displayed 
6. Attacked an illegal instance (an instance that cannot possibly be recognized as 
that instance) à a suitable message is displayed 
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5.6 Testbeds	  Evaluation	  
Hanks et al. (1993) in their thorough examination of testbeds 12 and controlled 
experimentation, identify a major purpose for the use of these methods: to provide 
meaningful metrics and benchmarks for comparing competing systems. They also 
argue that the scientific value of well-crafted testbeds and experimental methods is 
their power to highlight interesting aspects of the system performance. They further 
state that this value is realized only if the researcher can adequately explain why their 
system behaves the way it does. 
As remarked earlier, all CAMAL spin-off projects including this CernoCAMAL 
research work have involved the use of testbeds and controlled experimentation. The 
foundation for CAMAL as a UTC is based on the on-going development of 
computational architectures for cognition, affect, and motivation that make use of a 
BDI model, an affect model, and a motivational blackboard. It would be instructive 
to reflect on the way in which previous CAMAL spin-off projects’ testbeds have 
been evaluated, and further point out the advantages of the CernoCAMAL testbeds. 
It is still open to argument, though, what the appropriate evaluation criteria for 
measuring any individual cognitive architecture testbed are, thus the success of any 
cognitive research project can be difficult to assess. However, the list below provides 
a guideline for approaches that measure the mentioned past projects’ testbeds and 
experiments on CAMAL. It notes some essential features that testbeds should 
exhibit. It is then followed by a table, highlighting these measures and criteria against 
which the CAMAL past projects, including CernoCAMAL, can be evaluated. 
The need for experimentation in testbeds is manifest: we want to understand why and 
how well our cognitive architecture (CernoCAMAL) works and how efficiently our 
cognitive agent (Cerno) operates in dynamic and unknown environments. Obviously, 
we will not always be able to do so using analytical methods! Experimentation is 
therefore key. 
  
                                                
12 Some noteworthy examples of Simulation Grid Worlds: The Parameterisable Tile World of Pollack 
and Ringuette (Pollack & Ringuette 1990), The Multi-Agent MICE Grid World (Montgomery & 
Durfee 1990), The Phoenix Fire fighting Testbed (Hart, Cohen, Greenberg, Westbrook 1990), The 
Truck World Simulator (Hanks et al. 1992), The NASA Tile World (Philips & Bresina 1991), The 
DND Tile World (Davis 2008). 
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• The testbed should have a clean interface, in order to maintain a clear distinction 
between the agents and objects and also the world in which they are all 
embedded. 
• The testbed, although reasonably realistic 13 should be controlled and simplified. 
• The testbed should be populated with agents having imperfect sensors and motors 
(actuators – effectors). 
• The testbed should present a well-defined and reasonable model of passing time. 
• The testbed and the carried out controlled experimentation should allow for 
problems and environmental conditions to be varied in a controlled fashion. 
• The testbed should allow performance statistics to be gathered and then used for 
the evaluation of the system performance. Ideally, it should also be useful for the 
data to be formatted automatically for analysis. 
• Measure of success should not solely be based on a simple achievement of a goal 
state. It should also take into account the possibility of partial goal satisfaction 
(Haddaway, Hanks 1993; Wellman, Doyle 1991). 
• The testbed metrics should be both internal (separate module function) and external 
(behavioural – observed responses).  
                                                
13 Meaning it contains objects, blocks, etc, as in a real world terrain. 
103 
Evaluation Criteria 
Nunes 
2001 
Bourgne 
2003 
Lewis 
2004 
Venkatamuni 
2008 
Gwatkin 
2009 
Miri 
2012 
Clean and Clear Interface ü    ü    ü    ü    N/A   ✔ 
Controlled and Simplified 
Environment 
ü    ü    ü    ü    ü    ü   
Realistically Imperfect Sensors 
and Motors 
N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   ü    ü   
Feature Variation Flexibility 
(Parameterisability) 
ü    ü    ü    ü    ü    ü   
Partial Goal Satisfaction ×   ×   ×   ×   ×   ✔ 
Statistics Collection ×   ü    ü    ü    ü    ü   
Validating Test Cases ü    ü    ü    ü    ü    ü   
       
Table 5-1: Evaluation of CAMAL’s Spin-Off Projects 
104 
A crucial observation to be made here is that experimentation mandates 
simplification, and that must not be mistaken with insufficiency or incomprehensive 
evaluation. The success of any cognitive architecture research project can be 
evaluated and reported by concentrating on only that specific area in which the 
experimentation is being carried out – in this thesis being the probabilistic reasoning 
capability, object and instant recognition, and degree of belief manipulation of 
CernoCAMAL. It may be necessary for a while to tolerate relatively simplified 
synthetic testbeds as we explore the cognitive abilities of particular cognitive 
architectures. Later, we can gradually add depth and realism to the simulation 
systems we build. 
5.7 Summary	  
This chapter began with a brief introduction to the concepts of testbeds and 
controlled experimentation. The experimental methodology used to evaluate various 
aspects of CernoCAMAL’s cognitive performance was outlined, followed by a 
summary of the different types of experiments to be carried out in these two 
synthetic worlds. An ontological description of the two simulation testbeds that 
Cerno will be operating in for experimentation purposes was given.  The features and 
implementation details for these two virtual environments were presented. The 
predicates and elements constituting the reactive feedback list, accompanied by their 
interpretations and actions to be taken by the CPR, were listed. The chapter 
concluded with reflecting on the way in which previous CAMAL spin-off projects’ 
testbeds had been evaluated, and further pointed out the merits of the CernoCAMAL 
testbeds.  
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6 Experiments	  and	  Results	  
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to a series of experiments with the 
CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture in the two synthetic testbeds described. The 
details of the experiments are outlined, starting with the most important one – how 
the proposed EBS enables probabilistic object / instance reasoning in the CPR. After 
discussing the experiments one by one, the obtained graphs are presented. This is 
followed by repeating the same experimentation process in the second testbed. A 
final experiment is proposed to use the most recent phase of CAMAL research 
(RoboCAMAL: Gwatkin 2009) that focused on translating the concepts of motivation, 
affect, and learning from a simulated agent to an embedded robot. The rationale 
behind this evaluation method is highlighted, followed by the details of the tests 
carried out.  The chapter concludes with summarising the acquired results. 
6.1 Introduction	  
This thesis presented one possible way to develop a probabilistic CAMAL that could 
be used to govern artificial minds probabilistically. The motivation and impetus for 
this investigation and subsequently extending CAMAL was the considerable 
evidence that probabilistic thinking and reasoning was linked to cognitive 
development and played a role in cognitive functions. This led us to believe that a 
probabilistic reasoning capability was an essential part of human intelligence. Thus, 
it should be a vital part of any system that attempted to emulate human intelligence 
computationally. A series of experiments were set out to test the CernoCAMAL 
cognitive architecture for validating its research goals and objectives, including: 
Ø EBS and CPR Experiments  ( in CernoCAMAL ) 
Ø Goal Achievement Success and Failure  ( between CAMAL and CernoCAMAL ) 
Ø Population Adaptation  ( in CernoCAMAL ) 
Ø Probabilistic Motivator Norms  ( in CernoCAMAL ) 
Ø Comparative Experiments  ( between CernoCAMAL and RoboCAMAL ) 
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6.2 Predator-­‐Prey	  Experiments	  
This section presents the predator-prey experiments carried out using the 
CernoCAMAL cognitive agent in the predator-prey tile-world testbed.  A number of 
experiments were performed over a number of cycles, and some internal variables 
and statistics were recorded. From the obtained results, the two cognitive 
architectures of CAMAL and CernoCAMAL can be compared and contrasted. 
6.2.1 Validation	  of	  CPR	  in	  Predator-­‐Prey	  Testbed	  
These tests are performed to ensure that the CPR can use the EBS and assumed 
degrees of belief, infer posterior probabilities correctly, assign them to the 
appropriate belief descriptors, and reason probabilistically about the number of 
objects and their instances that may be present in the environment. Cerno was 
allowed to operate in the sheep-dog virtual world (see 5.2) that consisted of a varying 
number of spheres, preys, and predators. Each experiment was run for 10 
deliberative cycles. This was repeated with and without obstacles. The 
configuration of having 3 spheres, 3 preys, and 3 predators, with no unidentified 
objects, can be represented as: 
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  object,	  0.0	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  sphere,	  1/3	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  pred,	  	  	  1/3	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  prey,	  	  	  1/3	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
The reactive component was pre-configured with the following goals: 
find	  (	  sphere	  )	   	   eat	  (	  sphere	  )	  
find	  (	  prey	  )	   	   herd	  (	  prey	  )	  
find	  (	  pred	  )	   	   attack	  (	  pred	  )	  
This initial configuration assumes that if there is one object, then for Cerno it is 
equally likely to be a sphere, a prey, or a predator, hence the probability of any 
domain object being present is 1/3	  or 0.3 with a 0.5 degree of belief since the 
statements are assumptive. 
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CernoCAMAL, upon receiving goal- and task-oriented reactive feedback interprets 
them and reasons about the number of objects and their instances that may be present 
in the environment. It is imperative to understand what exactly every predicate 
indicates and how it is operated on. In particular, note the instances that are 
destroyed (eaten) and cannot be re-generated when stumbled upon, and the instances 
that are lost but can be re-generated when stumbled upon. Table 6.1 over the next 
few pages shows how Cerno interprets the constituent elements of a reactive 
feedback list, along with its reasoning and the actions it takes. 
Environment Description/Occurrence Cerno’s Interpretations/Actions 
Lost an instance of an object that has actually 
been found before, 
e.g. lost(sphere1). 
 
That particular instance is lost. 
Lost an object in its general form, 
e.g. lost(sphere). 
 
All instances of that object are lost. 
 
Ate an instance of an object that has actually 
been found before, 
e.g. ate(prey2). 
That particular instance is eaten and, therefore, 
destroyed. 
Ate an object in its general form, 
e.g. ate(sphere). 
Only one instance of that object is eaten (the 
most-recently found instance, i.e. Recency 
Conflict Resolution) + 
that particular instance is destroyed. 
Found an object in its general form, while the 
instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that 
object is definitely the first to be found. 
 
A new unique instance is generated. 
Found an object in its general form, that there is 
memory trail of a previously lost instance of it. 
That previously generated lost instance is re-
created, instead of a new incremental one. 
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Found an object in its general form, while it can 
refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than 
extending the instance list). 
	  
found refers to that previously found instance. 
Found an object in its general form for the second 
time (i.e. two founds in a single reactive 
feedback list). 
the first found refers to a previously found 
instance + the second found generates a new 
unique instance.	  
Near an object in its general form, while the 
instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that 
object is definitely the first to be near to. 
 
A new unique instance is generated.	  
Near an object in its general form, that there is 
memory trail of a previously lost instance of it. 
That previously generated lost instance is re-
created, instead of a new incremental one.	  
Near an object in its general form, while it can 
refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than 
extending the instance list). 
	  
near refers to that previously near (found) 
instance.	  
Near an object in its general form for the second 
time (two nears in a single reactive feedback 
list). 
The first near refers to a previously found 
instance + the second near generates a new 
unique instance.	  
Hit an object in its general form, while the 
instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that 
object is definitely the first to be hit. 
 
A new unique instance is generated.	  
Hit an object in its general form, that there is 
memory trail of a previously lost instance of it. 
That previously generated lost instance is re-
created, instead of a new incremental one.	  
Hit an object in its general form, while it can 
refer to a previously found instance, rather than 
generating a new unique instance (rather than 
extending the instance list). 
	  
hit refers to that previously hit (found) instance.	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Hit an object in its general form for the second 
time (two hits in a single reactive feedback list). 
The first hit refers to a previously found 
instance + the second hit generates a new 
unique instance.	  
Attacked an object in its general form, while the 
instance list of that object is empty, i.e. that 
object is definitely the first to be attacked. 
 
A new unique instance is generated. 
Attacked an object in its general form, that there 
is memory trail of a previously lost instance of it. 
That previously generated lost instance is re-
created, instead of a new incremental one. 
Attacked an object in its general form, while it 
can refer to a previously found instance, rather 
than generating a new unique instance (rather 
than extending the instance list). 
	  
attacked refers to that previously hit (found) 
instance 
Attacked an object in its general form for the 
second time (two attackeds in a single reactive 
feedback list) 
the first attacked refers to a previously found 
instance + the second attacked generates a new 
unique instance 
Table 6-1: Cerno’s Reasoning over Reactive Feedback Lists 
The initial assignment of degrees of belief follows the Belief Preference Model 
values (below) and basics of probability calculus detailed in section 4.3 including the 
main rule of probability that states: The probability of an event is defined as the ratio 
of the number of outcomes of that event divided by the total number of possible 
outcomes. For example [pred1, prey1, sphere1] indicates the following set of 
probabilities ( P(pred)=1/3, P(prey)=1/3, P(sphere)=1/3 ) and [pred1, prey1, sphere1, sphere2] 
indicates the following set of probabilities ( P(pred)=1/4, P(prey)=1/4, P(sphere)=2/4 )       
as evident in the sample run of the program over the next few pages. 
Beliefs Preference Model: 
belief_preference(	  perception,	  assumption	  ).	  
belief_preference(	  perception,	  deduction	  ).	  
belief_preference(	  deduction,	  assumption	  ).	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A sample run of the program, demonstrating that Cerno operates as expected, is 
presented below: 
[	  found(pred),	  found(prey),	  found(sphere)	  ].	  
found(pred)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   pred1	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   prey1	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   sphere1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey1,	  sphere1	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  1,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  1,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  	  	  0.3),	   deduction,	  1,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  	  	  0.3),	   deduction,	  1,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(sphere),	  hit(prey),	  found(sphere)	  ].	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  sphere1	  
hit(prey)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey1	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   sphere2	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey1,	  sphere1,	  sphere2	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  2,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  2,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  2,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  2,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(sphere),	  found(prey),	  attacked(pred)	  ].	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  sphere1	  or	  sphere2	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey1	  
attacked(pred)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey1,	  sphere1,	  sphere2	  ]	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belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  3,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  3,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  3,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  3,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(prey),	  found(sphere),	  near(pred)	  ].	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey1	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  sphere1	  or	  sphere2	  
near(pred)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey1,	  sphere1,	  sphere2	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  4,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  4,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  4,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  4,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(prey),	  lost(pred1),	  attacked(pred)	  ].	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey1	  
lost(pred1)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
attacked	  (pred)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  pred1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey1,	  sphere1,	  sphere2	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  5,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  5,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  5,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  5,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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[	  ate(prey),	  found(pred),	  found(prey),	  near(sphere)	  ].	  
ate(prey)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   prey1	  is	  destroyed	  
found(pred)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   prey2	  	  (prey1	  cannot	  come	  back	  to	  life)	  
near(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  sphere1	  or	  sphere2	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey2,	  sphere1,	  sphere2	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  6,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  6,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  6,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  6,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  ate(sphere),	  found(pred),	  hit(prey),	  found(sphere)	  ].	  
ate(sphere)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   sphere2	  is	  destroyed	  	  (recency	  rule)	  
found(pred)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
hit(prey)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey2	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  sphere1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey2,	  sphere1	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  7,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  7,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  7,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  7,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  attacked(pred),	  found(pred),	  found(prey),	  found(sphere)	  ].	  
attacked(pred)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  pred1	  
found(pred)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   pred2	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey2	  
found(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  sphere1	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==>	  [	  pred1,	  pred2,	  prey2,	  sphere1	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  8,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.25),	  deduction,	  8,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.5),	   deduction,	  8,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.25),	   deduction,	  8,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  lost(pred),	  found(prey),	  near(sphere),	  attacked(pred)	  ].	  
lost(pred)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  both	  pred1	  and	  pred2	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey2	  
near(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  sphere1	  
attacked	  (pred)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  pred1	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  prey2,	  sphere1	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  9,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  9,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  9,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.3),	   deduction,	  9,	  0.75	  ).	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(pred),	  found(prey),	  hit(sphere),	  near(sphere)	  ].	  
found(pred)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  pred2	  
found(prey)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  prey2	  
hit(sphere)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  sphere1	  
near(sphere)	   -­‐-­‐>	   sphere3	  	  (sphere2	  cannot	  come	  back	  to	  life)	  
==>	  [	  pred1,	  pred2,	  prey2,	  sphere1,	  sphere3	  ]	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(object,	  0.0),	   deduction,	  10,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(sphere,	  0.4),	   deduction,	  10,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(pred,	  0.4),	   deduction,	  10,	  0.75	  ).	  
belief(	  apriori_prob(prey,	  0.2),	   deduction,	  10,	  0.75	  ).	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6.2.2 Goal	  Achievement	  	  Success	  and	  Failure	  
A succession of experiments was carried out to evaluate CernoCAMAL’s overall 
performance, in terms of goal success and failure, and consequently task 
effectiveness. The objective here was to assess the efficacy of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over the original CAMAL in a tangible manner, by using success and 
failure counts. In other words, efficacy is measured in quantitative terms here, as: 
greater number of successes and lower number of failures. A general sample set of 
obtained experimental results are presented in figures 6.1 and 6.2 to enable the 
comparison of the two cognitive architectures. In the predator-prey tile world, the 
term success refers to one of the following: 
1. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved. The new beliefs explicitly 
state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Goal	  Success. 
2. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved. The new beliefs state that 
the negation of the goal negation has been achieved. This situation is known as 
Double	  Negation	  Success. 
3. The intention (defined in the association construct) is accomplished. The new beliefs 
state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Intention	  Success. 
4. The avoid-collisions intention (defined in the association construct) is accomplished. 
The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Avoid-­‐Collisions	  
Success. 
 
            Figure 6-1: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes 
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These results serve to demonstrate a clear increase in the number of successes in time 
that occurred, directly supporting the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over CAMAL in terms of success counts. Similarly, the term failure 
refers to one of the following: 
1. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is not achieved. The new beliefs 
explicitly state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Goal	  Failure. 
2. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is not achieved. The new beliefs state 
that the negation of the goal has been achieved. This situation is known as Goal	  
Negation	  Failure. 
3. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved, but on the wrong object. 
The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Wrong-­‐Object	   Goal	  
Failure. 
4. The intention (defined in the association construct) is not accomplished. The new 
beliefs state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Intention	  Failure. 
5. The avoid-collisions intention (defined in the association construct) is not 
accomplished. The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Avoid-­‐
Collisions	  Failure. 
 
 
       Figure 6-2: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures 
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These results serve to demonstrate a clear decrease in the number of failures in time 
that occurred, directly supporting the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over CAMAL in terms of failure counts. 
Summarily, the term task effectiveness describes if overall the tasks (goals and 
intentions collectively) were successfully completed. This is inferred based on the 
increase in the number of success counts and the reduction in the number of failure 
counts. The two graphs clearly show a decrease in the number of failures in time 
along with an increase in the number of successes in time that occurred. This 
outcome indicates the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL architecture over 
CAMAL in terms of success / failure counts,  and also task effectiveness. 
6.2.3 Population	  Adaptation	  Experiments	  
These experiments investigate CernoCAMAL’s ability to adapt in a dynamic, 
uncertain environment. Adaptation is a term commonly used in AI to connote 
assimilation and adjustment of a cognitive agent to its surroundings, particularly if 
there is uncertainty inherent to the environment the agent is embedded in, e.g. 
changes taking place in an unpredictable fashion. Cerno is a cognitive agent 
equipped with a means of reasoning probabilistically about objects and their 
instances in its enclosure. It is, therefore, reasonable to conjecture that over time the 
findings using Cerno about a probable number of objects and their instances should 
be close to the actual numbers pre-determined by the experimenter, hence the term 
Population Adaptation. 
Furthermore, if the controlled experimentation was paused and some modification to 
the number of specific objects and their instances were made, upon resuming 
experimentation, the findings using Cerno about a probable number of objects and 
their instances should again be close to the actual numbers pre-set by the 
experimenter.  This particular interpretation of adaptability is what we refer to in this 
thesis. For this purpose, the Experiment feature of the blackboard monitor was 
deployed. The number of domain model objects was incremented until there was 5 of 
each, giving a total of 15 objects in the simulation world (anything more would have 
been too cluttered). Upon completion of the tests, the inferred numbers for each object 
and their instances were recorded. 
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Figure 6.3 illustrates the obtained graph based on the experimental results. It can 
clearly be seen how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number of 
objects and their instances in its environment, with no drastic error in working out 
the population number. These results serve to demonstrate CernoCAMAL’s ability to 
adapt in a dynamic, uncertain environment, with regards to reasoning 
probabilistically about the number of objects and their instances. 
 
                        Figure 6-3: First Adaptability Experiment 
For the second part, to perform the add/remove assessments based on the highlighted 
specific perspective on adaptation, the Adapt feature was designed. This feature 
enabled the changes to take place at the testbed level. They were made to Cerno’s 
surroundings by either removing known instances of objects or adding general 
classes of objects. This process facilitated the running of the cognitive architecture 
for a pre-defined number of times (deliberative cycles), pausing it, adding or 
removing a number of objects or instances, and then resuming Cerno’s operation. 
The number of domain model objects was incremented until there was 5 of each, 
giving a total of 15 objects in the simulation world (anything more would have been too 
cluttered). Upon completion of the tests, the inferred numbers for each object and its 
instances were recorded. Figure 6.4 illustrates the obtained graph based on the 
experimental results. 
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It can clearly be seen how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number 
of objects and instances in its environment. This further validates CernoCAMAL’s 
ability to adapt in a dynamic, uncertain environment, with regards to reasoning 
probabilistically about the number of objects and their instances. It, essentially, 
demonstrates how CernoCAMAL could be adaptive to changes in its enclosure –      
a capability that CAMAL does not possess. 
 
                      Figure 6-4: Second Adaptability Experiment 
It is important to note that these demonstrations and experiments show no drastic 
fluctuations between the inferred number of objects and their instances and the actual 
numbers pre-determined by the experimenter.  This implies a consistent accuracy in 
how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number of objects and 
instances in its environment, lending support to validate CernoCAMAL’s ability to 
adapt in a dynamic, uncertain environment, with regards to reasoning 
probabilistically about the number of objects and their instances. 
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6.2.4 Probabilistic	  Motivator	  Norm	  Experiments	  
This succession of experiments investigates whether the inclusion of a probabilistic 
motivator norm yields a higher overall performance, success count, task 
effectiveness, and goal achievement. In a previous CAMAL spin-off work 
(Venkatamuni 2008) the concept of metacognition was investigated as a powerful 
catalyst for control of motivational-BDI architectures, with respect to reasoning, 
planning, decision-making, and learning. It was concluded, based on extensive 
experimental results, that using a metacognitive (reflective) layer would improve the 
performance of the CAMAL architecture in general, as well as in terms of specific 
metrics, e.g. life expectancy and resource collection. 
In this work, however, a slightly different methodology is employed to test the same 
concept, in that the reactive component of CernoCAMAL does not actually 
deliberate to determine which norm should be used in the motivational blackboard.  
Instead, the probabilistic norm is pre-programmed prior to runtime; meaning it is 
defined in the domain model (hand-coded). This manual incorporation is highlighted 
in the final chapter as a potential future improvement. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the 
obtained graphs based on experimental results. It can clearly be seen that there is a 
decrease in the number of failure counts in time, plus an increase in the number of 
success counts in time that occurred. 
 
            Figure 6-5: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes 
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These results along with the second set of results below serve to demonstrate the 
overall advantage of the integration of a shallow probabilistic norm that takes into 
account the inferred degrees of belief. 
 
            Figure 6-6: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures 
6.3 MobileSim	  Experiments	  
This section presents the ARIA robotic experiments carried out using the 
CernoCAMAL cognitive agent (Cerno) in the MobileSim testbed. A number of 
experiments were performed over a number of cycles, and some internal variables 
and statistics were recorded. From the obtained results, the two cognitive 
architectures of CAMAL and CernoCAMAL can be compared and contrasted. 
6.3.1 Validation	  of	  CPR	  in	  ARIA	  MobileSim	  Testbed	  
Similar CPR tests are performed in the MobileSim environment to ensure that the 
CernoCAMAL’s Probabilistic reasoner can use the EBS and assumed degrees of 
belief, infer posterior probabilities correctly, assign them to the appropriate belief 
descriptors, and reason probabilistically about the number of objects and their 
instances that may be present in the environment.  Cerno was allowed to operate in 
the MobileSim virtual world that consisted of a varying number of (virtual) robots, 
objects, and obstacles. 
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CernoCAMAL runs on a P3DX robot, whereas an Amigo robot wonders around as 
an agent. There are also 5 objects of different sizes present in the MobileSim 
environment. The aim for Cerno here is to distinguish the robot (agent) from objects 
(and obstacles and walls). Cerno is a cognitive agent equipped with a means of 
reasoning probabilistically about objects and their instances in its enclosure. It is, 
therefore, expected that over time the findings using Cerno in the MobileSim testbed 
about a probable number of objects and robots are close to the actual numbers known 
to the experimenter. Note that it is not attempted here to emulate a similar setting 
(e.g. same number of objects) to the predator-prey simulation environment. The point 
of exploiting the ARIA MobileSim testbed is to provide a simulation environment 
different to that of predator-prey, in both features and terrain and also the robotic 
nature of it.  Each experiment was run for 5 minutes. 
The configuration of having 5 objects (MobileSim’s default, randomly-appearing 
objects) and 1 robot (agent) can be represented as: 
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  object,	  1/2	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
belief	  (	  apriori_prob	  (	  robot,	  	  1/2	  ),	  assumption,	  1,	  0.5	  ).	  
The reactive component was pre-configured with the following goals: 
find	  (	  object	  )	   	   avoid	  (	  object	  )	  
find	  (	  robot	  )	   	   avoid	  (	  robot	  )	  
This initial configuration assumes that if there is one item, then for Cerno it is 
equally likely to be a default object or a robot, hence the probability of any domain 
object being present is 1/2	  or 0.5 with a 0.5 degree of belief since the statements 
are assumptive. CernoCAMAL, upon receiving goal- and task-oriented reactive 
feedback interprets them and reasons about the number of objects and robots that 
may be present in the environment. A sample run of the program, demonstrating that 
Cerno operates as expected, is presented below. The code snippets represent the 
running of the program over 5 minutes, that demonstrate Cerno operates as expected. 
For clearer illustration,  belief(	  apriori_prob	  ) clauses have been removed. 
  
122 
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(object),	  found(robot),	  found(object)	  ].	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   object1	  
found(robot)	   -­‐-­‐>	   robot1	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   object2	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(robot),	  hit(object),	  found(object)	  ].	  
found(robot)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
hit(object)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  object1	  or	  object2	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   object3	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object3,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(object),	  found(robot),	  hit(object)	  ].	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  object1	  or	  2	  or	  3	  
found(robot)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
hit(object)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  object4	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object3,	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  found(robot),	  lost(object),	  near(object)	  ].	  
found(robot)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
lost(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  object1	  and	  2	  and	  3	  and	  4	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object1	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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[	  near(robot),	  found(object),	  near(object)	  ].	  
near(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object2	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object3	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object3,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  near(robot),	  lost(object),	  near(object)	  ].	  
near(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
lost(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  object1	  and	  2	  and	  3	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  object4	  
==>	  [	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  near(robot),	  lost(robot),	  near(object)	  ].	  
near(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
lost(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object1	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object4	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  near(robot),	  hit(robot),	  near(object)	  ].	  
near(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  robot1	  
hit(robot)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object2	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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[	  hit(robot),	  found(object),	  near(object)	  ].	  
hit(robot)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  object1	  or	  2	  or	  4	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object3	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object3,	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  lost(robot),	  lost(object),	  near(object)	  ].	  
lost(robot)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
lost(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  object1	  and	  2	  and	  3	  and	  4	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object4	  
==>	  [	  object4	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  hit(robot),	  found(object),	  hit(object)].	  
hit(robot)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  robot1	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object1	  
near(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object2	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
[	  hit(object),	  found(object),	  hit(robot)	  ].	  
hit(object)	  	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  either	  object1	  or	  2	  or	  4	  
found(object)	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  previously-­‐lost	  object3	  
hit(robot)	   	   -­‐-­‐>	   refers	  to	  robot1	  
==>	  [	  object1,	  object2,	  object3,	  object4,	  robot1	  ]	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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6.3.2 Goal	  Achievement	  	  Success	  and	  Failure	  
A succession of experiments were carried out to evaluate CernoCAMAL’s overall 
performance, in terms of goal success and failure and consequently task 
effectiveness. The objective here was to assess the efficacy of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over the original CAMAL in a tangible manner, by using success and 
failure counts.  In other words, efficacy is measured in quantitative terms here, as the 
greater number of successes and lower number of failures. A general sample set of 
obtained experimental results are presented in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 to enable the 
comparison of the two cognitive architectures. 
In the ARIA MobileSim world, the term success refers to one of the following: 
1. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved. The new beliefs explicitly 
state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Goal	  Success. 
2. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved. The new beliefs state that 
the negation of the goal negation has been achieved. This situation is known as 
Double	  Negation	  Success. 
3. The intention (defined in the association construct) is accomplished. The new beliefs 
state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Intention	  Success. 
4. The avoid-collisions intention (defined in the association construct) is accomplished. 
The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Avoid-­‐Collisions	  
Success. 14 
                                                
14 It is noteworthy that since MobileSim has a built-in avoid-collisions mechanism, the number of 
Avoid-­‐Collisions	  Failure  dropped to zero in all of the experiments. 
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             Figure 6-7: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes 
These results serve to demonstrate a clear increase in the number of successes in time 
that occurred, directly supporting the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over CAMAL in terms of success counts. 
Similarly, the term failure refers to one of the following: 
1. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is not achieved. The new beliefs 
explicitly state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Goal	  Failure. 
2. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is not achieved. The new beliefs state 
that the negation of the goal has been achieved. This situation is known as Goal	  
Negation	  Failure. 
3. The set goal (defined in the domain model) is achieved, but on the wrong object. 
The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Wrong-­‐Object	   Goal	  
Failure. 
4. The intention (defined in the association construct) is not accomplished. The new 
beliefs state that. This situation is known as  Explicit	  Intention	  Failure. 
5. The avoid-collisions intention (defined in the association construct) is not 
accomplished. The new beliefs state that. This situation is known as Avoid-­‐
Collisions	  Failure. 
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            Figure 6-8: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures 
These results serve to demonstrate a clear decrease in the number of failures in time 
that occurred, directly supporting the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL 
architecture over CAMAL in terms of failure counts. 
Summarily, the term task effectiveness describes if overall the tasks (goals and 
intentions collectively) were successfully completed. This is inferred based on the 
increase in the number of successes and the reduction in the number of failures. The 
two graphs clearly show a decrease in the number of failures in time along with an 
increase in the number of successes in time that occurred. This outcome 
demonstrates the overall advantage of the CernoCAMAL architecture over CAMAL 
in terms of success / failure counts and also task effectiveness. 
6.3.3 Population	  Adaptation	  Experiments	  
These experiments investigate CernoCAMAL’s ability to adapt in the MobileSim 
dynamic, uncertain environment. It is dynamic as there is a moving robot (besides 
the P3DX that is running the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture) and it is 
uncertain as there is built-in noise and added random error in the simulation testbed. 
Adaptation is used in the exact same sense as before (see 6.2.3). Therefore, the 
findings using Cerno about a probable number of obstacles and robots should be 
close to the actual numbers pre-determined by the experimenter. 
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Furthermore, if the controlled experimentation was paused and some modification to 
the number of specific objects or robots were made, upon resuming experimentation, 
the findings using Cerno about a probable number of objects and their instances 
should, again, be close to the actual numbers pre-set by the experimenter. 
Similar to predator-prey experiments, the Experiment feature of the blackboard 
monitor was deployed. The number of domain model objects was incremented until 
there was 5 green objects and one red robot (see figure 5.3). Upon completion of the 
tests, the inferred numbers for each object and its instances were recorded.  Figure 
6.9 illustrates the obtained graph based on the experimental results.  It can clearly be 
seen how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number of objects and 
robots in its environment. 
 
                        Figure 6-9: First Adaptability Experiment 
It can clearly be seen how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number 
of objects and instances in its environment. This further validates CernoCAMAL’s 
ability to adapt in a dynamic, uncertain environment, with regards to reasoning 
probabilistically about the number of objects and their instances. It, essentially, 
demonstrates how CernoCAMAL could be adaptive to changes in its enclosure – a 
capability that CAMAL does not possess. 
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For the second part, to perform the add/remove assessments based on the highlighted 
specific perspective on adaptation, the Adapt feature was employed, similar to 
Section 6.2.3. This feature enabled the changes to take place at the testbed level. 
They were made to Cerno’s surroundings by either removing or adding green objects 
and red robots. This process facilitated the running of the cognitive architecture for a 
pre-defined number of times (deliberative cycles), pausing it, adding or removing a 
number of objects or instances, and then resuming Cerno’s operation. Upon 
completion of the tests, the inferred numbers for each object and its instances were 
recorded. Figure 6.10 illustrates the obtained graph based on the experimental 
results. 
It can clearly be seen how close the findings using Cerno were to the actual number 
of objects and robots in its environment. This further validates CernoCAMAL’s 
ability to adapt in a dynamic, uncertain environment, with regards to reasoning 
probabilistically about objects and robots (static and dynamic items).  It, essentially, 
demonstrates how CernoCAMAL could be adaptive to changes in its enclosure – a 
capability that CAMAL did not possess. 
 
                     Figure 6-10: Second Adaptability Experiment 
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6.3.4 Probabilistic	  Motivator	  Norm	  Experiments	  
As mentioned in Section 6.2.4, a previous CAMAL spin-off work (Venkatamuni 2008) 
investigated the concept of metacognition as a powerful catalyst for control of 
Motivational-BDI architectures, with respect to reasoning, planning, decision-
making, and learning. Extensive experimental results confirmed that using a 
reflective (metacognitive) layer would improve the performance of the CAMAL 
architecture in general, as well as in terms of specific metrics, e.g. Life Expectancy 
and Resource Collection. The probabilistic norm is pre-programmed prior to runtime; 
meaning it is defined in the domain model. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the obtained 
graphs based on the experimental results. It can clearly be seen that there is a 
decrease in the number of failures in time, as well as an increase in the number of 
successes in time that occurred.  This outcome demonstrates the overall advantage of 
the integration of a probabilistic norm that takes into account the inferred degrees of 
belief. 
 
           Figure 6-11: Overall Increase in the Number of Successes 
These results along with the second set of results on the next page serve to 
demonstrate the overall advantage of the integration of a shallow probabilistic norm 
that takes into account the inferred degrees of belief. 
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            Figure 6-12: Overall Reduction in the Number of Failures 
6.4 CernoCAMAL	  	  vs.	  	  RoboCAMAL	  
The RoboCAMAL research project (Gwatkin 2009) specifically investigated the 
anchoring problem in a mobile robot running a simplified version of the CAMAL 
cognitive architecture (see 3.9.1). The anchoring problem is the problem of linking 
perceptual data about objects and events to symbolic representations of those objects 
and events. In other words, anchoring is the establishment and maintenance of a 
correspondence from sensory data to propositions denoting objects identified from 
within the sensory data, and actions upon those objects (Coradeschi and Saffiotti 1999, 
2003; Shapiro and Ismail 2003). RoboCAMAL is an autonomous mobile robot (AmigoBot – 
ActiveMedia Robotics) that inhabits a bounded maze, which can include specific known 
objects e.g. blue ball and further mobile robots. 
RoboCAMAL also investigated whether it was possible to learn and adapt in a 
physical environment. It used two different sensor modalities (sonar, vision, or both) 
and four different reactive architectures (priority, suppression, aggregate, winner) 
producing a total of twelve possible reactive sub-architectures to achieve any goal. 
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The CernoCAMAL research project specifically investigated how CAMAL could be 
extended to reason probabilistically about domain model objects through perception, 
and how probability formalism could be integrated into its BDI model to coalesce a 
number of mechanisms and processes. CernoCAMAL incorporated probabilistic 
reasoning capability into CAMAL and can, therefore, be used to control the actions 
of a cognitive mobile robot too. However, due to the different research goals and 
objectives, experiments performed with RoboCAMAL are not directly mapped onto 
CernoCAMAL.  Only two significant experiments carried out by RoboCAMAL have 
been identified to be simulated on CernoCAMAL to ascertain whether an 
improvement or rectification has been accomplished in the process of integrating 
probabilistic reasoning ability in CAMAL. 
The rationale behind this selection was the fact that the first experiment highlighted a 
shortcoming in RoboCAMAL and is, therefore, a sensible point of reference and 
comparison between the two architectures. Subsequently, the second experiment 
highlighted a strength in RoboCAMAL and is, therefore, an appropriate point to 
ensure that RoboCAMAL was not compromised by the inclusion of belief 
affordances.  The obtained experimental results are summarized into two graphs that 
clearly illustrate the argued points.	  
6.4.1 Challenge	  for	  CernoCAMAL	  
A significant partially-successful learning experiment was identified that was 
performed using RoboCAMAL, to discover that two domain model objects were 
mistaken: blue ball and black robot. RoboCAMAL incorrectly identified the blue ball 
as the black robot due to the large number of black pixels generated by its primitive 
vision system in response to the blue ball. A similar experiment can, thus, be 
considered as a method of comparison that shifts the emphasis of this work towards a 
tangible aspect of the contributions, since RoboCAMAL provides a solid point of 
reference to an existing published system.  The experiment aims to ascertain whether 
the extension of the belief structure and incorporation of probabilistic reasoning 
capability using degrees of belief have improved one of RoboCAMAL’s drawbacks: 
misidentification of these two domain model objects. 
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Of course an obvious way of improving this shortcoming is by adopting a more 
sophisticated camera and coding a new vision system, but this is beyond the scope of 
this work. Since the CernoCAMAL project has access to the RoboCAMAL’s 
platform and hardware however, it would be instructive to reflect whether 
CernoCAMAL architecture could compensate for RoboCAMAL’s inadequacy. For 
this experiment, CernoCAMAL was provided with the following environmental 
beliefs: 
environment(	  sparse	  )	   &	  	  	  environment(	  static	  )	  
plus all the possible actions it can take (intentions), to determine whether it can 
achieve its goal correctly; i.e. without misidentifying the blue ball with the black 
robot. To carry out this experiment, CernoCAMAL needs to be able to generate a list 
of associations.  To do this, CernoCAMAL was pre-programmed with the goal: 
goal(	  X	  )	  
Here, X is the object of the goal, with Y and Z representing the other possible 
objects. These are highlighted in the Object(s) column of Table 6.2.  The experiment 
was run for every object-based goal; i.e. find, track, and hit with every possible 
object as the focus of that goal. No associations were pre-programmed. 
CernoCAMAL was run in six different environments for five minutes each. The 
experiment was repeated three times for each environment. Table 6.2 shows the six 
possible environment combinations used for the experiment. 
Environment Object(s) 
1 Blue Ball 
2 Black Robot 
3 Red Robot 
4 Blue Ball + Black Robot 
5 Blue Ball + Red Robot 
6 Blue Ball + Black Robot + Red Robot 
 
Table 6-2: Cerno’s Possible Environment Combinations 
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Each experiment produced a number of associations.  In RoboCAMAL, this failed in 
that a significant number of associations appeared to find the black robot when it was 
not actually present! Also, some of the associations themselves were wrong. For 
instance, when the environment only contained one blue ball, it should have been 
considered sparse. However, the belief environment(cluttered) was present in 
the associations. 
This result, basically, highlighted the difficulty when using real sensors. The only 
way RoboCAMAL could have constructed the wrong belief found(black_robot) 
was if the vision system had identified a black robot. This meant that the vision 
system had incorrectly identified the object as a black robot when in fact only a blue 
ball was present. 
This also explained the presence of the belief environment(cluttered). If 
RoboCAMAL believed it had found both the blue ball and the black robot, then it 
would deduce that the environment is cluttered (as more than one object is present). 
It was clear that the cause of this failure was the primitive vision system incorrectly 
identifying a blue ball as a black robot. 
In CernoCAMAL, this did not fail in the sense of misclassifying the two objects 
frequently. There were a number of wrong associations that indicated the two domain 
model objects were indeed mistaken, but in the large context of the experiment, this 
number was negligible. The summary results are shown in the graph of Figure 6.13. 
The minuscule number of wrong associations ( 2.3 % ) are plotted against the total 
number of generated associations, to show that the percentage of failures was 
negligible. The different environments are marked using numbers one to six. 
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              Figure 6-13: Negligible number of wrong associations 
6.4.2 Cerno-­‐on-­‐Robo	  Challenge	  
The other significant successful experiment performed using RoboCAMAL was 
adaptation experiment. An important point to note here is that in the context of 
RoboCAMAL, adaptation referred to its ability to modify its goals to reflect changes 
in its environment. The obtained experimental results showed that RoboCAMAL had 
the ability to adapt to a variable environment, and attempted the goals it believed 
achievable at the right time. Similar to the previous set of experiments, it would be 
instructive to reflect whether CernoCAMAL architecture might have compromised 
this RoboCAMAL’s capability. 
For this experiment, CernoCAMAL architecture was instantiated with three goals: 
hit(blue_ball)	  	  &	  	  hit(red_robot)	  	  &	  	  hit(black_robot)	  
plus the correct associations were given to the architecture at start up, to determine 
whether it can modify its goals to reflect changes in its environment. CernoCAMAL 
was then allowed to run three minutes in a variable environment. The environment 
contained the six possible combinations used for the previous experiment, listed in 
Table 6.2.  These combinations were changed at intervals of one minute. 
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Each experiment produced a number of associations. In RoboCAMAL, this 
succeeded in that most of the generated associations reflected the changes made at 
one minute intervals. In CernoCAMAL this, too, succeeded based on the huge 
percentages of correct-to-incorrect associations that showed CernoCAMAL had 
modified its goals to reflect the changes made to its maze. There were a number of 
wrong associations that indicated adaptation took at times up to a whole minute, but 
in the large context of the experiment, this number was negligible ( 1.95 % ). The 
summary results are shown in the graph of Figure 6.14. 
 
               Figure 6-14: Negligible number of wrong associations 
6.5 Summary	  
This chapter began with a brief introduction to a series of experiments with the 
CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture in the two synthetic testbeds described. The 
details of the experiments were outlined, starting with the most important one  –  
how the proposed EBS enabled probabilistic object / instance reasoning in the CPR.   
After discussing the experiments one by one, the obtained graphs were presented. 
This was followed by repeating the same experimentation process in the second 
testbed. A final experiment was proposed to use the most recent phase of CAMAL 
research (RoboCAMAL: Gwatkin 2009). The rationale behind this evaluation method was 
highlighted, followed by the details of the tests carried out. The chapter concluded 
with summarising the acquired results.  
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7 Critical	  Analysis	  and	  Discussion	  
This chapter begins with reiterating the outcomes of experiments, followed by 
discussion and analysis of the results. The key capabilities and functions that 
cognitive architectures should support are presented. Some dimensions along which 
one should assess and evaluate cognitive architectures are, then, outlined. The 
chapter concludes with noting some open issues in the area and proposing some 
directions that future research should take to address them. 
7.1 Experimental	  Results	  Appraisal	  
The previous chapter described the various experiments performed with 
CernoCAMAL along with their obtained results. It began by describing the 
experiments carried out in the predator-prey testbed, including the comprehensive 
testing of the EBS and CPR, goal achievement success and failure, population 
adaptation, and probabilistic motivator norm experiments. This was followed by 
repeating the same experimentation process in the second testbed – ARIA 
MobileSim. The chapter concluded with some experiments performed using the 
RoboCAMAL platform and hardware, as a simple method of comparison that shifts 
the emphasis of this work towards a tangible aspect of the contributions, since 
RoboCAMAL provides a solid point of reference to an existing published system. 
The experiments that tested the functioning of the EBS and CPR showed that at the 
deliberative level the integration of the EBS and inclusion of the CPR enabled 
probabilistic reasoning over the goal- and task-oriented feedback generated by 
reactive sub-systems. Put simply, they enabled probabilistic reasoning about domain 
model objects through perception, as well as integrating probabilistic formalism into 
the BDI model. 
The goal achievement success and failure experiments showed that there was a clear 
decrease in the number of failures in time, as well as a clear increase in the number 
of successes in time. This outcome demonstrated the overall advantage of the 
CernoCAMAL architecture over CAMAL in terms of success and failure counts, and 
also task effectiveness. 
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The population adaptation experiments showed that the findings using Cerno were 
very close to the actual number of objects and instances in its environment. This 
further validated CernoCAMAL’s ability to adapt in a dynamic, uncertain 
environment, with regards to reasoning probabilistically about objects and their 
instances. It, essentially, demonstrated how CernoCAMAL could adapt to changes in 
its enclosure, based on the specific definition of ‘adaptability’ provided earlier. 
The probabilistic motivator norm experiments showed that there was a clear decrease 
in the number of failures in time, as well as a clear increase in the number of 
successes in time. This outcome demonstrated the overall advantage of the 
integration of a probabilistic norm that takes into account the inferred degrees of 
belief. 
These results also implied that the revision and re-implementation of the belief-
updating, belief-resolution, motivator-selection, and motivator-updating mechanisms 
worked as expected. In conclusion, the results showed that CernoCAMAL performed 
as expected. They also indicated the compatibility of the probabilistic BDI model 
with the affect and motivational models and also affective and motivational valences 
used throughout CernoCAMAL, ensuring a consistent and systematic metric across 
all aspects of affect, reasoning, and domain model management. 
In a nutshell, the succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds 
demonstrated improvements and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall 
cognitive performance, as well as specific probabilistic reasoning capabilities of the 
CPR. In applying the CernoCAMAL architecture to RoboCAMAL platform, the 
minuscule number of wrong associations showed that the percentage of failures was 
negligible, thus RoboCAMAL’s performance improved by the application of 
CernoCAMAL architecture. Obviously, the ‘negligibility’ concept is open to 
interpretation as a question of how little is considered negligible.  In the scope of this 
work, given the number of overall experiments, the ratio of wrong-to-correct 
associations is considered negligible  ( 2.3 %  and  1.95 % ). 
These results, along with their interpretations, address and validate the research goals 
and objectives that were set out in the beginning of this thesis. The next section 
addresses some general evaluation and assessment criteria in order to consider 
CernoCAMAL in a wider picture. 
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7.2 Evaluation	  and	  Assessment	  Criteria	  
It is now time to consider CernoCAMAL in a wider picture, and address some of the 
research issues and challenges for cognitive architectures in general; in particular 
what cognitive architectures are actually for and how they should be evaluated and 
assessed. This is important, because the area of cognitive architectures research 
supports one of the pivotal goals of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence:   
the structure, creation, and understanding of synthetic intelligence and artificial 
cognition for autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots. 
Cognitive architectures refer to the design and organization of the mind and 
cognition. They show various components and the control flow through those 
components. They also specify the underlying mechanisms and processes of a 
cognitive system. Essentially, they provide a working model of some set of cognitive 
phenomena. They must, therefore, account for the existence and explanation of 
cognitive behaviours and capacities. 
The inclination towards developing cognitive architectures is rooted in the fact that 
they aim for a reasonable breadth of coverage across a diverse set of tasks and 
domains. More importantly, they offer accounts of intelligent behaviour at the 
systems level, rather than at the level of component methods designed for specialized 
tasks (Langley, Laird, Rogers 2009). Instead of carrying out research that addresses only 
one issue at a time, we should attempt to unify many findings into a single theoretical 
framework (i.e. a computational cognitive architecture) and then proceed to test and 
refine that theory and framework. As highlighted in the Literature Review Chapter, 
there has been a substantial body of research on cognitive architectures (see 3.9). 
Clearly, based on the definition of a UTC as a single set of mechanisms and 
processes for all cognitive behaviour, a fully transparent and functioning model of all 
cognition would be fantastic, if such a thing is even possible! Realistically, however, 
in making steps towards that ultimate goal, we need to define, evaluate, and assess 
those aspects of cognition that are central and pivotal to cognitive architectures. 
There are varied properties and key capabilities, as a means of evaluating and 
assessing them, that a cognitive architecture can and should support, including: 
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7.2.1 Knowledge	  and	  Information	  Accessibility	  
Langley et al. (2009) in their thorough discussion of cognitive architectures and the 
research issues surrounding them, identify a central issue that confronts the designer 
of a cognitive architecture: how to let a cognitive agent access different sources of 
knowledge and information. In CernoCAMAL this is facilitated by the use of a 
blackboard that acts like a global workspace for holding the relevant information 
about the agent’s environment, attributes, properties, beliefs, desires, current state, 
previous states, etc. This blackboard is potentially accessible by all the processes of 
the agent. Furthermore, the knowledge and information held on it can be divided into 
several distinct areas: Extended beliefs that the agent can have about its environment, 
desires that the agent can have about the objects in its environment, intentions that 
the agent can have to achieve its goals, associations that are used to manage the 
probabilistic BDI and affect models, and a motivator that contains the result of the 
operation and execution of the various knowledge sources of the blackboard.        
The motivator construct of the CernoCAMAL blackboard is such an important part 
that the blackboard is usually referred to as the ‘motivational’ blackboard. It not only 
holds the relevant information and knowledge and allows the various cognitive 
processes access to the information they require to carry out their tasks, but also 
controls and coordinates the flow of information through the cognitive architecture. 
7.2.2 Generality	  and	  Integration	  
Cognitive architectures as UTCs are intended to support general intelligent behaviour 
exhibited by cognitive beings, such as humans and animals. Thus, generality is a key 
aspect for evaluating a candidate cognitive architecture. Such generality factor could 
be evaluated by constructing testbeds that are designed for a diverse set of tasks, and 
then testing its behaviour in those environments. The more environments in which 
the cognitive architecture supports intelligent behaviour, the greater its generality. 
The CernoCAMAL framework was initially implemented as a situated cognitive 
agent in a synthetic predator-prey Tile World. It was subsequently interfaced with 
ARIA’s MobileSim environment and applied to a virtual P3DX robot to implement a 
cognitive robotic agent. The architecture was even mounted on RoboCAMAL hardware 
to ascertain whether it would improve some of the drawbacks of RoboCAMAL.            
A succession of experiments in both synthetic simulation and robotic testbeds were 
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carried out to demonstrate improvements in CernoCAMAL’s overall cognitive 
performance, as well as specific probabilistic reasoning capabilities. The results, 
along with their interpretations, addressed and validated the research goals and 
objectives that were set out in the beginning of this thesis. 
7.2.3 Belief	  and	  Degree-­‐of-­‐Belief	  Reasoning	  and	  Updating	  
Forming beliefs, updating them, and reasoning with them are central cognitive 
activities that let an agent augment its knowledge base of beliefs along with their 
plausibility. There can also be drawn (inferred) conclusions from other beliefs or 
assumptions that the agent already holds. To support such capabilities, a cognitive 
architecture must first be able to represent beliefs and relationships among them. 
Subsequently, it must be able to reason about them and eventually update them.       
A common formalism for encoding belief representation and the relationships 
between the stated beliefs is first-order logic 15. In CernoCAMAL, Prolog has 
facilitated the symbolic expression of and operations on belief statements, including 
the degree-of-belief incorporation and reasoning. Given that the deliberative 
component is written in Prolog, CernoCAMAL’s belief updating and reasoning are 
computationally efficient. These belief updating and reasoning operations play an 
important role, not only when inferring new beliefs but also when deciding whether 
to maintain existing ones or discard them. Such belief reasoning and maintenance 
mechanisms are especially important for dynamic and uncertain environments in 
which situations may change in unexpected ways. 
7.2.4 Desire	  and	  Goal	  Reasoning	  and	  Updating	  
In addition to beliefs and belief maintenance operations, a cognitive architecture 
must also be able to represent desires and goals.  These are detailed in the cognitive 
agent’s domain model and possibly generated. In CernoCAMAL, Prolog has 
facilitated the expression of and operations on goal statements, including the 
affective value of goal importance (urgency). The goal importance resolution 
includes reducing this affective value if a goal fails and increasing it upon success. 
                                                
15 Other notations include production rules, neural networks, and Bayesian networks. 
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7.2.5 Intention,	  Action,	  and	  Behaviour	  
A cognitive architecture must be able to execute intentions, actions, or behaviours in 
the environment (simulation or real world). Intentions are plans of actions that can be 
inferred from beliefs and desires of an agent, or explicitly provided (pre-programmed 
in the domain model). They are akin to plans of actions or possibly reactive sub-
architectures that are based on the agent’s desires, and have access to the agent’s 
beliefs. If the environment changes and the agent’s beliefs are updated, then the 
agent’s intentions should be modified accordingly to prevent the agent from failing 
to achieve its goals. For example, a mobile robot should have means and skills for 
navigating from one place to another, or possibly for manipulating its surroundings 
with actuators and effectors (motors). These may be encoded in the robot’s domain 
model in terms of primitive or component actions, but they may also specify more 
complex actions or procedures. CernoCAMAL’s BDI schema and domain model 
contain the intentions, actions, and behaviours that the agent is capable of carrying 
out. These intentions are used in the association constructs, and are acted upon to 
achieve the agent’s desires. 
7.2.6 Object	  Recognition	  and	  Classification	  
A cognitive agent must be able to recognize objects – whether fixtures e.g. walls and 
obstacle, or dynamic like other robots. It must also be able to recognize situations 
and events, e.g. finding or hitting an object. Recognition is closely related to 
classification of objects and events, which involves the assignment of objects and 
situations to known concepts or categories. For example, in the case of 
RoboCAMAL (Davis, Gwatkin 2010) that the architecture was used to control a mobile 
robot, blue-coloured balls were often misclassified as black, due to the similarity 
between the number of black pixels in their captured images. This was improved by 
the incorporation of degrees of beliefs in the structure of belief predicates. To 
support this cognitive capability, a cognitive architecture must provide some way of 
identifying objects and events. This is obviously testbed-dependant. In the predator-
prey testbed, the simulation world has explicit sensing operators with configurable 
parameters, e.g. sonar and vision, with pre-defined ranges (see 5.2). In the MobileSim 
testbed, too, the simulation world has explicit sensing operators (see 5.3). 
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7.2.7 Decision	  Making,	  Learning,	  and	  Adaptation	  
To operate in an environment (physical terrain or simulation world) a cognitive agent 
requires the ability to make decisions and select among available actions. Such 
decisions are often associated with the recognition of an event or situation, and most 
cognitive architectures combine the two mechanisms in a perception-deliberation-
action cycle (recognize-think-act cycle) that underlies most of cognitive behaviour.    
To decide what to do next and support decision making, a cognitive architecture 
must provide some way of representing alternative intentions, actions, or behaviours, 
and then offer some process for selecting among these alternatives. The first, 
obviously, determines whether a given intention, action, or behaviour is allowable. 
The second selects among these allowable alternatives, often by computing an 
affective numeric score (affordance) and choosing one or more with higher 
affordances. In CernoCAMAL, the probabilistic BDI, affect, and motivational 
models are used to enable the decision-making process. The inclusion of degree-of-
belief in the structure of its belief predicates (its BDI model) also enables the 
architecture to select a focused belief set that reflects its current activities, as 
highlighted by actions, objects, and agents referenced in a current motivator. The 
motivator, then, enables goal revision and the selection of the next goal, based on 
goal importance and current beliefs and goal success. The deliberative processing of 
these constructs allows the selection of an appropriate action related to specific 
objects and tasks. This, in turn, drives motivator revision using the association 
construct, which in turn enables belief-desire-intention combinations to be ranked 
based on the likelihood of their success (insistence – association values). 
Ideally, a cognitive architecture should also incorporate some way to improve its 
decision making through learning and adapting. For example, in the case of 
RoboCAMAL the architecture used associations to enable some form of 
reinforcement learning about the effects of its actions upon its environment (Davis, 
Gwatkin 2010). Another project (Venkatamuni 2008) benefited from a capability that 
Sloman (2001) refers to as meta management mechanisms. In this CAMAL spin-off 
work, the concept of metacognition was investigated as a powerful catalyst for 
control of affective-motivational-BDI architectures, with respect to reasoning, 
planning, decision-making, and learning. It was concluded that using a metacognitive 
(reflective) layer would improve the performance of the CAMAL architecture. 
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As illustrated in the experiments, the same concept helped improve CernoCAMAL’s 
cognitive performance as well, in terms of specific metrics related to this work, 
despite the fact that there was actually no ‘reflection’ in choosing a probabilistic 
metacognitive norm (see 6.2.4 & 6.3.4). 
7.2.8 Perception	  and	  Perceptual	  Processing	  
A cognitive agent may sense the world through different modalities, just as humans 
use sight, hearing, touch, etc. A cognitive architecture must, therefore, provide some 
way of identifying objects and events, which is again obviously testbed-dependant. 
In CernoCAMAL, perceptual data from the testbeds’ sensors (reactive layer) are 
passed to the deliberative component. These perceptual messages are actually posted 
to the motivational blackboard and reasoned about by the CPR. The belief-update 
module uses the new information to modify its belief set. The goal-update then uses 
the updated belief set to determine if the current goal has been achieved, and what 
the new goal is. The association-update then uses the new belief and goal set to 
determine the relevant action or intention. Put differently, sensory information is 
mapped onto belief structures. Belief affordances (degrees of belief) define the degree 
to which the belief statement is believed to be true. The insistence measure 
(association value) allows the control of external behaviour through the building of 
associations that link beliefs, goals, and intentions. In a nutshell, the rationality of 
CernoCAMAL’s BDI model and CPR reasoner is modulated with affective 
mechanisms, allowing belief and apriori updating to structured and controlled 
environments through the use of its EBS. 
In addition to fulfilling all the above evaluation criteria and assessment measures, 
this work presents a vigorous affect- and affordance-based core for mind and 
cognition, that consequently addresses belief uncertainty using degrees of belief in 
the structure of belief predicates. It is also in line with the Gibsonian affect and 
affordance theory, as well as Davis’s theory of affect (Gibson 1979; Davis, Lewis 2003, 
2004) since degrees of belief could be considered belief affordances. The next section 
highlights some of the open research issues that are still to be addressed in this area. 
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7.3 Open	  Research	  Issues	  and	  Some	  Recent	  Developments	  
Despite some significant commonalities, the current state of cognitive architectures is 
exploding with different theories and frameworks, being developed with different 
goals in mind. The future of cognitive architectures, however, is mainly determined 
by how the major and immediate challenges for this area of research are dealt with. 
Section 2.1 stated that nearly thirty years ago, Donald Norman (1980) had set an 
agenda of important topics for Cognitive Science. He had argued that there were at 
least twelve issues that should comprise this agenda: consciousness; perception; 
memory; language; thought; belief; emotion; interaction; performance; learning; 
skill; and development. This list has played an important role in determining where 
researchers have focused their work in AI. In addition, Section 2.5 pointed out some 
of the challenges that were faced by many research groups across the globe 
undertaking research using autonomous cognitive agents and mobile robots. These 
are the research issues that are still being actively investigated: 
Ø How to describe enough of the properties of a cognitive agent, its abilities, and its 
environment, to allow it to make high-level decisions on how to act or what to do 
next. 
Ø How to store, manipulate, express, and retrieve the knowledge and information 
about the environment and the agent itself into its cognitive architecture. 
Ø How to include concepts such as common-sense, free-will, and the like. 
These, as well as Norman’s agenda, are the major themes for this area of research. 
Other open research issues such as representing beliefs and goals of a cognitive agent 
have also played an immense role in the shaping of cognitive architectures research, 
with numerous accounts in the literature (e.g. Simon 1967; Sloman 1987; Newell 1990). 
Their frameworks and architectures for computational models of cognition have 
allowed the specification of beliefs and goals to guide the cognitive agent’s actions 
or behaviours. One such architecture based on their framework, ICARUS (Langley, 
Choi 2006; Choi 2011) as a significant recent development in this field, operates in an 
explicit goal-oriented fashion in which it uses multiple, reactive, top-level goals. 
ICARUS recognizes the need for further research on uncertainty of beliefs and 
highlights this area as a potential future work. CernoCAMAL has addressed this, in 
line with its stated research questions and objectives. 
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As previously discussed (see Chapters Three & Four), Sloman (1987, 2002) had proposed 
‘motivators’ to resolve conflicts among goals. In contrast to ICARUS, which uses 
degree of relevance to prioritize goals, Sloman proposed three different measures – 
urgency, insistence, and intensity – that should affect how a system manages goals. 
Some cognitive architectures such as CLARION (Sun et al. 2001; Sun 2007; Sun 2009) 
also provide nomination and retraction of goals, as well as drive and goal 
mechanisms that correspond to a psychological account of goal nomination. 
CernoCAMAL not only implements insistence (association value), urgency (goal 
importance), and intensity (motivator value), but also possesses goal generation and 
retraction based on how long a goal has been tried and how many times it has 
succeeded or failed. 
Another outstanding recent work (Dittes, Goerick 2011) presents a formalism suitable 
for both flexible description of hierarchical architecture concepts, as well as 
functional design of the resulting system integration process. Their formalism uses 
the CogAff framework as an existing schema for embedding and relating integrated 
functionalities. Some researchers have also recognized the extent to which the 
internal and external states of a cognitive agent are influenced by affect and 
motivation (e.g. Norman, Shallice 1986). Norman and Shallice (1986) presented a detailed 
model for control of behaviour that included the environmental stimuli, motivational 
factors, and an attentional system to govern the activation of goals and the selection 
of action schemas. Simon (1967) proposed goal-terminating and interruption 
mechanisms that enabled an essentially serial information processor to deal with 
unpredictable situations in real time. His termination mechanism stops further actions 
when a goal is achieved, which ICARUS incorporates as one of its basic features 
(Langley, Choi 2006; Choi 2011).  In 2002 Gray and Braver claimed that emotions could 
prioritize conflicting alternatives and trade-offs. They further argued that the need for 
integration of emotion in cognitive control aids adaptation to the environment. 
Except for the interruption mechanism, CernoCAMAL’s affect and motivational 
models provide a comprehensive framework to incorporate emotion and motivation 
processes, as fully dissected in chapters three and four. 
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There also are some cognitive architectures that address motivations and goals in 
different ways to CernoCAMAL. One such system is CLARION (Sun 2007) which 
incorporates implicitly represented drives and explicitly specified goals. Two s in the 
architecture interact to nominate goals. A motivational sub-system maintains an 
implicit, value-based network that relates the state of the world and the strength of an 
agent’s drives. A metacognitive sub-system uses a multiple vote approach to 
determine the current goal. Each internal drive proposes multiple goals in the order 
of their assigned numeric preference. The sub-system chooses the goal that receives 
most votes across all the drives and passes it to the execution module. 
During the same year, another architecture was developed that incorporated an 
explicit goal nomination mechanism (Broersen, Dastani, Hulstijn, and van der Torre 2002) 
dubbed BOID. This framework explains goals as a result of interactions between 
beliefs and desires, but the architecture also includes obligations and intentions.     
An agent in this framework computes beliefs from observations of the world, while 
desires and obligations that are consistent with these beliefs trigger goals. The system 
treats previously-generated goals as intentions that it uses to generate successive 
goals. 
7.4 Summary	  
This chapter began with reiterating the outcomes of experiments, followed by 
discussion and analysis of the results. The key capabilities and functions that 
cognitive architectures should support were presented. Some dimensions along 
which one should assess and evaluate cognitive architectures were then outlined. The 
chapter concluded with noting some open issues in the area and proposing some 
directions that future research should take to address them. 
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8 Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  
This chapter begins with a reminder of the primary aims of the CernoCAMAL 
research project. The motivation and impetus for this work that was put forth in 
earlier chapters is re-iterated, followed by highlighting the goals and objectives of 
this thesis. A summary of the work done on the cognitive architecture under 
investigation is presented, followed by drawing some conclusions on the outcomes 
and obtained experimental results.  The main contributions of this research work are 
then revisited, in light of the overall collection of experimental results.  The chapter 
concludes with a few potential future avenues for improving CernoCAMAL further. 
8.1 Thesis	  	  Summary	  
This thesis set out to demonstrate one possible way to extend CAMAL and enable it 
to reason probabilistically about domain model objects through perception. The 
primary aims of the CernoCAMAL research project were, therefore, to investigate 
how CAMAL could be extended to reason probabilistically about domain model 
objects through perception, and how probability formalism could be integrated into 
its architecture to coalesce a number of mechanisms. The thesis also demonstrated, 
through experimentation and analysing the obtained experimental results, an 
improvement and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall cognitive 
performance, as well as specific probabilistic reasoning capabilities of its CPR.        
It was argued that these improvements, particularly in terms of goal success, goal 
failure, and task effectiveness, occurred as a consequence of incorporating degrees of 
belief as a means of probabilistic reasoning and inference in CernoCAMAL. 
The motivation and impetus for this investigation was the considerable evidence that 
probabilistic thinking and reasoning was linked to cognitive development and played 
a role in cognitive functions, such as decision making and learning. This led us to 
believe that a probabilistic reasoning capability was an essential part of human 
intelligence. Thus, it should be a vital part of any system that attempted to emulate 
human intelligence computationally. In other words, probabilistic reasoning is an 
essential aspect of the process of cognition and, therefore, must be considered in any 
adequate description of it, such as a computational cognitive architecture. 
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8.2 Conclusions	  and	  Outcomes	  
Cognition is better viewed as solving probabilistic, rather than logical, inference 
problems; meaning cognition is better understood in terms of probability theory, 
rather than in terms of logic (Oaksford, Chater 2007, 2009).  The probabilistic approach to 
cognition has, therefore, become an established approach in recent decades –
something that this body of work took advantage of. 
This thesis presented a BDI affective-motivational cognitive architecture that could 
be used to govern artificial minds probabilistically. There are many views on what 
constitutes a cognitive architecture or the place of affect and motivation in a 
cognitive architecture though. CernoCAMAL pursued a perspective informed by 
affective and motivational control states, rationalized by a cognitive model of 
probabilistic reasoning using degrees of belief. Any thesis that deals with cognition 
and cognitive architectures needs some explanation as to its scope and focus. The 
scope and focus of the current cognitive architecture under investigation was to 
extend the original overarching cognitive architecture of CAMAL to enable it to 
reason probabilistically about domain model objects through perception, and also 
integrate probability formalism into its BDI model to coalesce a number of 
mechanisms, in line with the Gibsonian affect and affordance theory, as well as 
Davis’s theory of affect (Gibson 1979;  Davis, Lewis 2003, 2004). 
The succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds established 
improvements in CernoCAMAL’s cognitive performance and probabilistic inference 
over the original CAMAL. In applying the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture to 
RoboCAMAL platform, the minuscule number of wrong associations showed that 
the percentage of failures was negligible, thus RoboCAMAL performance improved 
by the application of CernoCAMAL architecture. CernoCAMAL effectively presents 
a vigorous affect- and affordance-based core for mind, as the BDI model is now 
valenced via affective values and affordances, allowing the entire BDI schema to run 
using numeric affective values to prioritize choices over the current belief set. Since 
affect is used across the entire cognitive architecture as a decision metric, affective 
values and affordances can be thought of as a currency. The BDI model that lacked 
an affective decision metric consistent with the affordances used in the affect and 
motivational models, is now grounded consistently in the use of affect. 
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8.3 Research	  Questions	  Re-­‐visited	  
There clearly existed a need to address and incorporate probabilistic reasoning and 
inference in CAMAL. The primary aim of the CernoCAMAL research project was to 
tackle this need with the formal probability theory. This research therefore attempted 
to address the following specific research questions in the current cognitive 
architecture under investigation: 
Ø Can CernoCAMAL reason probabilistically by exploiting the proposed EBS? 
Can the integration of the proposed EBS facilitate probabilistic reasoning and 
inference in CernoCAMAL? 
Yes. In light of the overall collection of experimental results, CernoCAMAL can 
reason probabilistically by exploiting the proposed EBS. In other words, the 
integration of the proposed EBS facilitated probabilistic reasoning and inference 
in CernoCAMAL. This was specifically validated and confirmed, as correct 
operation of the CernoCAMAL’s CPR in terms of probabilistic object and 
instance reasoning was tested comprehensively. 
Ø Can the BDI model run compatibly with the affect and motivational models, and 
affective and motivational valences used throughout the whole architecture? Can 
this ensure a consistent and systematic metric across all aspects of affect, 
reasoning, and domain model management? 
Yes. The correct results and expected operations of the processes indicated the 
compatibility of the BDI model with the affect and motivational valences used 
throughout the architecture. This provides a consistent and systematic control 
language for ordering propositions, selecting goals, constructing a plan of action, 
forming a focused belief with an updated degree of belief, and prioritising 
processes. It ensures a consistent and systematic metric across all aspects of 
affect, reasoning, and domain model management. 
Ø Can the probabilistic deliberation results of the CPR be used for computing 
changing degrees of belief given apriori, and subsequently using the BDI, affect, 
and motivational models to determine the agent’s intentions, actions, and 
behaviours? 
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Yes. The performed CPR tests confirmed and validated that the CernoCAMAL’s 
probabilistic reasoner can deliberate using the EBS and assumed degrees of 
belief, infer posterior probabilities correctly, assign them to the appropriate belief 
descriptors, and reason probabilistically about the number of objects and their 
instances that may be present in the environment. 
Ø Can the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture be applied to virtual and physical 
cognitive agents using synthetic testbeds and mobile robots? 
Yes. The succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds, by 
successfully applying the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture to virtual and 
physical cognitive agents, showed improvements and increased efficacy in 
CernoCAMAL’s overall cognitive performance, as well as specific achievements 
in light of the overall collection of experiments. 
8.4 Thesis	  Contributions	  and	  Claims	  Re-­‐visited	  
This thesis has made several contributions, which are effectively the extensions and 
augmentations to the CAMAL architecture. They include the following: 
Ø The integration of the EBS that associates a probability value with every belief 
statement, in order to represent the degrees of belief numerically. 
The correct results and expected operations of the processes indicated the correct 
integration of the EBS. The association of probability values with belief 
predicates represented beliefs numerically, resulting in the compatibility of the 
probabilistic BDI model with the affect and motivational models and affective 
and motivational valences and affordances used throughout the architecture. 
Ø The inclusion of the CPR that reasons probabilistically over the goal- and task-
oriented feedback generated by reactive sub-systems. 
In light of the overall collection of experimental results, the CPR was included 
successfully, resulting in CernoCAMAL being able to reason probabilistically 
over the goal- and task-oriented feedback generated by reactive sub-systems      
by exploiting the proposed EBS. 
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Ø The compatibility of the probabilistic BDI model with the affect and motivational 
models and affective and motivational valences and affordances used throughout 
CernoCAMAL. 
The probabilistic BDI model is now valenced via affective values and 
affordances, allowing the entire BDI schema to run using numeric affective 
values to prioritize choices over the current belief set. The BDI model that lacked 
an affective decision metric consistent with the affordances used in the affect and 
motivational models, is now grounded consistently in the use of affect and 
therefore compatible with the affect and motivational models and affective and 
motivational valences used throughout CernoCAMAL, ensuring a consistent and 
systematic metric across all aspects of affect, reasoning, and domain model 
management. 
The integration of the EBS and CPR necessitated the revision and re-implementation 
of the belief-updating and belief-resolution mechanisms. It also necessitated the 
revision and re-implementation of the motivator-selection and motivator-updating 
mechanisms. Their correct operations was validated and confirmed by 
CernoCAMAL’s various evaluations performed in experimentation testbeds. Also, 
the succession of experiments in simulation and robotic testbeds, by successfully 
applying the CernoCAMAL cognitive architecture to virtual and physical cognitive 
agents, showed improvements and increased efficacy in CernoCAMAL’s overall 
cognitive performance, as well as specific achievements in light of the overall 
collection of experiments. 
8.5 Potential	  Future	  Directions	  
The current CernoCAMAL research has now taken a number of new directions, as 
researchers pursue their own agenda. These new directions take the original design 
associated with the overarching CAMAL architecture, together with the concept of 
an underlying affect and affordance mechanism that can be used to compare process 
priority and rank goals and weigh intentions but re-frame the research according to 
specific interests or needs (Davis 2010). 
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Using a more sophisticated mobile robot such as a P3DX (ActiveMedia 2010) along 
with a new vision system and camera could be the next step, resulting in a more 
accurate object identification and consequently a deeper perceptual anchoring model. 
This new perceptual model could combine the input from the improved sensors of 
the new robot with apriori information included in the domain model. The new robot 
would be more adaptable and capable of working in unknown and uncertain 
environments. This is loosely related to the UK Computing Research Committee’s 
Grand Challenge Number Five: Architecture of Brain and Mind (GC5 2011). 
GC5 is a multidisciplinary attempt to understand and integrate natural intelligence 
and high-level cognitive processes at various levels of abstraction. The aim is to 
demonstrate the results of our improved understanding in a succession of 
increasingly sophisticated working robots. Previously, Professor Aaron Sloman and 
recently Professor Leslie Smith have been coordinating the efforts and research in 
this area. 
Another next step could be regarding the manual incorporation of shallow 
probabilistic metacognitive norms (see 4.5.2 & 6.2.4 & 6.3.4). Currently, CernoCAMAL 
does not deliberate to determine which norm should be used in the motivational 
blackboard. This means that the probabilistic norms have to be pre-programmed 
prior to start-up; i.e. hand-coded and defined in the domain model. This manual 
incorporation could be improved upon by constructing more norms and reasoning to 
choose one that has already yielded greater success and task effectiveness in the past. 
In addition to the above two specific ways of improving the CernoCAMAL 
architecture, there are still plenty of open issues in cognitive architectures research 
that deserve attention and effort from researchers in the area, despite the many 
advances that have occurred during almost four decades of research and work.       
An outstanding issue is that each existing cognitive architecture exhibits many of the 
capacities described in this thesis and elsewhere, but few support all of them. 
However, a cognitive architecture as a UTC was defined as a single set of 
mechanisms and processes for all cognitive behaviour. The research community 
should perhaps devote more resources to trying to coalesce and unify the existing 
capacities and capabilities into one universal and comprehensive framework of mind 
and cognition. 
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Moreover, methods for the evaluation and assessment of cognitive architectures and 
their cognitive abilities could be broadened to include more realistic terrains.  
Metrics like those used in this thesis for experimentation purposes are necessary, but 
not sufficient to provide an accurate way of comparing and contrasting competing 
architectures and cognitive systems. Despite evaluating various cognitive 
performances in different testbeds, more complex environments must be created, 
both physical and simulated, that exercise these cognitive capabilities and provide 
realistic opportunities for measurement (Langley, Messina 2004). Experimental 
comparisons among competing architectures can play an important role in measuring 
key variables in unbiased and informative ways. 
On the positive side, we now have over four decades worth of experience and 
development with constructing and using a variety of cognitive architectures for a 
wide range of problems and terrains!  
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10 	  Appendix	  I	  –	  Blackboard	  and	  Domain	  Model	  
For the majority of work in simulation and robotic worlds, variations of an initial 
domain model and motivational blackboard have been used.  This appendix describes 
the components that make up the domain model and motivational blackboard: 
time(	  T	  ). 
details the number of processing cycles that the deliberative component has 
executed. 
goal	  object 
used to describe the focus of a goal, such as sphere	  or	  blue_ball 
object	  /	  colour	  profile 
used to identify and distinguish objects based on their RGB values, etc. 
sparse_to_cluttered	  (	  2	  ).	  
akin to a threshold that determines the minimum number of objects that must 
be present for the environment to be considered as cluttered. 
descriptor_set	  (	  sparse,	  cluttered,	  dynamic,	  static	  ).	  
details all the possible states the environment can be in. The environment is 
considered dynamic if there is an agent present, e.g. robot. 
object_set	  (	  object,	  agent,	  sphere,	  prey,	  pred	  ).	  
provides information on the possible objects that can be present within the 
environment. The term object is used when an unidentified object is 
detected. 
 	  
183 
Reactive	  Cycles	  
highlights the maximum number of reactive processing cycles that the agent 
should run for, before it constructs a deliberative statement, as in the Cycles 
element in a motivator construct: 
motivator	  (	  Goal,	  Association,	  Deterministic,	  Cycles,	  Intensity	  ).	  
domain_synonym(	  found,	  near	  ). 
details the belief found can be deduced if the belief near is present. 
object_predicate_set	  (	  avoid,	  find,	  hit,	  attack,	  eat,	  herd,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  lost,	  found,	  near,	  ate,	  attacked,	  destroyed,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  location,	  herded,	  know_of,	  instance_of	  ).	  
details the possible states that various objects can be in. It is further divided 
into belief_predicate_set and goal_predicate_set. As the names 
suggest, belief_predicate_set details the possible beliefs about objects 
and goal_predicate_set details the possible goals pertaining to objects. 
They allow the agent to construct beliefs and goals about its surroundings: 
goal_predicate_set	  (	  avoid,	  find,	  hit,	  attack,	  eat,	  herd	  ).	  
belief_predicate_set	  (	  hit,	  lost,	  found,	  near,	  ate,	  attacked,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  destroyed,	  location,	  herded,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  know_of,	  instance_of	  ).	  
An example set of intentions is outlined below in the ontological specification of one 
of the experimental testbeds: 
Intention	   	   :-­‐	   methodavoid	  |	  methodfind	  |	  
methodhit	  |	  methodattack	  |	  
methodherd	  |	  methodeat	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negate(	  X,	  ~X	  ). 
points out which two belief statements are conflicting (opposite), such as: 
negate(	  found(red_robot),	  lost(red_robot)	  ). 
Beliefs Preference Model: 
belief_preference(	  perception,	  assumption	  ).	  
belief_preference(	  perception,	  deduction	  ).	  
belief_preference(	  deduction,	  assumption	  ).	  
Three sources that determine which belief is more reliable: 
deduction	  	  >	  	  perception	  	  >	  	  assumption	  
Shallow Metacognitive (Reflective) Norms: 
norm	  (	  belief,	   belief_decay_threshold,	  15	  ).	  
norm	  (	  goal,	   failed_goal_interval,	   15	  ).	  
fail(	  Intention	  ).	  
 shows the intention (action or behaviour) that has failed. 
goal_minmax.	  
represents the minimum and maximum values that the goal-importance value 
can take. 
belief,	  goal,	  association,	  motivator,	  etc...	  
 have been introduced before ( see chapter 3 ). 
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11 Appendix	  II	  –	  Software	  Development	  Engineering	  
In the beginning, there were only machines and assembly languages! These evolved 
into higher-level programming languages such as C that were able to break apart 
programming steps into sub-routines and procedures. The next generation allowed 
programmers to group collections of sub-routines and procedures into libraries and 
modules. A subsequent innovation added the notion of object orientation and classes, 
i.e. data and functions could be grouped into a single object, which further 
encapsulated the internals of the routines and increased modularity and re-use. 
Nowadays, C++ is a popular programming language. In the context of Artificial 
Intelligence and Cognitive Science research, Prolog is as popular. 
Prolog is a powerful symbolic programming language that is particularly suited to 
the notion of logic programming with uncertainties and inexact reasoning. It has 
built-in pattern matching (unification), automatic search (backtracking), and 
relational database (knowledgebase). It also embodies the powers of deductive 
reasoning and inference. Its symbolic-deductive functional mode of operation closely 
resembles that of human reasoning ad cognition. This is what AI is essentially about, 
many believe. In addition, Prolog is well-suited for problems that involve objects and 
symbols, in particular structured objects and relations between them. These features 
of Prolog make it a powerful programming language for AI, and symbolic, non-
numeric, goal-oriented programming in general. 
C++ doesn’t need much advertisement, particularly after Microsoft Visual Studio 
provided a neat, standardized, unifying framework. But Prolog, perhaps due to its 
rather different programming paradigm, deserves a bit of evangelism! Prolog is well-
suited for interfacing with C++ enabling the application programmer to implement 
an object that encapsulates the Prolog services. In addition, Prolog back-end services 
can be easily integrated with C++ front-end user interface code – an approach to 
systems and embedded programming that draws on Prolog’s strength for rule-based 
programming. In this way, the C++ interface to the Prolog services would be well-
defined, and the implementation could be maintained without impacting the rest of 
the application. These advantages, collectively, have been major considerations in 
adopting Prolog and C++ for the purposes of this thesis. 
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12 	  Appendix	  III	  –	  Copy	  Rights	  and	  Permissions	  
Permission to reproduce figures and diagrams from the following key individuals 
have been obtained: 
Dr. D.N. Davis 
Prof. Aaron Sloman 
